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The Parliamentary Elections in Belarus: 
Lukashenka’s Dress Rehearsal?
Uladzimir Padhol and David R. Marples
On 16 October 2000 the Advisory and Monitoring Group of the OSCE in Minsk declared that the parliamentary elections, 
which took place in the Republic of Belarus on 15 
October, did not meet international standards for 
democratic elections. In addition the US 
Department of State has also refused to recognize 
the validity of the elections and will continue to 
regard the Parliament of the 13th Session, dissolved 
by President Lukashenka in late 1996, as the 
legitimate parliament of Belarus. The chairman of 
that parliament, Semyon Sharetsky, left Belarus in 
the summer of 1999, fearing for his safety. A second 
round of the elections took place on 29 October, 
resulting in the election of 97 deputies in the 110- 
seat assembly. It may take a further three months 
for the remaining thirteen seats to be filled.
The elections have been the subject of 
considerable debate among all factions of the 
political spectrum in Belarus since they were 
announced last summer. A division occurred among 
the opposition between those who felt that the only 
logical step was to boycott the elections—led by 
politicians such as Anatolii Lebedka, the chairman 
of the United Civic Party, and Vintsuk Vyachorka, 
the leader of the Belarusian Popular Front—and 
those who have maintained that it was important for 
opposition leaders to gain a foothold in state 
structures by means of the assembly—such as 
Nikolay Statkevich, the leader of the Social 
Democratic Party, and Henadz Hrushavy, the 
chairman of the largest NGO in Minsk, “For the 
Children of Chernobyl.” These leaders planned to 
run as independent candidates, without official 
backing from their respective parties, believing that 
the elections might orient the populace to 
democratic values.
The OSCE and the Dialogue
The decision of Statkevich and Hrushavy was 
supported by the OSCE’s Advisory and Monitoring 
Group in Minsk, led by Ambassador Hans Georg
Wieck, which has maintained that the opposition 
should gain a foothold in the official structures and 
advocated a mass turnout at the polling booths as a 
form of public protest. The role of the OSCE AMB 
has itself caused dissension among the opposition,1 
some of whom have maintained that the 
organization is in this way promoting the 
government’s cause. At issue are the results of an 
agreement made between President Alyaksander 
Lukashenka and the OSCE at a summit in Istanbul, 
Turkey, in November 1999, during which 
Lukashenka agreed to develop a serious “dialogue” 
with the opposition, thereby (it was hoped) bringing 
to an end the impasse between the two sides, which 
dates back to the November 1996 referendum by 
which the president amended the 1994 Constitution 
to enhance his own powers and conversely to 
reduce that of the Supreme Soviet. Though Western 
states in general did not recognize the validity of the 
changes made by Lukashenka, or the legality of the 
referendum through which he engineered them, the 
OSCE AMG in Minsk worked steadily to encourage 
Lukashenka to open the dialogue with the 
opposition.
The agreement made in Istanbul obliged 
Lukashenka to fulfill four conditions:
• To allow the opposition access to the 
official media;
• To give legislative authority to the 
parliament;
• To provide a democratic election code;
• To end political repression that has seen 
the arrest and detention of many activists, 
in addition to the disappearance of several 
prominent oppositionists.
Most notably the Conservative Christian Part)' of 
the Belarusian Popular Front, led by the former BPF leader, 




Lukashenka accepted the notion of consultation and 
appointed M. Sazonov as the negotiator for the 
government side. The opposition leaders discovered 
in practice that it was impossible for the disparate 
political leaders to sit at the same table. They 
included, for example, the chairman of the Liberal 
Democratic Party, Haydukevich, the chairman of 
the Communist Party, Kalyakin, and the leaders of 
the United Civic Party and the Belarusian Popular 
Front (BPF), which itself divided into two branches 
in 1999. Kalyakin’s Communists supported 
integration with Russia whereas the other parties 
were anxious to protect Belarusian statehood. 
Haydukevich’s party was virtually a branch of the 
Russian party of the same name led by Zhirinovsky. 
On Lukashenka’s side there was also some cause for 
concern. The logical outcome of the Dialogue was 
the emergence of a group of democratic leaders, 
with access to the official media, who might 
eventually be elected to parliament and form a 
strong enough bloc to prevent the ratification of a 
Union Treaty with Russia. Thus the president 
resolved to limit the discussions to a few leaders 
with whom he could deal adequately or who in 
general supported the same long-term goals as the 
government. These included the Yabloko party run 
by Olga Abramova and the Liberal Democrats. 
Sazonov was eventually dismissed from his post as 
the government spokesman and the talks broke 
down.
Under these circumstances, and with the political 
situation at an impasse, the opposition had to make 
a decision whether to participate in the 
parliamentary elections. An important marker in 
reaching a decision was the All-Belarusian Congress, 
held in Minsk in the summer of 2000. The OSCE’s 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights sent a small technical group to Belarus to 
observe the elections, while pointing out that this 
group did not constitute official recognition of the 
validity of the elections. The Lukashenka 
government, however, purported to believe 
otherwise, choosing to regard the delegation as ipso 
facto recognition of the electoral process. The 
United States, which recently held Senate hearings 
about the political repressions in Belarus, took a 
hostile stance from the outset and dechned to send 
any observers.
Prior to the election, on 15 September, the 
Central Electoral Commission, under the 
chairmanship of Lidziya Yarmoshyna, rejected the
registration of over 60 democratic candidates on the 
grounds that some of the signatures they had 
collected were invaHd, or else they had given 
incorrect information about their financial situation. 
Those rejected included virtually all the prominent 
candidates from the wing of the opposition 
movement that supported the elections (Statkevich 
and former Prime Minister MikhaE Chyhir were the 
notable exceptions). Supporters of Hrushavy, for 
example, had reportedly collected more than 40 
times the required number of signatures for their 
candidate. Further, another 200 candidates were not 
permitted to run by local election commissions. 
Those de-registered took their case to the Supreme 
Court, which subsequently upheld the decisions of 
the central and local commissions. Those poEticians 
excluded in this fashion then joined in the general 
boycott caUed for by the opposition.
Opposition leaders reported more evidence of 
electoral indiscretions. The opposition sent 
observers into most of the electoral districts in the 
period 10-15 October. According to Viachorka, 20 
percent of the ballots in the Hrodna region were 
cast before 15 October and in Enproper fashion. 
Students from the Belarusian State Economic 
University and the Belarusian University of Culture 
reported that their faculties were under acute 
pressure to halt classes and force the students to 
vote. Many professors beEeved that they would lose 
their jobs otherwise. The Vyasna human rights 
center—s chairman, Ales Belyatsky, noted that the 
electoral commissions indiscriminately removed 
names from the register and aUowed numerous 
people to vote without showing identification. The 
Electoral Commission itself was formed by the 
government and included very few members from 
opposition groups. Notably, despite what appeared 
to be obvious falsifications of the election results in 
several constituencies, not a single member of the 
Commission ever admitted to such in the 
independent press or before the courts.
According to Yarmoshyna, the official electoral 
turnout was 60.6 percent, thus weU above the 
minimum requirement of 50 percent, and this 
despite a decision by the more radical opposition 
members to boycott the elections. Official figures 
indicate that the 50 percent total was reached or 
exceeded in 96 out of 110 electoral districts, with 14 
districts declared invaEd because of insufficient 
voters. Of these 14 districts, 5 were in the Brest 
region, 4 in Vitsebsk, and 3 in the city of Minsk.
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Notably, whereas the 43 candidates who received an 
outright majority in the first round included 22 
members of the former parliament (Lukashenka 
version) and leaders of the KGB and Union of 
Patriotic Youth, those with invalidated ballots 
included Statkevich of the Social Democratic Party 
and Serhy Haydukevych, leader of the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Belarus.
None of the prominent opposition candidates 
(with the exception of Abramova) fared very well. 
Chyhir received 23 percent of the vote, well behind 
Natalia Masherova, daughter of the former 
Communist Party leader of Belarus (Petr 
Masherov), who received 48 percent. According to 
the authorities, Haydukevich received 10 percent of 
the vote in his riding, which left him in last place. 
Kalyakin’s total was 15 percent. The Communists as 
a whole, who ran in 71 ridings, won only four seats. 
The opposition observers dispute the official figures 
and particularly those for the percentage of voters: 
they maintain that the turnout was about 30-40 
percent of the electorate in the towns and up to 45 
percent in rural areas. In short, they believe that the 
results were falsified.
The US assessment of the elections concurs with 
that of the so-called European parliamentary'’ troika: 
the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the European 
Parliament, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, all of whom resolved to put on 
hold any decision to normalize relations with 
Belarus. The representatives acknowledged that the 
government had made some improvements, but 
that overall the elections still fell short of the 
standards required. In contrast, Russian president 
Vladimir Putin—according to Lukashenka—had 
telephoned his congratulations to his Belarusian 
counterpart on the conducting of democratic 
elections. There has, however, been no public 
statement from President Putin to this effect, 
though the Russian Foreign Ministry' praised the 
elections and the way' in which they were conducted 
on 18 October. In addition, the Russian parliament 
sent a delegation to observe the elections, which 
reported that that they' maintained a high 
democratic standard.
A Prelude to the Presidential Elections 
of 2001
The run-off elections on 29 October saw 53 
ridings contested and an alleged turnout of just over 
50 percent. Prior to the 15 October vote, the 
opposition organized protest marches in cities 
across Belarus. Generally, however, the number of 
those who marched was relatively' small—averaging 
around 2,000-except in the more politicized city of 
Minsk, where an estimated 4,000 demonstrated 
against the elections. The opposition held a press 
conference on 16 October, declaring that the 
boycott represented a victory', citing the statement 
of the US Department of State. The new parliament 
is a strange collection of deputies. Only' 16 are 
affiliated with any political party (mostly 
Communists) and only one major opposition leader 
has a seat—Olga Abramova, the leader of the 
Belarusian branch of the Yabloko faction, which in 
Russia, despite its democratic basis, supports the 
integration of Belarus into Russia.
In some respects, the elections might be written 
off as a non-event. The process was controlled by 
the government, which ensured that very few strong 
oppositionists would be able to stand for office. 
The ultimate result will be another powerless 
assembly, while the president will continue to 
control the upper house that he established in late 
1996. Thus the question arises why' the process was 
conducted at all, what possible benefits might be 
derived from the elections from the government 
perspective?
First and foremost, the elections are widely' 
perceived as a foretaste of the presidential election 
that must take place by November 2001, according 
to the revised Constitution. Those oppositionists 
who insisted on running as independent candidates 
often stressed this point, i.e., that if they' abandoned, 
the electoral process, the electorate would perceive 
them as neglecting its interests and its willingness to 
adopt more democratic practices. Hrushavy’s 
comment was that “The people will vote, and they 
will vote for someone.”2 Moreover this school of 
thought maintained that the chances of electoral 
success in a presidential election if the elections 
were boycotted would be minimal. The aftermath of 
the elections sees a variety of groups that are
Authors’ interview with Henadz Hrushavy, Minsk, 
Belarus, 2 August 2000.
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anticipating the presidential elections a year ahead of 
time. These are as follows:
1. The OSCE AMG led by Wieck will continue 
to play an important role in its efforts to encourage 
debate between the various opposition centers and 
the intransigent government.
2. A new group called “Citizens’ Committee 
‘Elections-2001'” has been established It includes 
politicians, such as Hrushavy, who are democrats, 
but who were denied registration in the October 
2000 elections, and it seeks a leader who can unite 
the various opposition sectors and run against 
Lukashenka.
3. The Supreme Soviet of the 13th Session led by 
Sharetsky has received recognition from the United 
States, which renders it a continuing player in the 
light of the violations of democratic procedure 
during the elections. On 17 October, Sharetsky, 
evidently emboldened by international recognition, 
called for a “Temporary Government of National 
Unity,” indicating his likely participation in the 
process of electing a new president.
4. The democrats on the Right have formed an 
umbrella group called New Freedom, which is led 
by Anatoly Lebedka of the United Civic Party and 
Vintsuk Vyachorka of the Belarusian Popular Front, 
two politicians who were at the forefront of the 
boycott movement. Lebedka has not commented on 
speculation that he will run for president, but he has 
created an association of young politicians and 
appears to be assembling a team in support of his 
candidacy. Lebedka has close Enks with several 
American poEticians and has received some 
financial support from such quarters. OfficiaUy, 
however, Lebedka supports the notion of a single 
candidate from the opposition.
5. Haydukevich’s Liberal-Democratic Party will 
continue to play a role. While it is unEkely to acquire 
mass popularity, Haydukevich is one of the few 
poEticians that have been acceptable to Lukashenka 
in the Dialogue process.
6. The Communist Party of Kalyakin, which has 
representation, however minEnal, in the new 
parEament.
7. The Social Democratic Hramada led by 
Statkevich, a poEtician who has widespread 
recognition from Germany, the European country 
that appears most committed to Belarus
8. Yabloko led by Abramova, whose standing 
has been enhanced despite the lack of credibiEty of
the elections.
9. A group around former Prune Minister 
Mikhail Chyhir, who ran in the October elections 
but was defeated in the run-offs. Chyhir and his 
family have suffered repeated harassment and 
detentions from the government, creating 
considerable sympathy on his behalf from the 
pubEc.
10. The Conservative Christian Party of Zyanon 
Paznyak, which has taken the position of non­
cooperation in any sphere with the government.
11. Stanislau Shushkevich, the former Speaker of 
parEament and the leader of Belarus in the period 
Enmediately after independence. Shushkevich 
recently appeared on Moscow Television’s Vremya 
and announced that he had gathered 700,000 
signatures in support of his candidacy for president. 
Both he and Paznyak ran for president in the 
elections of 1994, gaining between them about 22% 
of the total vote.
12. The intelEgentsia and poEticians who held 
the AE-Belarusian Congress in the summer of 2000, 
which accepted resolutions supporting the 
continued independence of Belarus. There is some 
overlap between this group and the AElections 
2001" committee.
13. A coaEtion of youth organizations, which 
includes the Youth Front, the Youth Society, and 
the Young Christians Social Union, in addition to 
the youth structure of the United Civic Party.
Can the opposition unite its forces to put 
forward a credible candidate to run against 
Lukashenka? The process of the OSCE Dialogue 
and the parEamentary elections has indicated yet 
again that there are serious divisions among the 
opposition, which serve only to bewilder the fragile 
electorate. It seems unEkely that a single candidate 
might emerge from the plethora of poEtical parties 
and different interest groups described above. The 
president has already dismissed the possible 
candidacy of Chyhir, noting that since his former 
Premier could not win a seat in the parEament, it is 
highly unEkely that voters would accept him as a 
candidate for the office of president. PoEticians 
such as Sharetsky and Paznyak have the perhaps 
insurmountable problem of operating from outside 
the country. Paznyak already ran into serious 
problems in this regard in the mock presidential 
elections held by the opposition in the spring of
1999. Opinion poUs over the past three years have
4
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not suggested that the electorate supports strongly 
any of the various candidates for president, potential 
or actual.
Is it likely that the government will permit a 
democratic election for president? Lukashenka may 
take one of two routes: either the “one against all” 
route that was demonstrated effectively by 
Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma in October 
1999, when he successfully ran for re-election in 
that country; or else the prevention of registration 
for candidate of opposition leaders. Lukashenka 
already appears to be confident of success, and 
declared that journalists could anticipate 
congratulating him on his future victory.3 More 
ominously, however, he has also stated that if the 
opposition wishes to take part in the presidential 
elections, then it must start to work “constructively” 
with the president.4
The parliamentary elections also demonstrated 
that however flawed the process may have been, the 
Belarusian government is not immune to 
international opinion and criticism. This is evident 
from the sharp comments emanating from the 
Belarusian Foreign Ministry dissenting from the 
views of the representative from Europe. 
Lukashenka has also been sharply critical of the 
Western views on the elections, particularly those of 
the United States. Belarus is in an acute economic 
and social crisis and the government is finding it 
increasingly hard to divorce itself from these 
problems. Both wages and pensions have fallen to 
an all-time low in dollar values (around $32 and $17 
per month respectively). Polls indicate that while 
there is as yet no credible alternative political 
candidate to Lukashenka, the population is anxious 
to see measures in place to improve the standard of 
living.
The Russian Perspective
The elections illustrated the critical role of 
Russia in the future of Belarus. Though the Russia- 
Belarus Union, which has gone through several 
stages, has run into difficulties, Russia is today the 
only country that provides substantial economic and 
political support to the government of Belarus. 
Though a majority of Russians favor the 
incorporation of Belarus, the Putin government
Belarusian Television, 15 October 2000.
4 Sovetskaya Beiomssiya, 20 October 2000.
must take into account the views of the United 
States and the countries of Europe, none of which 
would support the elimination of Belarusian 
independence unilaterally by Russia. The decision 
must be seen to come from within Belarus. The 
most democratic route would therefore be a 
national referendum. However, sociological surveys 
conducted in 1999 revealed that only a minority of 
those polled supported the union with Russia, 
whereas a clear majority favored the continuing 
independence of the Belarusian state.
The second possibility is the legitimization of the 
Union by the leadership organs of Belarus. 
However, the situation is complex. Lukashenka’s 
official term as president, according to the 1994 
Constitution, ended on 20July 1999. The European 
states and the United States have never recogiized 
the validity of the November 1996 Referendum 
through which Lukashenka expanded his powers 
and extended his term in office until November 
2001. Similarly, the smaller version of the parliament 
(120 seats rather than 260) that. replaced the 
Parliament of the 13th Session also lacks 
international recognition. For Russia, an act of 
union between the two states decreed by the 
existing state organs would be unsatisfactory in an 
international climate that does not perceive these 
organs as legitimate. The parliamentary elections of 
October 2000, however, presented a new possibility 
of making the Union a reality, providing that the 
deputies elected were supportive of such an event. 
As a result, Russia took a profound interest in the 
procedures and candidates.
Lukashenka’s attitude toward the Russia-Belarus 
Union is currently ambiguous. In the Yeltsin era 
there seemed to be a realistic hope for the 
Belarusian president that he might ultimately assume 
the presidency of such a Union. Under Putin, this 
hope has faded. The new Russian president appears 
more inclined to favor a single territory, i.e., to 
incorporate Belarus into Russia as a western 
province, without any corresponding body to 
administer the amalgamated state. In such a Russia, 
there would clearly be no role for Lukashenka. 
Consequently, some of Lukashenka’s speeches, 
paradoxically, have sounded patriotic. He is 
unwilling, publicly, to give up independence if 
Belarus is not to be treated as an equal partner. The 
Putin administration, however, must remain a major 
player in Belarus and perceives for itself a significant 
role now that the United States has so publicly
5
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distanced itself from the authoritarian republic. 
The new US ambassador to Belarus, Michael
Kozak, caused much anger in Minsk official circles 
with his comment that Belarus today is the “Cuba 
of Europe.” However, the republic appears to be 
increasingly isolated, almost a backwater of Soviet- 
style repression amid a sea of general change. With 
the fall of Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslav, 
Alyaksander Lukashenka is the only remaining 
dictator of the old Communist style remaining in 
Europe. Opposition demonstrations have frequently 
made an analogy between the two leaders, who have
long been on friendly terms. It is a comparison that 
the Belarusian president can ill afford to ignore, 
though for the moment his position remains secure.
Uladzimir Padhol is Chairman of the Department of 
Political Psychology at the Belarusian People’s University in 
Minsk.
David Marples is Professor of Plistoty at the University 
of Alberta, Canada, and the author of Belarus: A 
Denationalised Nation (1999).
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A Sacred Place is Never Empty:
The External Geopolitics of the Transcaspian 
Stephen Blank
I—^he ongoing fighting in Chechnya and
I Central Asia illustrates how the Russian 
JL proverb of my title (“sviato mesto pusto ne 
byvaet”) applies to the Transcaspian region. 
Central Asia and the Caucasus have become 
"sacred" battlegrounds of a new great game 
involving many states and movements. Thus the 
legal status of the Caspian Sea, a focal point of 
Transcaspian energy issues, "sits at the intersection
of the sexiest questions in international relations."1
These rivalries are not merely an East-West 
competition for energy access. Several 
simultaneous overlapping smaller games 
conducted by the local states themselves and 
neighboring political factions like Afghanistan's 
rivals for power are also occurring and involve 
geostrategy, the quest for energy access, ethnic and 
religious struggles, and outright criminality, e.g. , 
Afghanistan and Central Asia’s narcotics 
trafficking, perhaps Central Asia's most vertically 
integrated industry.2 Thus Russia declared drugs a 
national security threat in 1999 and U.S. officials 
and analysts view Central Asia as a sieve through 
which nuclear and other contraband regularly 




Any geostrategic analysis must begin with 
geography. The Transcaspian region is 
simultaneously an object and a subject of 
overlapping interstate relationships in Europe, the 
Middle East, South and East Asia. No discussion 
of its “sacredness” is complete if it ignores the 
simultaneity and breadth of its penetration by a 
much broader range of political forces than is 
presumed in conventional discussion of the new 
great game.
This region's geopolitics stretch from influence 
over economic-political outcomes in Southeastern 
Europe to membership in the OSCE and 
Partnership for Peace (PFP), the Economic 
Cooperation Organization (ECO) and the 
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), to 
membership and even sponsorship of Asian 
security fora. These states participate in PEP 
programs and exercises, while Georgia and 
Azerbaijan actively seek NATO guarantees and 
even membership or alliance with NATO and 
Israel either to resolve their internal ethnic 
conflicts or to guard future pipelines.4 Georgia 
and Turkey espouse a regional security system to 
anchor the region firmly to Turkey, and through it 
to NATO, the EU, and the United States, and 
counter a perceived Russo-Greek-Armeno-Iranian 
counter-alliance against those states and
Bahrain Rajaee, “Regional Geopolitics and Legal 
Regimes: The Caspian Sea and US Policy,” International Politics, 
37, no. 1 (Mar. 2000):75.
2 This was suggested to the author by S. Frederick 
Starr, Director of Johns Hopkins’ Central Asia Institute in 
Washington, D.C., in November 1999.
3 “Outlook,” U.S. News and World Report, April 17, 
2000, p. 11; Stephen Bryen, “The New Islamic Bomb,” 
Washington Times, April 10, 2000.
4 Jan S. Adams, “The U.S.-Russian Face-off in the 
Caspian Basin, Problems of Post-Communism, 47, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 
2000):55-57; Taras Kuzio, “Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: 
The Emergence of CiULJAM,” European Security, 9, no. 2 
(Summer 2000):99-l05; Svante E. Cornell, “Uzbekistan: A 
Regional Player in Eurasian Geopolitics?” European Security, 9, 
no. 2 (Summer 2000): 122; and conversations with Azeri 
experts in Washington and Tel Aviv (1999).
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Azerbaijan.’ Romania and Bulgaria also seek entry 
into regional energy and security agendas, further 
complicating evolving security relationships.5 6
While NATO has shunned this commitment, 
this lineup of states on both sides illustrates the 
interpenetration or convergence of different 
regional security systems here. And that process 
goes far beyond Europe. The mention of Israel 
and of Iran in these prospective blocs 
demonstrates Middle Eastern involvement in this 
sweepstakes and how the former Soviet republics 
have become part of the “New Middle East.” 
Politicians everywhere grasp this fact. Moscow's 
Joint Communique with Egypt (September 1997) 
stated:
Security and stability in the European continent are 
organically linked to security in the Mediterranean, the 
Near East, and other adjacent regions, including the 
Black Sea. Guidelines and practical activities designed 
to ensure security and stability in one region must be 
supplemented with measures to achieve the same tiling 
in other regions.The CIS is an important factor of 
stability and development in Eurasia and the world as a 
whole.7
Thus the Transcapsian’s importance derives 
equally from geography and from energy sources. 
U.S. policy is not just about energy access, but is 
geostrategic in its own right. Such reasoning 
probably applies to the other powers involved 
given their proximity' to the region.8
The southern CIS connects Russia and the 
Middle East and more generally Europe and Asia 
and is the medium through which any state or 
region projects power and influence in the other 
region. These geopolitical facts retain an enduring 
significance. The expectation and construction of 
major infrastructural and communications 
projects, like the EU's Silk Road project, have 
already promoted an accelerating and deepening 
transformation of Transcaspian relationships with 
foreign states, not just neighbors.9 * These 
transformations will surely enhance these areas' 
importance as a medium through which foreign 
governments project power and influence into 
other zones, thereby increasing the already large 
number of foreign interactions of Transcaspian 
states and adding to regional rivalries.111 Therefore 
the following terms accurately capture this region’s 
strategic location between contending major and 
smaller powers, its strategic fragmentation and 
local governments’ difficulties in creating any 
overall unifying framework, and the rivalry' not just 
among all the the great powers who aspire to play 
a major regional role here.
First of all, the Caucasus (i.e., the North 
Caucasus part of the Russian Federation and the 
Transcaucasian states, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Georgia) and Central Asia comprise a shatterbelt 
or shatterbelt zone, i.e., “strategically oriented 
regions that are politically fragmented areas of 
competition between the continental and maritime
5 Istanbul, Slilliyet (Ankara edition), in Turkish, 
February 12, 2000; Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central 
Eurasia, henceforth FBIS SOF, February' 16, 2000; Moscow, 
Krasnaya Z.veegcia, in Russian, February' 16, 2000, FBIS SOF, 
February 16, 2000; Elkhan E. Nuriev, “Conflicts, Caspian 
Oil, and NATO, Major Pieces of the Caspian Puzzle” inGary 
K. Bertsch, et al., Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign 
Body in theCaucasus and Central Asia (NY: Routledge, 1999), 
140-51.
6 Stephen Blank, “Russian and Europe in the 
Caucasus,” European Security, 4, no. 4 (Winter 1995):630-31.
7 Moscow, Internet, Russian Federation Presidential 
Administration lElME', in Russian, September 29, 1997, FBIS 
SOF, 97-272, September 30, 1997.
8 Statement of Stephen Sestanovich, Ambassador- 
at-Large, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for the 
New Independent States, Before the I louse International 
Relations Committee, April 30, 1998, Turkistan Newsletter, vol.
98-2:089-o6-May-1998 (henceforth: Sestanovich, Testimony)
and the statements by Ashton Carter and John Deutch in
“Caspian Studies Program Experts Conference Report: 
Succession and Long-Term Stability in the Caspian Region,” 
Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1999, 
pp. 10-12 (henceforth: Conference Report).
9 Manaz Z. Ispahani, Roads and Rivals: The Political 
CSses of Access in the Borderlands of Asia (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1989) for the geostrategic importance of 
transportation routes in Central Asia.
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powers.”11 Continental and maritime powers are 
traditional geopolitical designations for Russia and 
the United States and/or United Kingdom 
respectively. This terminology signifies the 
persistent rivalry between these two "blocs" over 
shatterbelts like the former Ottoman empire and 
the Middle East.
Shatterbelts cannot overcome physical, 
environmental, historical, cultural, and political 
differences to form a lasting basis for unified 
political or economic action. Some parts of a 
shatterbelt may seek neutrality, others may opt for 
a tighter or looser association with a great power 
either out of strategic choice or constraint from 
the great power.12 Nevertheless, disunity' remains 
their “default option” and facilitates the larger 
foreign interventions between contending blocs or 
powers that fixes the region as a shatterbelt.
To the extent that these new states forge and 
develop political, economic, and cultural ties with 
the Middle East they will integrate with the new 
Middle East, the paradigmatic shatterbelt and the 
region most penetrated by' the interactions of great 
external powers.13 The Middle East is riven by 
internal and interstate conflicts having little to do 
with great power rivalries that predate and 
postdate the Cold War. Internal conflicts within 
and among the local states also characterize the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus the Middle East 
remains a classic shatterbelt torn by both external 
great power competition and the internal rivalries 
among regional states, powers of a second, 
regional rank.
Presently, then the only' remaining shatterbelt is die 
Middle East, and it, too, is in transition. The Middle
Mackubin Thomas Owens, “In Defense of 
Classical Geopolitics,” Naval War College Review, 52, no. 4 
(Autumn 1999): 69, quoted from Saul B. Cohen, Geography 
and Politics in a World Divided, 2d ed. (NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1973), 86-87; and Rajaee, p. 78, quoted from 
“Geopolitics in the New World Era,” in George Demko and 
William Wood (eds.), Reordering the World: Geopolitical 
Perspectives on the 21“ Century (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 
34.
12 Ibidem.
13 M. E. Ahari, The New Great Game in Muslim
Central Asia, McNair Paper, no. 47, Institute for National
Security' Studies, National Defense University’, Washington,
D.C., 1996, pp. 45-50.
East is tilting toward the maritime [Rimland] realm, as 
the former Soviet Union has suddenly' ceased to be a 
major economic and military' supplier, at least for the 
time being. Nonetheless, Russia remains sensitive to 
the future strategic orientation of the new Caucasus and 
Central Asian states and especially' to the roles of 
Turkey' and Iran. [...] The Middle East is also a 
shatterbelt because it is so highly' fragmented. The 
region contains six regional powers—Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Syria, and Turkey—which in turn, cast their 
shadows over smaller states or separate groups within 
those states.14 * *
Transcaspian states, along with India, Pakistan, 
and China, all function in the Transcaspian 
context exactly as geostrategists would expect. 
These states,
Are emerging cores within their regions. They' have 
nodal characteristics in terms of trade and 
transportation as well as military' influence, and they' 
aspire to regional or subregional influence. Limited 
extraregional economic or political ties are also 
characteristic of such powers. Finally, though often 
overshadowed by a great power, second-order states try' 
to avoid satellite status, sometimes by' play'ing off one 
major power against the other.1’
Consequently, the Transcaspian states or 
territories are also typical buffer states. They are 
situated between two or more conflicting spheres 
of influence and they mainly separate the 
conflicting sides. Buffer states could comprise a 
rather large zone of territory, as in this case. But 
what determines their status is their "vicinal 
location", i.e., their location near neighboring 
"spheres of influence.” Here these buffer states' 
primary' characteristic is the presence of 
strategically important transportation routes. The 
presence of such routes, e.g., pipelines, ensures 
the buffer zone's importance to its neighbors and 
virtually guarantees that all rivals will strive for 
decisive influence over those routes or at least to
14 Cohen, p. 32, in Demko and Wood, as quoted 
by Rajaee, p. 78.
15 Cohen, p. 26, in Demko and Wood, as quoted 
by Rajaee, p. 78.
9
THE HARRIMAN REVIEW
prevent others from gaining decisive control over 
them.16
Consequently, because the Transcaspian region 
adjoins all their spheres of influence, the great 
powers and second-order powers contend for 
influence. And for every effort at cooperation like 
GUUAM, an organization comprising Georgia, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Moldova, and Azerbaijan 
established to counter Russian pressure upon 
those states, there arises other countervailing 
trends. Examples of those countervailing trends 
are Russia and China's use of terrorist threats to 
initiate their own effort at military-police 
integration of the area around Russia, or the 
Russo-Armenian alliance, or the Russo-Iranian 
strategic partnership, or the Russo-Chinese 
partnership to which Central Asian issues certainly 
contribute. Indeed, Moscow has used the terrorist 
threat to attenuate Uzbekistan's adherence to the 
GUUAM organization and weaken GUUAM’s 
ability to serve as a counter security system in the 
CIS.17
Finally the Transcaspian has also become or 
can be viewed as a security complex. As this 
term’s originator, Barry Buzan, defines it, a 
security complex denotes “a set of states whose 
major security perceptions and concerns are so 
interlinked that their national security problems 
cannot reasonably be analyzed apart form one 
another.”18 Whether these security concerns are 
those of amity or enmity, the intensity of these 
states' interactions with each other is much greater 
than are their relations with states outside the
16 As we saw in 1999 and 2000, there are enormous 
and ongoing opportunities for internal inter-state conflict 
throughout the Transcaucasus, north Caucasus, and Central 
Asia.
17 Bruce Pannier, “Central Asia: joint Military 
Exercise Practices Common Defense,” Radio Free 
Europe/ Radio Liberty, March 29, 2000, The Monitor, October 
19, 2000, The Fortnight in Review, 6, no. 20, October 20, 2000.
18 Barry Buzan, “The Post-Cold War Asia-Pacific 
Security Order: Conflict or Cooperation?” in Andrew Mack 
and John Ravenhill (eds.), Pacific Cooperation: BuildingEconomic 
and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1995), 130-38. Interestingly, Russian writers also use 
this term, as quoted by C. W. Blandy, Chechnya: Two Federal 
Interventions and Interim Comparison and Assessment, Conflict 
Studies Research Centre, RMA Sandhusrt, Camberley, Surrey, 
2000, pp. 8-9.
complex. But this complex is, in his words, 
“overlaid” with the external great and small power 
rivalries around and inside the Transcaspian. 
These patterns of “overlay” suppress or distort 
indigenous trends and processes of formation of 
relationships among Transcaspian states.19 Since 
the Transcaspian is simultaneously conceivable as 
a shatterbelt, buffer zone, and security complex 
internal and external crises are everywhere 
inextricable. While internal structurally-derived 
crises may be the most threatening ones to these 
governments, those crises cannot be confronted 
analytically or in political reality apart from the 
regional and global dynamics of the regional 
rivalries for influence.20
Because of the large number of external forces 
the minimum needs of all concerned parties are or 
should be that no one foreign power dominate 
the Transcaspian. This outcome should satisfy 
their minimum, if not greater, interests while 
addressing the local states' urgent and legitimate 
needs. Then this area would be nobody's sphere 
of influence and become instead "a zone of free 
competition."21 Despite the multifarious internal 
trends that could destabilize this area, none of the 
major contenders, Russia, China, and the United 
States is ready to accept this. Therefore smaller 
contenders like Pakistan and Iran, Israel, India, 
and Saudi Arabia will not do so either. Indeed, 
Washington ultimately aims to transform it from a 
shatterbelt into part of the West’s pluralistic 
security community.22 Since that threatens many 
other states’ interests this region remains a 
contested one.
The Transcaspian states confront multiple and 
parallel internal challenges that could serve as the 
basis or pretexts for larger international crises and
Buzan, 130-38.
20 Mohammad Ayob, “From Regional System to 
Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the 
Construction of Regional Order,” Australian journal of 
International Affairs, 53, no. 3 (1999):247-60.
S. Frederick Starr, “The Security Environment 
of Central Asia,” Emirates Lecture Series, no. 22, Emirates 
Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi, 1999, 
p. 24.
22 For the classic definition of such communities, 
sec Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North 
Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
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are constant causes of instability.23 Those 
challenges to security permit foreign intervention 
which then generally triggers a counter movement 
by another interested state or states. Thus in 1999 
a wave of kidnappings in Kyrgyzstan by Afghan- 
trained guerillas illustrated Kyrgyzstan's inability to 
defend itself and triggered a Russian and Chinese 
countermove to integrate Central Asian militaries 
and police forces against the threat of terrorism 
and separatism.24 25While such examples highlight 
linkages between domestic and foreign threats to 
these states; they also highlight the complexity of 
factors that lead states to fill up this sacred space.
The Perspectives of the Local and 
Foreign Powers
Given this context, and their own youth, the 
new states’ main objective is to consolidate their 
integrity, independence, and sovereignty by 
diversifying their foreign and defense policies. 
Therefore, they have welcomed every government 
that wishes to participate in the region, not just 
Russia and the United States/NATO. Turkey, on 
its own and as Washington's staunch ally, plays a 
major role throughout the area. Indeed, Turkish 
military and political officials now call Turkey a 
Caucasian state.23 Similarly, Iran, China, Pakistan, 
and increasingly India are all active here and are 
expected to become still more active. Indeed, 
Pakistan has announced its intention to support 
Azerbaijan militarily, thereby adding to India’s 
anxieties about Baku’s support for Pakistan.26 
Japan and to a lesser degree South Korea have 
measurable interests in the region's oil and natural 
gas supplies. Israel, either alone or apparently with 
Turkey, plays a very visible regional role. And 
Saudi Arabia is also active, mainly through its
support for Wahabbite Muslim religious 
establishments. The EU has launched an 
ambitious program to tie Europe to Asia through 
a transportation corridor that penetrates virtually 
all the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, the 
TRACECA or Silk Road project. And Balkan and 
East European states—notably Greece, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, and Poland—also 
show considerable interest in regional 
developments. More recendy Kazakstan and 
Lithuania started discussing the export of Kazak 
energy supplies through Lithuania's port at 
Ventspils to bypass Russia's monopoly over 
pipelines and ports.
All these relationships illustrate how the local 
oil and gas producers must diversify their 
relationships with as many willing partners as 
possible to retain as much independence and 
sovereignty as possible. And that means 
diversifying the routes by which their energy 
products get to market. Otherwise, they will 
remain Russia's economic satellites' as the only 
existing pipeline network was built by the Soviet 
Union to maximize Russian and central control. 
Lastly the local governments themselves 
continually seek ways to balance Russian 
pressures, e.g. GUUAM's discussions on security 
and guarding pipelines.27
For Moscow our title proverb also denotes its 
attitude to the region. Essentially Moscow insists 
this its influence alone must fill this region. 
Countless Russian statements since 1992 insist 
that this is a sphere of exclusively Russian 
interests.28 Otherwise Russia will be marginalized 
and this area will revert to the influence of alien 
and hostile powers that threaten Russia's very 
survival.29 This quintessentially Leninist, if not 
tsarist, outlook epitomizes the most hard-boiled
"3 Boris Rumcr, “In Search of Stability,” Harvard 
internationalReview, 22, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2000):44-49.
24 Pannier. Of course, by 2000 the guerillas 
operating in Central Asia and Afghanistan had become the 
cause of a major international crisis.
25 “Our Aim Is to Strengthen the Turkish Armed 
b'orces by Modernisation,” Interview with I I. E. Mr. S. 
Cakmakoglu, Turkish Minister of Defence, Nava!Fortes, no. 6 
(1999):35.
26 Moscow, Kommersant, in Russian, June 14, 2000,
FBIS SOV, June 14, 2000; Baku, Agadlyg in Azeri, June 14,
2000, FBIS SO V, June 14, 2000.
27 Pannier, The Fortnight in Review, October 20,
2000, The Monitor, October 19, 2000, FBIS SOV, February 16, 
2000. For a sign of the geostrategic importance of the 
TRASECA or Silk Road project, see Leila Alieva, Reshaping 
Eurasia: Foreign Policy Strategies and leadership Assets in Post-Soviet 
South Caucasus, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet 
Studies, Working Paper Series, Winter 2000, pp. 19-20.
28 Dov Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the 
CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan (NY: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2000) is replete with such statements.
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theory of realism in international relations that 
sees those relations in terms of zero-sum games, 
the artificiality of small states’ sovereignties, and 
Russia as a power threatened on all sides by 
powers who seek to take its territory or 
marginalize it.30
Therefore, Russia views all foreign penetration 
of the Transcaspian with alarm and reacts 
increasingly sharply to threats, real or imagined, 
and its media is saturated with articles depicting 
NATO enlargement, the formation of the 
GUUAM, and NATO's campaign in the Balkans 
as serial threats. For the General Staff, the 
message was already clear in 1998. Russia had to 
reply to these threats by force.31 As Russia's 
conception of the state remains an imperial one 
wedded to notions of a zero-sum game and the 
tsarist-derived belief that empire and state are 
coterminous and if there is no empire, there is no 
state, the resort to force is not surprising.
President Vladimir Putin and leading military 
officials have repeatedly invoked the domino 
theory towards Chechnya and the need to crush it 
by force because this threat was an international 
one sponsored by a kind of Muslim terrorist 
international.32 But the decision to go to war 
against Chechnya was also a signal to NATO and 
Washington of a resolve to fight local wars, if 
necessary, to defend Russia's position in the 
Caucasus. The General Staffs 1998 threat 
assessment saw Kosovo and Chechnya as two 
sides of the same coin and tied Kosovo to 
Chechnya even before NATO actually went to 
war in Kosovo. This assessment lambasted 
NATO in November 1998 for desiring to act 
unilaterally out of area and impose a new world 
order by bypassing the UN and OSCE. It accused 
NATO and specifically the United States of going 
beyond the Washington Treaty and convert 
NATO into an offensive military bloc that was
30 For example, Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the 
National Question: Selected Writings and Speeches (NY: 
International Publishers, 1942), 77.
31 Moscow, Ne^avisimoe Voennoe Obocreme, in 
Russian, November 6-12, 1998, FBIS SOW November 9, 
1998).
" Moscow, Vek (electronic version), in Russian, 
November 26, 1999, FBIS SOW, November 29, 1999.
expanding its “zone of responsibility” by punitive, 
military means.33 Its authors charged:
At the same time, it is not unlikely that NATO could 
use or even organize crises similar to that in Kosovo in 
other areas of the world to create an excuse for military 
intervention since the “policy of double standards” 
where the bloc’s interests dictate the thrust of policy 
(the possibility of the use of military force in Kosovo 
against the Yugoslav Army and simultaneous disregard 
for the problem of the genocide faced by the Kurds in 
Turkey, the manifestation of “concern” at the use of 
military force in the Dniester Region, Chechnya, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh) is typical of the alliance’s actions.34
The authors went beyond hinting at renewed 
fighting in Chechnya to warn NATO openly about 
Russia’s likely reaction to an operation against 
Serbia. Rather than accept a NATO-dictated 
isolation from European security agendas and the 
negating of organizations like the UN and OSCE, 
Russia would act since this crisis offered NATO 
an opportunity' to project military force not just 
against Serbia but against Russia itself. Since 
NATO enlargement's main goal was to weaken 
Russian influence in Europe and globally the 
following scenario was likely. “Once our country 
has coped with its difficulties, there will be a firm 
NATO ring around it, which will enable the West 
to apply effective economic, political, and possibly 
even military pressure on Moscow.”33 Specifically,
When analyzing the development of events in the 
Balkans, parallels with the development of events in the 
Caucasus involuntarily suggest themselves: Bosnia- 
I-Ierzegovina is Nagorno-Karabakh; Kosovo is 
Chechnya. As soon as the West and, in particular, 
NATO, has rehearsed the “divide and rule” principle in 
the Balkans under cover of peacekeeping, they should 
be expected to interfere in the internal affairs of the 
CIS countries and Russia. It is possible to extrapolate 
the implementation of “peacekeeping operations” in 
the region involving military force without a UN 
Security Council mandate, which could result in the 
Caucasus being wrested from Russia (it bears 
mentioning that this applies as well to the independent 
states of the Transcaucasus an involuntary hint of the




continuing neo-imperial mindset of the General Staff- 
author) and the lasting consolidation of NATO’s 
military presence in this region, which is far removed 
from die alliance’s zone of responsibility. Is Russia 
prepared for the development of diis scenario? It is 
obvious that, in order to ensure diat die Caucasus does 
not become an arena for NATO Allied Armed Forces’ 
military intervention, the Russian Government must 
implement a well defined tough policy in the Balkans, 
guided by die UN charter and at die same time 
defending its national interests in die region by 
identifying and providing the appropriate support for 
this policy’s allies.36
The U.S. view is equally geostrategic and 
regards access to energy not just as an economic 
benefit, but strategically. Former high-ranking 
members of the Clinton Administration state that 
even if Caspian energy will not equal Saudi 
holdings, it will be a significant though not 
determinative factor in global energy. But Caspian 
energy is crucial to the security and stability of the 
new states, which is “a vital American interest.”37 
They are a vital U.S. interest because of the 
Transcaspian states' proximity to Russia, Iran, 
Turkey, and China. Their independence 
constitutes a bulwark against Russian neo­
imperialism and a check upon Iranian pretensions 
to Pan-Islamic anti-Westernism in the Muslim 
world.38
Therefore, Washington must support these 
states' independence, develop bilateral regional 
security relationships, forge relationships between 
the Partnership for Peace and these states, and 
create a win-win energy policy based upon 
multiple pipelines so that no one power dominates 
the region or excludes anyone else, allowing all 
these states to share equally in the energy wealth.39 
This means breaking Russia's monopohstic policy, 
multiple pipelines and the creation of stable 
conditions that would permit the enormous 
foreign investments needed to bring energy on 
line.40
37 Conference Report, 10-12.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
NATO's and Washington's increasing presence 
dates from 1994-95 and aimed to counter the 
threat of a Russian-directed coercive economic- 
political-military reintegration of the CIS.41 Since 
that time Washington has launched a 
comprehensive economic, political, and military 
program to integrate these states with the West in 
all these domains, and preserve multiple energy 
pipelines, the new states' independence and 
freedom from any rivals' sphere of influence.42 
U.S. officials view this area as an alternative or 
backup to the Middle East, whose volatility 
constantly threatened energy prices, Western 
economies, and great power relationships.43 By 
1995 crucial decisions to keep Russia from 
monopolizing the region's energy holdings had 
been made. In February 1995 Washington 
decided to support pipelines running through 
Turkey and not Russia., to break Russia's grip on 
Central Asia's oil export, help ensure the survival 
of independent states in the region, and protect 
U.S. corporate interests.
Consequently, Washington has increasingly 
become the arbiter of interstate energy issues in 
the CIS, excluding and rivaling Russia. U.S. 
officials and diplomats relentlessly pursue a 
pipeline from Central Asia through the Caspian 
Sea, Baku, and Georgia to Ceyhan, Turkey, which 
excludes Russia and Iran (even in the face of 
compelling economic logic).44 * * *Complementing the
41 Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, “US Policy and the 
Caucasus,” Contemporary Caucasus Newsletter, Berkeley Program 
in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, issue 5, Spring 1998, pp. 3- 
4.
42 Stephen Blank, U.S. Militay Engagement with 
Central Asia and the Transcaucasus (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic 
Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2000).
43 Geoffrey Kemp and Robert Harkavy, Strategic
Geography and the Changing Middle East (Washington, 
D.CcCarnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), 
xiii; “Introduction,” Robert D. Blackwill and Michael
Stuermer (eds.), Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the
Greater Middle East (Cambridge: MIT University Press, 1997), 
2.
4 Laurent Ruseckas, “US Policy and Caspian 
Pipeline Politics: The Two Faces of Baku-Ceyhan,” Caspian 
Studies Program Experts Conference Report: Succession and 
Long-Term Stability' in the Caspian Region, Strengthening 
Democratic Institutions Project, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University', 1999, pp. 119-22.
13
THE HARRIMAN REVIEW
focus on energy issues is Washington’s leading 
role in international financial institutions who play 
a large role in channeling foreign resources to 
Central Asia. All these activities also contradict the 
U.S.’ stated intention that NATO enlargement and 
associated trends would not further embroil it in 
all kinds of local issues. Instead, Washington is 
the main center of international adjudication of 
many regional issues.
The Defense Department has discussed 
strengthening military cooperation with 
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan and training 
Azerbaijan’s army, thereby alarming Armenia and 
Russia.4’ The Pentagon allocated areas of 
responsibility (AORs) to U.S. commands for the 
Transcaspian. In September 1995, U.S. experts on 
Central Asia cited Washington's extensive interests 
in Caspian energy as a reason for possibly 
extending U.S. Persian Gulf security guarantees 
here.46 Indeed, it seems that the Caspian 
exemplifies the "unipolar moment where 
Washington can construct and maintain a 
convivial alignment of international forces. 
Implicitly it drinks that it can constrain Russian 
policy here with few or no seriously negative 
consequences."47
U.S. writers increasingly call this area part of 
the “greater Middle East,” the “strategic fulcrum 
of the future,” or the “strategic high ground,” due
45 Moscow, Ne^avisimaya Gas^eta, in Russian, 
September 13, 1997, Foreign Broadcast Information Sendee,
Military Affairs (henceforth FBIS UA-IA), 97-259, September 
16, 1997, R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Leads Peacekeeping Drill in 
Kazakstan,” Washington Post, September 15, 1997, p. 17; 
Charles Clover and Bruce Clark, “Oil Politics Trouble Central 
Asian Waters,” Financial Times, September 23, 1997, p. 9.
46 “If We Clash It’ll Be on the Caspian,” Current 
Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (henceforth CDPP), 27, no. 21, 
June 21, 1995, p. 21; Dmitri Vertkin, Kazakhstan Security and 
the New Asian Landscape, BailriggPaper, no. 26, Centre for 
Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster 
University, 1997, pp. 17-18; Robin Morgan and David 
Ottaway, “Drilling for Influence in Russia’s Back Yard,” 
Washington Post, September 22, 1997, pp. Al, 15.
47 Douglas Blum, “Sustainable Development and 
the New Oil Boom: Comparative and Competitive Outcomes 
in the Caspain Sea,” Program on New Approaches to 
Russian Security, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard 
University, Working Paper Scries, no. 4, 1997, p. 21.
to its energy resources.48 The strategic rationale 
for American involvement in the Transcaspian’s 
defense and security relations stem from today's 
new geostrategic situation. “The main reason why 
the West cannot remain complacent about 
Russia’s actions is the fact that Russia’s ‘near 
abroad’ is, in many cases, also democratic 
Europe’s near abroad.”49 50However, Washington 
could relatively easily be drawn into local ethnic 
conflicts either as peacemaker or peacekeeper. 
This would accord with the Georgian and Azeri 
demands noted above for NATO involvement 
and commitment to their states' interests. The 
alliance that these states seek with Turkey could 
indirectly bring the NATO and/or the EU into 
the fray. If this intervention came to resemble the 
Kosovo campaign it would trigger Russia's worst 
nightmare with unforeseeable consequences.
Hitherto Washington has wisely eschewed 
directly committing U.S. troops to any of the 
many local conflicts, but that is not a commitment 
of principle. There are reports of U.S. willingness 
to send peacekeeping troops should the OSCE's 
Minsk process bring peace to Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Clearly American regional military involvement is 
growing. General John Sheehan (USMC), former 
CINC of the U.S. Atlantic command (ACOM) and 
NATO’s S A CL A NT (Supreme Allied 
Commander Atlantic) announced U.S. willingness 
to take part in regional peace support operations 
involving Central Asian forces under UN 
authorization, further extending Washington's 
offer of security cooperation to them.’0
The Transcaspian’s heightened importance has 
already apparently convinced many that challenges 
to regional security entail threats to our critical or 
even vital interests. U.S. militaty' analysts frankly 
state the goals of activities under the rubric of 
engagement and Partnership for Peace, as essential 
aspects of the U.S.’ strategy of “extraordinary
48 Kemp and Harkavy, xiii; Blackwill and Stuermer,
2.
49 John Roper and Peter van I lam, “Redefining 
Russia’s Role in Europe” in Vladimir Baranovsky (ed.), Russia 
and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda (Oxford: Oxford 
University' Press for SIPRI, 1997), 517.




power projection.” These programs include joint 
exercises, staff visits, training, increasing 
interoperability, etc. These activities also assist 
transition to war and, if necessary, participation in 
its initial stages and perhaps even subsequent 
combat operations as well?1 NATO’s increased 
southern Mediterranean exposure can only 
increase its prominent institutional role in conflict 
prevention, security assistance, and military- 
political integration. Thus in the summer of 1999 
NATO began to unify and control the region’s air 
space, signifying eventual interest in including this 
area in its operational plans and future 
membership?2
NATO’s expanding interest reflects the 
broader process by which the CIS has entered into 
Europe's security agenda?3 This too is more than 
a question of conducting PfP programs and 
exercises in the region. Turkey’s provision of 
military training to Central Asian states and 
Azerbaijan, intention to organize a Caucasian 
peacekeeping force, and sponsorship of a new 
stability pact and system are only the most 
prominent of such examples?4 The Greco-Turkish 
rivalry in the Aegean and Balkans could have been 
projected into the Middle East and the CIS or 
exploited by Russia for its own purposes in all 
these regions and used to block American and 
Turkish goals; it is not accidental that at the 
OSCE's 1999 Istanbul conference American 
activity revolved around influencing the process of 
Greco-Turkish negotiations, winning the CIS 
members to support a pipeline through Baku to 
Turkey (Ceyhan on the Mediterranean coast) and 
getting Turkey into the EU's active consideration 
for membership. Thus the old Eastern Question 
has, since 1993, reemerged as the question of the
former Soviet republics' future destiny; issues of 
European energy security and geostrategy are now 
intimately Enked to security outcomes in the 
Transcaspian?3 Turkish goals of preventing future 
Russian miEtary threats and securing its leading 
influence in a region of the world where it now 
finds new opportunities for influence since the 
end of the Cold War coincide with American and 
NATO strategy. This trend creates great 
apprehension among certain, though not all, 
sectors of Russian foreign and defense 
poEcymaking.
The Transcaspian Region and
Eurasian Regional Security Agendas
This example suggests the imbrication of 
security agendas in and around the Caspian with 
those in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. 
Pakistan views the region as an essential strategic 
hinterland in its quest for security against India?6 
Meanwhile, Indian analysts differ as to whether or 
not India has invested or should invest 
considerable resources to stabiEze Central Asia 
against Pakistani designs there. But apparently 
China, Russia, and the United States each want to 
enEst India's influence in Central Asia as a 
stabiEzer against the threat of disintegrating 
regimes there. Of course, since each actor defines 
the goals and content of this stabilization 
differently and clash among themselves, the 
rivalries around Central Asia are Enked to Indo- 
Chinese tensions, Sino-American rivalries over 
Asia, and Russia’s ongoing efforts to forge 'a 
counter-American strategic triangle with India and 
China. But simultaneously the joint struggle to 
contain Afghan-based “terrorism” and insurgency 
to some degree also unites Washington and 
Moscow with Delhi?'
51 Roger W. Barnett, Extraordinary Power Projection: 
An Operational Concept for the U.S. Nan)', Strategic Research 
Development Report 5-96, U.S. Naval War College, Center 
for Naval Warfare Studies, Occasional Papers, Newport, RI, 
1996, pp. 7-8.
52 Luke 1 Iill and Brooks Tignor, “NATO Reaches 
to Caucasus,” Defence News, August 2, 1999, pp. 3, 19.
53 Blank, “Russia and Europe in the Caucasus,”
622-45.
54 Hill and Tignor, 3, 19; The Monitor, December 10, 
1998; Umit Eginsoy, “Turkish Moves in Caucasus, Balkans 
Irk Rivals in Region,” Defense News, August 3-9, 1998, p. 12.
55 Stephen Blank, “The Eastern Question Revived:
Russia and 'turkey Contend for the New Middle least,” in
David Menashri (ed.), Central Asia Meets the Middle East
(London: Frank Cass Publisheers, 1998), 168-88.
56 Stephen Blank, Energy, Economics, and Security in
Central Asia: Russia and Its RJvals (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1995), 23-26.
57 C. Raja Mohan, “Fostering Strategic Stability and 
Promoting Regional Cooperation”; Kanti Bajpai, “India-US
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Khripunov and Anupam Srivastava, “Contending with the
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Consequently, Central Asia, if not the 
Caucasus, is fully integrated into the whirlpool of 
inter-Asian security agendas. Since Pakistan- and 
Afghan-inspired efforts to subvert the current 
secular governments by supporting Islamic 
insurgencies grows out of Pakistan’s wager on 
Islamic self-assertion throughout Asia and its own 
self-projection as an Islamic state and torchbearer, 
Indian involvement will probably grow?8 
Meanwhile, Central Asia is already exposed to the 
unholy trinity of Islamic and ethno-religious 
insurgencies, drugs, and civil strife. Local leaders 
must to some extent reckon with the potential for 
Central and South Asian conflicts to join with 
each other and become a factor for the possible 
escalation of Indo-Pakistani hostilities or of the 
civil wars in Tajikistan, and Afghanistan, or 
potentially new conflicts in Central Asia. Were 
any of those contingencies to occur, it is unlikely 
that Central Asia could escape either the actual or 
political fallout of a potential Indo-Pakistani 
conflict.
The Chinese Gambit
Many factors are leading China into a deeper 
and broader engagement with the Transcaspian 
region that could eventually collide with the 
interests of the other major actors there, not 
excluding Russia. Indeed, some, including this 
writer, have hypothesized that in the long term China 
might be Russia’s most stubborn rival in Central 
Asia especially if it moves forward while Russia 
continues to stagnate.’9 However, if the economic 
disparity between Beijing and Moscow continues
‘Bear-ish’ Arms Market: US-Indiana Strategic Cooperation 
and Russia”- all in Gary K. Bertsche, et al. (eds.), Engaging 
India: US Strategic Relations with the World’s Eargest Democracy 
(NY: Routledge, 1999), 26, 32-33, 38, 197-98, 245-46; 
Margaret Coker, “U.S., Russia Worry Poor Central Asia 
Threatens as Terrorist Breeding Ground,” Cox News Service, 
October 17, 2000, www.nexis.com/ research/ search / 
documentDisplay?_docnum+121 &an: 10/18/2000.
58 Blank, Energy, Economics and Security, 26-30.
59 Ibid.; Yuri Peskov, “Russia and China: Problems 
and Prospects of Cooperation with CIS Members in Centra] 
Asia,” Eastern Affairs, no. 3 (1997):9-23; Guancheng Xing, 
“China and Central Asia: Towards a New Relationship,” in 
Yongjin Zhang and Rouben Azizian (eds.), Ethnic Challenges 
Beyond Borders: Chinese and Russian Perspectives off the Central Asian 
Conundrum (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 40-41.
to widen and accelerates, this rivalry' might emerge 
sooner rather than later for all the talk of bilateral 
strategic partnership. Already Russia warily limits 
China’s economic engagement in Central Asia 
whenever it can.60 For now, however, China 
supports Russia's leadership here and that support 
clearly gratifies Moscow.61
Nevertheless, China clearly seeks influence 
over the region in order to play a major, or at least 
greater, role in world politics. Chinese analyses 
highlight only some of the fundamental strategic 
issues for China’s future direction in world affairs 
that will be affected by the rivalry for energy and 
influence. Xu Xiaojie writes that China has a great 
opportunity to expand its political and economic 
position in Asia. Its involvement in the 
Transcaspian is an important component of this 
“geopolitical game.” Related issues involve U.S.-
C.hina relations regarding both governments’ 
Middle Eastern oil supplies, Sino-Russian energy 
relations, and China’s regional role in Northeast, 
Central, and Southeast Asia. Thus, “China’s 
future geopolitical priority certainly will be to 
regenerate an aggressive geostrategy that 
reestablishes a leading role in not just Asia, but the 
world scene.” 62 *
The motives for China's deepening 
Transcaspian engagement also derive from China’s 
own domestic confrontation with continuous 
unrest in Xinjiang since 1980, its most intractable 
domestic threat. China has employed several 
tactics to forestall this unrest. It has aligned itself 
with Russia, depriving CIS members of the option 
of using Russia against China or hiding behind 
Moscow’s support. Second, it has engaged all the 
Central Asian governments in cross-border
60 Shiping Bang, “Economic Integration in Central 
Asia: The Russian and Chinese Relationship,” Asian Survey, 
40, no. 2 (March-April 2000): 360-76; Philip Andrews-Speed 
and Sergei Vinogradov, “China’s Involvement in Central 
Asian Petroleum: Convergent or Divergent Interests,” Asian 
Survey, 40, no. 2 (March-April 2000):377-95.
61 “New Strategic Trends in Russo-Chinese 
Relations,” testimony of Professor Stephen J. Blank of the 
Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College to 
the House Armed Services Committee, 105‘b Congress, 
Washington, D.C.,July 19, 2000.
62 Xu Xiaojie, “China Reaches Crossroads for
Strategic Choices,” World Oil, April 1997, p. 99.
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economic relationships, creating webs of 
dependence to remind them of the risks of 
upsetting Beijing. Since Shanghai is Kazakstan’s 
main port and Chinese military might is relatively 
overt, Kazakstan and its neighbors have refrained 
from supporting the insurgents in Xinjiang. At 
the same time, and as part of the greater strategy 
of seeking long-term economic influence and 
access in Central Asia, China has redirected 
investment to its backward western and 
northwestern provinces to remove discontent, 
encourage continuing Han migration into those 
areas, and drown the insurgents in a Chinese sea.63
The need for energy as domestic sources reach 
their limits and demand grows has also driven 
China to buy pipelines going from Kazakstan to 
Shanghai and to make major investments in the 
oil- and gas-bearing states, including Azerbaijan. 
Since China cannot afford dependence on just one 
source of energy and must continue its economic 
progress without interruption, domestic tranquility 
and economic progress make it imperative that 
Beijing get into Central Asia and the Transcaspian 
before others, notably the United States and Japan, 
who has shown a very strong interest in enhancing 
its regional profile and gain preeminent influence 
over regional energy supplies.
Guancheng Xing writes:
For China, a Central Asia which is capable of 
overcoming its economic difficulties and getting out of 
its economic crises has a better chance of achieving 
economic prosperity and political stability. China can 
benefit greatly from its stable and prosperous 
neighboring states. Only when Central Asian states are 
politically stable and economically prosperous can Sino- 
Central Asian economic cooperation be conducted 
effectively and smoothly. Such economic cooperation 
can and will speed up economic development in the 
Northwest of China. It can therefore be argued that to 
a large extent the stability and prosperity of Northwest 
China is closely bound up with the stability and 
prosperity of Central Asia. It is, rightly, because of this 
consideration that China advocates and promotes active 
trade and economic cooperation between China and 
Central Asian states for common economic 
prosperity.64
63 Guancheng Xing, 44-45.
64 Ibid, 35.
China’s coherent and comprehensive strategic 
vision derives from more than economic motives. 
As he also observed, in its Central Asian policies 
China pays considerable attention to the Russian 
factor. China perceives the importance of the 
Russian tie to Central Asia and seeks to 
strengthen, not disturb it, because China also sees 
Russia as a factor of regional stability.64 During 
1999 two sources contributed to this support for a 
strong Russian security presence in the area and 
for strong bilateral cooperation with Moscow as 
part of the greater Sino-Russian rapprochement.
One of these is China’s perception of a 
threatened “Asian NATO.” China discerns the 
U.S.-Japan-ROK alliance and support for Taiwan 
that constrains or contains its expanding influence. 
In Central Asia, Beijing sees the expansion of 
American and NATO military influence to the 
Transcaucasus and Central Asia as a threat to its 
and Russia's influence. Chinese writers rarely, if 
ever, miss opportunities to warn Russia of 
Washington's nefarious aims regarding Moscow. 
Central Asia and the expansion of the Partnership 
for Peace program exemplify this point.65 6
But this support for Russia's position is 
conditional upon Russia's military not becoming a 
threat to China.67 Therefore, barbarians should be 
induced to fight barbarians, i.e, Russia clash with 
NATO. If Russia aligned with NATO, despite 
countless Chinese warnings, support for Russia's 
position in Central (and other parts of) Asia would 
disappear. Thus Chinese warnings about NATO’s 
actions and threats are not surprising. Meanwhile, 
China's true attitude towards NATO enlargement 
is much less hysterical and more cold-blooded.68
Thus China supports Central Asian military 
alignment with Russia because this removes many 
of its anxieties about Central Asian support for 
Xinjiang's Muslims or about disputed territories.
65 Ibid, 40-41.
66 Ibid, 39-40. Michael Pillsbury, China Debales the 
'Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National 
Defense University Press, 2000), passim.
67 Guancheng Xing, 40-41, and idem, “Security 
Issues in China’s Relations with Central Asian States,” in 
Zhang and Azizian (eds.), 215.
68 Czeslaw Tubilewicz, “Comrades No More: Sino- 
Central European Relations After the Cold War,” Problems of 
Post-Communism, 46, no. 2 (March-April 1999), 9-10.
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In 1999 the assassination attempts against Uzbek 
President Karimov, Islamic insurgencies in 
Kyrgyzstan supported by Afghan and Pakistani 
forces, the Chechen war, and the disturbed 
situation whereby Central Asian governments now 
seem disposed to discern new anti-government 
plots greatly alarmed Moscow, Beijing, and local 
governments and stimulated Russo-Chinese 
moves for renewed cooperation against 
“terrorism.” Moscow hopes to use these activities 
as a lever to promote rejuvenated military 
integration of Central Asia with Russia and firmer 
Sino-Russian military-political cooperation to put 
Central Asia “on ice.” This cooperation goes 
beyond the five power border treaty of 1996 
which adjusted all borders between Central Asia 
and China and between Russia and China and the 
regular meetings of high-level officials from all 
states. This anti-terrorist coalition clearly has 
broader strategic aims than simply stabilizing the 
status quo in Central Asia.69
China is also stepping up its visibility' in the 
Caucasus. In 1999 it was caught selling missiles to 
Armenia. Azerbaijan’s strong protests ultimately 
forced Beijing to apologize, much as it had done 
to the United States with regard to Pakistani 
nuclear projects, and claim this will not happen 
again. More likely, however, as in Pakistan, there 
will be more such examples. Perhaps China did so 
at the behest of Armenia and Russia. The Sino- 
Russian strategic cooperative partnership gives 
every sign of developing into a broader strategic 
coordination between the two governments. 
Russia and Armenia may' have asked China to 
make the sale to spare Russia from complications 
with Azerbaijan due to its earlier transfer of a 
billion dollars worth of weapons to Armenia 
which raised a great deal of trouble for Russia in 
its domestic politics and even more with Baku. As 
Azeri-based oil was about to come on stream and 
negotiations for a final decision on the routes or 
pipelines through which that oil would flow were 
about to begin, China seemed an appropriate 
conduit.
A second explanation that does not contradict 
this first one is that this sale coincided with 
China's desire to establish a foothold in the area,
although it is still unclear why Beijing would go 
out of its way' to antagonize a potential source of 
oil and gas. A third possibility is that the 
“princes,” members of the families of China’s 
ruling elites, who control arms sales can to some 
degree act on their own in such matters. While we 
cannot know the reason for this sale for certain, it 
signifies China’s deepening military' involvement 
with the Transcaspian. China is not only' upgrading 
its trade and economic relations with Central Asia, 
it is also buying into energy' fields and pipelines to 
stake its claim to leverage over those assets, 
pursuing influence in Central Asia, guaranteeing its 
own energy sufficiency in the face of rising 
demand, and suppressing domestic insurgency by 
a subtle policy tying domestic and foreign security' 
policies. China is moving to fulfill Xu Xiaojie’s 
blueprint and win an established role as a key' 
player here.'11
As Central Asia's destiny' may be increasingly' 
linked with that of East and/or South Asia the 
ultimate strategic implications of that trend remain 
undefined. But we can safely assert that Beijing is 
not only determined to have an enduring voice in 
the final disposition of the Transcaspian as a 
strategic region, but has also begun to act on that 
determination.
The Middle East
Similar prospects are visible in the Middle East. 
As Azeri efforts to involve Israel and Turkey' in an 
alliance system against Moscow, Athens, and 
Tehran suggest, regional alignments here can spill 
over into Middle Eastern alignments or vice versa 
and involve rivals in one “theater” in conflicts in 
the second theater. Even if we consider the new 
states as part of the new Middle East, they' clearly 
bring a different baggage and agenda into Middle 
Eastern politics. Their generally good relations 
with Israel stem from the practical needs that 
Israel can satisfy'. Israel has valuable economic 
and domestic development experience and 
capabilities, most notably with regard to the 
pressing water problems that afflict Central Asia. 
Good relations with Israel also open doors in 
Washington. Israeli military' assistance may' also be
69 Blank, Testimony. 70 Xu Xiaojic, 99.
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highly regarded, especially as all these states share 
enmity with fundamentalist Islamic forces. Those 
governments who suspect Iran's ultimate 
intentions also might be inclined to gravitate to 
Iran's strongest rival in the Middle East. 
Moreover, as the Central Asian governments are 
all anti-fundamentalist (i.e., against the 
politicization of Islam) they reject Iran's periodic 
calls for a more Islamic foreign policy. As Iran 
has all but signed an alliance with Christian 
Armenia against Azerbaijan, these states see Iran’s 
self-interest in such calls.
Nevertheless, Iran has been remarkably 
circumspect here, relying since 1999 primarily on 
economic ties to win influence. Iran has 
periodically offered its infrastructure and whatever 
economic benefits it can provide to Central Asian 
energy producers. But on the key issues of 
pipelines and the legal character of the Caspian 
Sea it has firmly supported Russia against 
Washington, Azerbaijan, and Kazakstan. Tehran 
aims to stifle Azerbaijani irredentism concerning 
the large Azeri minority in Northern Iran, and not 
to antagonize Russia, its main military benefactor, 
while Washington resolutely seeks to isolate it. 
Indeed, Russian support for Iranian nuclearization 
stems not just from its defense and nuclear 
industries' desperate need for revenues, but also 
from the well-founded belief that if it does not 
provide military assistance, Iran could create many 
difficulties for Russia here. This realization dates 
from February 1992, i.e., the founding days of 
Russian statehood.71
While Iranian media remain very troubled 
about the war in Chechnya, official Iran remains 
on Russia's side in this conflict, at least publicly.72 
This strategic marriage of convenience shows how 
strategic factors in the CIS affect one of the oldest 
and most solidly established relations in the 
Middle East, namely the Russo-Iranian
71 Stephen Blank, “Russia and Iran in a New 
Middle East,” Mediterranean Quarterly, 3, no. 4 (ball 1992): 124- 
27.
72 Tehran, Iran, in English, bcbruary 20, 2000, 
Foreign Broadcast Information Sendee, Near East and South Asia, 
(henceforth FBIS NES), February 20, 2000; Robert O. 
Freedman, “Russian-Iranian Relations Under Yeltsin,” Paper 
presented at the Sixth Annual ASN Convention, Columbia 
University, April 14, 2000.
relationship, helping convert it from one of almost 
unceasing conflict and mutual suspicion into a 
lively and developing amity and strategic 
partnership.
On the other hand, Iran is currently 
undergoing a struggle between moderates and 
more hardline elements. This struggle clearly 
revolves in some measure around Iranian attitudes 
towards the United States and its desperate 
economic weakness. If the moderates and 
exponents of an economic rationale for policy and 
rapprochement with Washington prevail, 
Washington will reciprocate by expanding support 
for diverse pipelines to include Iran, the most 
economically rational option in the pipeline 
equation. That would trigger a major and 
profoundly consequential geopolitical shift in 
Iranian policy away from support for Russia and 
China whose regional implications could equal 
those of Iran’s 1979 revolution.
Iranian Nuclearization and the 
Transcaspian Region
However, perhaps the most unpredictable risk 
factors facing the entire area are the consequences 
of Iran’s impending nuclear capability. U.S. 
military and political authorities agree that within a 
decade, if not earlier, Iran will have a functioning 
nuclear weapon and delivery: system.'3 Iran is 
reportedly working on developing IRBMs to 
extend its reach into Europe and Asia and even 
ICBMs for potential use against the United States 
itself.74
Almost all speculation and analysis concerning 
Iranian capabilities has focused on the Middle 
East and Europe, ignoring the impact of Iranian 
nuclearization on Central Asia or the Caucasus. A 
nuclear Iran with unresolved but long-smoldering 
domestic struggles, thinking that it can deter 
resistance, could well be tempted into foreign 
policy adventures to achieve domestic aims and 
aggrandize its influence abroad. While Russia and 
China have been among the main supports of
73 James Risen and Judith Miller, “CIA Tells 
Clinton an Iranian A-Bomb Can’t Be Ruled Out,” New York 
Times, January 17, 2000, p. 1; Associated Press, February' 29, 
2000.
74 FBIS UMA, 98-075, March 17, 1998.
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Iran’s nuclearization, quite possibly neither 
government might view Iranian and/or Pakistani 
nuclearization positively, given the repercussions 
in Xinjiang and Central Asia. Such factors should 
give us a sense of how the rest of Asia might be 
affected by Iranian nuclearization.
Neglect of Central Asian threat scenarios if 
Iran gains nuclear capabilities is pardy attributable 
to the fact that the pace, direction, and extent of 
Iran's overall rearmament and acquisition of 
weapons of mass destruction gready depends 
upon foreign sales or transfers. Because of 
constant U.S. and other pressure that is exerted 
upon Russia and other providers it will be 
difficult, if not impossible to forecast what Iran's 
capabilities will be, how much of any single 
capability it will have, and when it gains those 
capabilities.
Iran's numerous and well-known difficulties in 
maintaining and servicing its existing weapons 
systems or in obtaining parts for aging U.S. 
systems also precludes easy assumptions 
concerning the pace, direction, timing, and extent 
of future Iranian military power and strategy7. Iran 
also may not have thought deeply about the 
strategic potentials and possible missions it will 
confront once it reaches the point of acquiring 
usable WMD. Nevertheless, Iran clearly seeks 
both regional hegemony and to avail itself of a 
credible deterrent capability primarily against those 
states it identifies as an actual or potential threat, 
Israel, Iraq, and the United States.
Will Iran use it to attempt nuclear blackmail 
against a Transcaucasian and/or Central Asian 
state? Will the United States or some other great 
power be able to extend its deterrence against Iran 
to that threatened state, and if so how? After all, 
in almost all these states there are actual or 
potentially secessionist ethno-religious or political 
minorities which Iran can use to destabilize the 
target state. If Lebanon is an example, the further 
away the target state is from Iran, the bolder Iran 
is in extending military7, political, intelligence, and 
economic support to groups like Hezballah. The 
Transcaspian’s unsettled situations already7 present 
tempting opportunities for engaging in such 
policies. Although Iran has hitherto been very7 
circumspect, if it has a functioning and viable 
deterrent it might use one or more of these
minorities, as it has used Hezballah, and even 
threaten the state that seeks to undertake reprisals 
against them with extended deterrence on behalf 
of its “clients.”
Will possession of usable nuclear weapons 
therefore lead Iran to support secessionist 
minorities elsewhere in the region in the belief that 
even other nuclear states are deterred by its 
capability? There are precedents for this that go 
beyond Lebanon. For example, Pakistan 
apparently7 employs a similar logic in its incitement 
of conflicts in Kashmir. Undoubtedly such 
concerns are warranted as no Central Asian state 
has truly secure borders or legitimacy7 and they all 
face real threats of ethnic secessionist wars that 
could draw in larger powers. Indeed, Iran 
constantly worries about Azerbaijan reuniting with 
Iranian Azerbaijan. If one adds a nuclear power 
to the ethnopolitical mix, regional security issues 
will become more complex and harder to resolve.
Indeed, Iran and Russia might part ways if 
Iran's nuclear capability becomes perceived as a 
threat to Russia. Alternatively7 Irano-Pakistani 
rivalry in Afghanistan might lead Iran to play7 a 
secessionist card against either Moscow or 
Islamabad in the belief of its essential 
invulnerability to serious retribution. If any of 
those rivalries grow over time, Iran's nuclear 
potential would exert considerable influence upon 
Central Asia. Inasmuch as many analysts concur 
that possession of nuclear weapons makes the 
world safe for conventional warfare, the 
temptation to use such weapons to assert Iranian 
objectives in Central Asia or the Transcaucasus 
might prove too strong to resist.
Neither does the scenario of a more aggressive 
Iran, and not only in the Gulf and Middle East, 
stop with these questions. We can already7 see Iran 
becoming a “second-tier” proliferator to other 
states. Since Pakistan had assisted Iraq's fledgling 
nuclear program, so might Iran decide to become 
an international proliferator and exporter.'3 Iran 
and its potential partners could constitute two 
simultaneous fronts against American or some 
other power in widely7 separated theaters to deter *
75 This point is based on conversations with Daniel 
Goure of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington, D.C., April 2000.
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U.S. or allied intervention and could make the 
mutual proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction the basis of their own coalitional 
activities.
Until now Central Asian states have 
successfully avoided nuclear entanglements and 
created a nuclear free zone with great power 
support from Moscow and Beijing. But will a 
nuclear Iran agree to tliis nuclear weapons free 
zone? And if it does not, what will then happen to 
that zone and what pressures might be unleashed 
within Central Asia or the CIS as a whole, or 
South Asia to react to Iran’s accretion of power?
Likewise, we cannot know what the ultimate 
configuration of Iranian forces will be or what 
kind of doctrine it will choose. India’s recently 
published nuclear doctrine speaks of a stable 
deterrent and second-strike capability, language 
that strongly implies it is moving towards a large, 
robust nuclear force with a triad of land-, sea-, and 
air-based deliver}' systems or missiles for those 
weapons.76 India is also apparently starting down 
the road of ballistic missile defenses to preserve its 
deterrent’s credibility and is greatly expanding its 
space program to provide for a potential 
reconnaissance and/or strike capability either in 
space or from earth to space.77
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Iran might conceivably move in the same 
direction and trigger a massive destabilization 
throughout much of Asia. Over time, and if 
Iranian proliferation remains essentially 
unimpeded, a relatively robust, diversified Iranian 
force, complete with second-strike capability and 
aspirations to a missile defense and space weapons 
and/or reconnaissance system might come into 
being. Here again we have not begun to imagine 
what the consequences might be for Transcaspian 
governments, India, Pakistan, or even for Russia 
and China under such circumstances. Certainly 
some thought should be given to these 
possibilities.
Even if the rest of the CIS remains non­
nuclear, Iran’s forthcoming entry into the nuclear 
club will create a third or fourth (including 
Pakistan) regional player in the Transcaspian, 
which has both nuclear weapons and vital strategic 
interests at stake in the region. Is it too much to 
assume that the connection between those two 
phenomena and regional security will grow and 
affect ever}' government in these regions or that 
has important interests there? If nothing else, the 
strategic competition for regional influence will 
probably intensify and the margin for action by 
any one external actor, including the United States, 
which has important energy and security interests 
in these areas, will diminish probably by an 
amount corresponding to the increased complexity 
of regional international interactions.
To the extent that Central Asia and the 
Transcaucasus are interlinked with other 
geostrategic zones of importance, South Asia, 
Europe, the CIS, or the Middle East, the spillover 
of conflicts from one region into another can 
create opportunities for the use of nuclear 
weapons as a political or even military instrument 
of policy. Azerbaijani calls for an alliance of 
NATO, Israel and the United States against 
Russia, Greece, Armenia, and Iran exemplifies the 
possibilities that may then arise by mixing up all 
these regions' security agendas into one large 
interconnected crisis.




Current international trends will probably 
continue the processes that are fusing CIS and 
other security agendas. NATO enlargement is the 
greatest manifestation of this fusion of security 
agendas for it brings NATO and the possible use 
of NATO forces closer to the new Middle East. 
And the U.S. unilateral supervision of the Arab- 
Israeli peace process follows close behind in 
importance as a factor bringing Europe and the 
Middle East together while also bypassing Russia. 
Russia’s eclipse as a major power has been the key 
factor that has ensured the relative smoothness of 
these processes. And in Asia the rise of China and 
intensified rivalry in South Asia are also in part 
results of Russia's decline. Hence Moscow’s alarm 
lest its eclipse become permanently inscribed in 
world politics at the very moment when it stands 
revealed as a failed state.
Yet other future threats, not even counting 
these states’ long-enduring structural internal 
pathologies also threaten Transcaspian stability 
and security. The commingling of ethnopolitical 
and religious identities in violent conflicts added 
to possible external support for the insurgents 
immensely complicates efforts to maintain peace 
here and is a convenient instrument in the hands 
of foreign and regional states who see something 
to gain by destabilizing neighboring regimes. 
Therefore, any disturbance of the regional status 
quo provides a basis for bilateral and trilateral 
cooperation among interested governments, 
particularly Russia, China, and India.
While the disturbances of 1999, assassination 
attempts, insurgencies, etc. cannot in and of 
themselves cement a triple alliance among these 
states, certainly "terrorism" and Islamic insurgency 
drives them together and enhances their
propensity to cooperate at American expense. Yet 
it is the regimes that America has supported, e.g., 
Islam Karimov's rule in Uzbekistan, whose 
policies breed and or perpetuate the conditions 
that make turbulence and external cooperation 
among Moscow, Delhi, and Beijing possible.
Moreover, the proximity of Central Asia and 
the Transcaucasus to the centers of the drug trade 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan guarantee that 
funding for insurgency in Central Asia will not 
abate. There are numerous allegations of Chechen 
involvement in the drug trade and for some time 
drug money, gun running, and religious-political 
agitation have marched hand in hand in Pakistan.'8 
Thus when one adds up all the threats to security, 
internal and external, it becomes clear that this 
sacred place will not remain empty. Nor is it likely 
that the internal or external order within and 
among local states will easily remain peaceful. 
Since so many of the players now define their 
Transcaspian interests as vital, it is entirely 
possible that both they and internal insurgents 
may not only come to see the region as a holy one 
but will regard the conflicts they provoke and 
react to as holy ones as well.
Stephen Blank is Professor of National Security Studies, 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
The views expressed here do not represent the views of 
the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. 
Government.
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Day 1, Heading ]Hes(
Baku, Azerbaijan, the gathering place for our 
unlikely caravan. The plan is to ride the route of 
the proposed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, 
nearly 1000 miles, on motorcycles. Not any 
motorcycles, but Soviet/Russian made Urals with 
sidecars. We are more than a dozen, from the 
United States, United Kingdom, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, Turkey and other states. Some of us 
are very familiar with the region while this will be 
the first time for others.
After days of preparation, the caravan 
departed from Baku for the Neftalan Oil Bath 
Sanitarium in Geranboy Province, approximately 
250 kilometers from Baku. Neftalan is the last 
functioning sanitarium specializing in the famous 
“white oil” therapeutic baths that attracted 
hundreds of thousands of Soviet-era health 
seekers. Today, all other sanatoria are filled with 
refugees from the war with Armenia over the 
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Nearly 
three-quarters of a million refugees have been 
moved from Karabakh and surrounding areas as 
a result of the conflict which began in the late 
1980s. A ceasefire has more or less held since 
1994 but there is still no resolution to this 
conflict.
gunplay, a metal detector and a gun check were 
installed in the lobby. Eventually, “rule of law” 
has begun to prevail in Georgia and with it the 
hotel has become less of an underworld 
attraction. In fact, visitors today wouldn’t have 
any idea of its past were it not for the metal 
detector.
Day 3, Shevardnadze
Today it was off to see Tbilisi and a visit with 
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze. Later 
that evening I met with two friends from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We talked politics 
and they recalled a cartoon that has become 
somewhat popular. It shows Shevardnadze asking 
his grandson what he wants to be when he grows 
up. The boy replies, “President of Georgia.” 
Shevardnadze is perplexed and asks the boy why 
Georgia would need two presidents. In the final 
frame the boy has gone missing. The implication 
is obvious.
It is amazing to me that Shevardnadze is still 
alive. He has been the target of multiple 
assassination attempts. I remember seeing him 
on the news, all bloodied after a near fatal
Day 2, Reaching Georgia
We rode the remaining 250 kilometers up the
Baku-Supsa pipeline into the Georgian capital of 
Tbilisi to establish camp. Camp is a relative term 
since the Tbilisi Metechi Sheraton Hotel is one 
of, if not, the most luxurious hotels in Georgia. 
However, it has a past that is sordid and 
indicative of the country in which it is located. 
Back in the early 1990s, it was a gathering place 
for local mobsters and strongmen. Such notables 
as Dhzaba Ioseliani, the leader of the 
Mekhedrioni paramilitary organization, were 
known to frequent the hotel. After repeated
Looking down on the historic capital of Georgia.
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attempt a few years ago. He is definitely a 
survivor. What will happen to Georgia when he 
is gone is anyone’s guess.
Georgia has had its share of conflicts since it 
declared independence in 1991 under the 
direction of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. It has fought 
a war on the streets of the capital, known as the 
Tbilisi War, between Gamsakhurdia’s men and 
those loyal to Tengiz Kitovani and Dhzaba 
Ioseliani, a war with ethnic Ossetians, and finally 
a war in its western territory of Abkhazia. In 
addition, Armenian unrest south of the capital 
and strained relations with Adjara on Georgia’s 
southern Black Sea coast still linger as potential 
trouble spots. Georgia could still explode into 
open conflict. Elowever, I think that every year 
that passes in relative peace is a good sign for the 
country.
The rest of the day was spent arguing about 
the route we should take from Tbilisi to the 
Georgian-Turkish border. Some in the group 
were concerned about security and the fact that 
the southern route passes through the Armenian 
enclaves of Georgia. Tensions have been semi­
constant in these areas. Two years ago 
government units on “routine exercises” were 
stopped from entering the predominantly 
Armenian Marneuli district by the local 
leadership. Tensions are still high and mistrust 
between the Georgian government and the 
Armenian regions never seems to abate. During 
the war in Abkhazia (1992-1994) Armenian 
citizens of Georgia found themselves caught in 
the middle. There were ethnic Armenians 
fighting on the Abkhaz side so many Armenians 
in other parts of Georgia felt compelled to join 
the war effort on the Georgian side as a sign of 
loyalty to the state. They were concerned that 
the presence of Armenians on the Abkhaz side 
would lead to retribution against Armenians in 
other parts of Georgia.
Day 4, Getting Caught
We hadn’t gone a mile from the hotel and the 
trailer blew another tire. It has been a chronic 
problem so far and there has been some heated 
discussions whether or not we should leave it 
behind. Anyway, the convoy became separated 
and instead of a tight unit moving through the
streets of Tbilisi, most of the motorcycles went 
on ahead while I and a few of the bikes stayed 
with the trailer. It was boring to hang out while 
they changed the tire so I walked out to the 
bridge. (We were just to the point of crossing the 
river to get to Rustaveli Street—the main avenue 
and the location of most of the Tbilisi War 
mentioned earlier.) I had only been on the bridge 
for a couple of minutes filming traffic passing on 
a street below when a car pulled up. Plainclothes 
officers immediately detained me. A police van 
pulled up and then another car arrived with 
someone who seemed to be in charge. They 
asked for my documents and the camera. I tried 
to tell them that I was with the motorcycle group 
and pointed to the chaos surrounding the trailer, 
only a hundred yards away.
It turns out the road I was filming below, 
which runs parallel to the river and is known as 
the President’s Road, was the street of the most 
recent attempt on Shevardnadze’s life. So now, 
illogically, it is forbidden to take any photos of 
the street—at all. After some discussion it was 
decided that I could leave with my camera but I 
would first have to erase the shots I had taken 
from the bridge.
We headed west along the old M-27 military 
highway, towards Gori, Stalin’s hometown. 
There was the usual bit of confusion as no one 
was told that at the junction, instead of turning 
south towards Gori, we would turn north toward 
the breakaway region of South Ossetia and its 
capital Ts’khinvaE to eat lunch at a restaurant a 
mile or so up the road. Half of the group went 
south, the other north. Eventually though, 
everybody made it to the restaurant.
Not far from the restaurant we could see an 
orange marker indicating the Baku-Supsa oil 
pipeline. The Georgian state oil company 
(GIOC) official traveling with us told us that if 
we went to the marker we would be detected and 
security would be sent out to see what we were 
doing. I find it hard to believe. An acquaintance 
of mine, a pipeline engineer, told me that they 
have found over one thousand illegal taps on the 
pipeline. Its humorous to me that there is so 
much Russian attention to the illegal taps the 
Chechens make on the pipeline running through 
their territory as one of the pretexts for Russian 
military action in the area, when corruption in
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Statue of Stalin in central Cori
Georgia still seems unrivaled. During the early 
1990s this was definitely the case. Everything was 
for sale. Even foreign aid, food and clothes, 
often turned up missing and then showed up for 
sale in local markets.
Finally, Gori, Stalin’s birthplace. There is a 
massive Stalin museum in central Gori, built at 
the exact location of the home of his birth. A 
large statue of Stalin—the ultimate Soviet 
ghost—stands in the central square, a reminder 
of the contradictions of the region. Stalin still 
has quite a following in Georgia despite the 
brutality that characterized his regime. He may 
have been a butcher, but he was their butcher. 
Oddly, the museum dedicated to his life, 
mysteriously left out much of 1941 and 1942, 
when the Nazis steamrolled into the Soviet 
Union, wiping out much of the Soviet military 
and almost reaching Moscow.
Our arrival in Bakuriani this evening 
happened to coincide with a retreat for the 
Georgian Parliament led by the number two man 
in Georgia, Zurab Zvanya. Between food and 
drink there was some serious debate regarding 
corruption. Apparently the Parliament went 
through 19 checkpoints between Tbilisi and 
Bakuriani. The checkpoints are little more than a 
way for the local police to exort bribes. Georgia, 
like many places in the former Soviet Union, is 
trying to redefine itself. Accessible transit routes, 
whether for oil or people, are critical to
development in Georgia. Too many checkpoints, 
especially those thrown up to demand payment 
for passage are bad for business—any business. 
By way of comparison, it was also noted that 
between Tbilisi and the Armenian border there 
are another ten checkpoints, while there are not 
any between the border and the Armenian capital 
Yerevan.
According to a Bertling Caspian official, the 
bribe taking in Georgia is chronic and is even 
categorized as official and non-official. Official 
bribes being those that are accompanied by a 
receipt while non-official bribes are strictly under 
the table. Some multi-national companies have 
even developed a special formula for figuring out 
what it costs to do business in Georgia.
Day 5, Confrontation
After a bike check we were on our way back 
to the main road and to the southern city of 
Akhalts’skhe. The detour to Bakuriani was very 
scenic. The small road through high-mountain 
passes reminded me how beautiful this country' 
really is, and what it might eventually become. 
However, stability remains an issue. We stopped 
at a small village and when I began to take 
pictures a man grabbed me. I thought it was a 
friendly embrace, but it was soon obvious that 
the man meant to fight. He was quickly subdued 
by other bystanders once they realized that I was 
being attacked. It happened so quickly' that it still 
seems strange that it even occurred. It reminded 
me of how quick the situation can turn ugly. In 
1995 I left my apartment in Tbilisi one day' to 
return to find that the others with me had been 
tied up and robbed. There wasn’t much money 
so they beat one of my friends with the butt of 
their weapons. It happened just like that.
Everywhere there were ample signs of the 
decaying Soviet-era infrastructure. Abandoned 
buildings and trains sit empty and rusty, in stark 
contrast to the natural beauty of the land. 
Eventually, we made it to Akhalts’skhe. We were 
not going straight to Turkey, however. We 
detoured again, this time in a southeasterly 
direction, paralleling the Georgian Turkish 
border. Our objective, to camp below the 
Vardzya cave house complex. It was an 
impressive route. The canyon road on which we
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traveled was flanked by signs of hundreds of 
years of civilization. There were stone lookouts 
perched on strategic hilltops every few 
kilometers, an advance warning system against 
foreign invaders. We soon came to Khertvissi 
Fort, a massive structure on the north side of the 
narrow valley commanding views in both 
directions.
A half-hour later we gazed at the impressive 
Vardzya cave complex. Built hundreds of years 
ago, they were completely hidden, and used as a 
place to live and fight foreign invaders using the 
narrow valley to gain access into Georgian lands. 
Apparently, the cave’s existence was forgotten. 
Eventually, a massive earthquake caused the 
whole front of the canyon wall to collapse, 
revealing the enormous cave city built into the 
side of the mountain
This was my first night in an actual camp and 
I realized that I should have brought my own 
sleeping arrangements. Yes, there was an extra 
tent, cushion and sleeping bag, but the barrel of 
oil—the actual barrel of Caspian crude, to be 
delivered to Ceyhan, leaked all over everything. 
Eventually, I found a couple white blankets that 
were pretty clean and used them instead of a 
sleeping bag.
Day 6, Tthnic Rivalries
After a fitful night’s sleep on what I thought 
were white blankets, but turned out to be large 
fiber glass pads with which to wrap the 
motorcycles for shipment back from Turkey, we 
backtracked past the Khertivissi Fort and again 
into Akhalts’skhe. It is a dusty town only 10 
kilometers from the Turkish border. One of the 
bolts holding the suspension in place vibrated 
out of one of the bikes and we were once again 
left waiting while a local machine shop went to 
work to manufacture a replacement.
It began to rain hours later as we finally left 
town for a campsite near the border. It wasn’t 
too far, but we were getting pretty wet. I more 
than others as I was riding in a sidecar and my 
driver chose to go through every mud and rain 
filled pothole he could find—both because it was 
there and he was more than a bit drunk. After 
being drenched I opted to ride in one of the 
support vehicles. Fie rolled his bike a few
minutes later.
Seven kilometers between Akhalts’skhe and 
the border is the small village of Vale. Half its 
population is ethnic Armenian. Our plan was to 
camp near the village and then ride across the 
border the next day. However, our Azerbaijan 
state oil company (SOCAR) officials, ethnic 
Azeris, refused to camp anywhere near Vale. 
They had gotten it in their head that Armenians 
might try to capture the symbolic barrel of Azeri 
crude oil while we camped.
Apparently, this would be a tremendous loss 
of face politically. Nearly everyone else agreed 
that their suspicions were ridiculous. Some 
confusion and confrontation followed after 
which a compromise was reached. It was 
decided to move our camp a kilometer or so 
closer to the border, and closer to the watchful 
eyes of border security personnel. In the end the 
SOCAR officials decided it was too wet outside 
and they decided to spend the night out of the 
mud and back in Akhalts’skhe.
Day 7, Turkey
It rained all night. Finally, morning came and 
the sun. I hoped it wouldn’t rain today since 
most of our stuff was completely soaked. There 
was a slab of cheese stuck to the side of one of 
the tents, having stuck right where one of the 
guys threw it the previous evening trying to see if 
anyone would even notice. It was funny that it 
hadn’t slid to the ground.
Eventually, after a very small fire made from 
petrol from the bikes, I walked down to a petrol 
station near the border and looked around for 
something to burn. There was a lot of scrap 
wood from a building being built across the 
street, so we scrounged up as much as we could 
carry and headed back to camp. The fire was 
much better now. I was actually getting warm 
and drying out some of my wet clothes. There 
was nothing to eat so everyone tinkered with the 
bikes and did their own tiring. We weren’t due to 
enter Turkey until 2 pm when the Turkish 
officials showed up to welcome us.
The border crossing went smoothly. We 
entered Turkey via the Turkgozu Customs 
entrance opened in 1995. After a brief ceremony 
we traveled until dark and reached the city of
26
THE HARRIMAN REVIEW
Oltu. We were behind schedule and did not get 
as far as planned, so our new escorts, Turkish 
police and petroleum company officials, 
scrambled around town to get us rooms at 
various hotels. I think my bill came to about 
$6.00.
Day 8, The Kurds
We awoke to the 75th anniversary of the 
Turkish Republic and the sound of tanks in the 
streets. They were part of a larger armada 
honoring the country’s anniversary, but as one 
Turkish bystander admitted, “this is a show of 
force, a demonstration of power not to be lost 
on the local Kurdish population.” He then 
pointed out Kurds among the resident Turks.
Day 9, Blue Berets
The military presence was noticeably heavier 
in Turkey. The region that the pipeline would 
travel has, until recently, been the scene of a 
fierce counter-insurgency operation to eliminate 
the Kurdish PICK. Just before passing the village 
of Besseray we passed a military base on the left. 
Artillery was positioned under camouflage 
netting next to rows of trucks and APCs.
Five minutes later, about 35 kilometers from 
Kamah, we came to a military checkpoint 
manned by soldiers wearing blue berets. It 
reminded me of the checkpoints that characterize 
Russia’s presence in Dagestan or along the Inguri 
River border separating Abkhazia from the rest 
of Georgia. Stop signs were placed to divert 
traffic flow past a fortified sandbag bunker, then 
past a parked armored personnel vehicle and 
finally, past another fortified sandbag bunker on 
the left side of the road.
Eventually we made it to Ilic, but not before 
passing another military base, the largest so far, 
perched on the hill across from the town. The 
military escort that accompanied us most of the 
morning handed us over to a new unit. We didn’t 
even turn off the bikes. Soon it was across the 
river and into Ilic.
In Ilic, our lunch stop, we met Turkish 
intelligence personnel. They explained that now 
that the terrorist threat is diminished the people 
are beginning to come back to Ilic. Apparently, it
Turkish military personnel in Ilic
was depopulated as a result of the local 
insurgency. I took a walk through town while I 
was waiting for lunch—followed by military 
personnel the whole time. There was another 
military' base at the end of the street. The whole 
town seemed to be garrisoned.
The road out of Ilic was dirt. There would be 
no pavement for much of the day. Shortly’ after 
leaving Ilic our military' escort handed us over to 
a blue berets unit. It consisted of two eight-man 
teams in Turkish-made Otocar trucks with 
parallel benches running lengthwise up the center 
of the truck bed. The soldiers sat with their 
backs to each other facing outward on both sides- 
of the vehicle. The unit commander sat in the 
cab with the driver. One soldier carried a 
machine gun. There was a sniper and the rest 
were equipped with assault rifles. Although the 
commander of the unit stated clearly' that, “our 
presence here is to show everybody that the 
Turkish Republic is secure and united,” his very' 
presence seemed to demonstrate that the area 
was not secure.
The terrain is pretty' rugged and barren. It’s a 
wonder that an insurgency' could take place here 
because there is no place to hide, or is there? I 
remember the Vardzya cave houses in southern 
Georgia. Then again, a Turk in Ilic told me that 
the “terrorists” are hidden in homes in every' 
town. Ironically, the river we’ve been following
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for most of the day is the headwater of the 
Euphrates, a traditional conflict line by the time it 
reaches the Middle East.
At one point we raced ahead of the caravan, 
across the dusty choking road, to take pictures. I 
hiked up to a good vantage point and looked 
around. There was nothing but endless landscape 
as far as I could see, but just in case I took off 
my Turkpetro shirt because I didn’t want to be 
mistaken for an employee of a state-owned 
company and targeted as a result.
I’m surprised how under-developed tliis part 
of Turkey is, compared to western and northern 
regions in which I have traveled. Turkey is in a 
catch 22, if they modernize the area it might 
empower the restless Kurdish minority that lives 
here. There are signs that the government is 
trying to modernize the region. The road is under 
construction and looks to be paved. Simple 
improvements like tliis may go a long way to win 
the hearts and minds of the people here and may 
eventually establish peace in the region. 
Eventually the barren hillsides turned to wheat 
fields and the look of prosperity.
We lost our commando escort and picked up 
lesser forces once we reached paved road. One 
of the Turks told me that there are at least three 
types of military forces and our escort is 
determined by our location. We are under the 
control, or protection, of the police in the cities, 
under the direction of the Gendarme on the 
outskirts, and under the control of the military in 
the countryside.
We were going to stay in Kangal but our 
Turkish Botas officials are concerned about the 
number of miles we have to make up tomorrow. 
As a result, it was decided to continue in the dark 
as far as Gurun. Again we filled up all the 
available hotel rooms in the small town. The 
room was small and crowded, but the beds were 
comfortable and at only $3 per person it was a 
bargain. The bathroom was at the end of the hall, 
as usual.
Day 10, Crash
The next day began without a hitch. We 
stopped for lunch in Saimbeyli and I bought a 
small, hand-made carpet. We were ahead of 
schedule for a change and optimistic of finally
making camp before dark. Disaster struck just 
before we reached Feke. Our Turkish driver went 
over the edge and tumbled a hundred feet down 
a steep precipice. He came to a stop in a thicket.
Remarkably, an ambulance was in Feke and it 
arrived in minutes. It took us a half an hour to 
get him up to the road. There was a 
confrontation with some Turkish press as many 
of the riders were emotional and not in the mood 
for aggressive press coverage. Some felt that it 
might have been the press that caused the ill- 
fated driver to drive beyond his capabilities and 
go over the edge.
It is amazing that only his legs were broken. 
He and the bike were mangled. He could have 
easily been killed. His right leg was pretty bad 
and the doctors later said that they thought they 
might have had to amputate. Fortunately, after 
hours in surgery, they were able to reconstruct 
the ankle and save his foot.
We eventually made it to our designated 
camping spot, above the city of Kozan. We were 
taken to a park below a crusaders castle. Again 
we arrived after dark. There was no firewood so 
some of the guys cut down a tree. Of course it 
didn’t burn but probably will for the next 
campers. I found it absurd that along the way we 
had talked about the environmental impact of an 
oil pipeline and there we were cutting down trees 
in a park. I mentioned this fact and was told by 
some of the guys that, “we were exempt.”
Day 11, Destination
We arrived in Ceyhan and then continued on 
to the Botas pipeline terminal in Yumurtalik 
(meaning the place where turtles lay their eggs). 
We were received by a large reception hosted by 
Botas and included Turkey’s Minister of Energy 
and other officials. It seemed as if the whole 
country’s press also attended.
The Botas facility sits on the edge of tire 
Mediterranean Sea and has a commanding view 
of the large bay that makes up this portion of the 
coast. A couple of tankers sit idly on the blue 
horizon, waiting their turn to be loaded with 
crude oil. Ceyhan is also the final point on the 
Iraqi-Turkish pipeline. Turkey has lost billions in 
transit fees since the US slapped sanctions on 
Iraq—another reason the Turkish government is
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so anxious to see the Baku pipeline pass through 
its territory.
Day 12, Going Home
As I packed to return home it was hard not to 
look back on the last two weeks and see the 
realities of the region played out in my journey. 
Maybe I am making too much of the trip, 
suggesting our experiences are metaphors for the 
realities of the region, but after a thousand bike 
break-downs, miles of rugged terrain, dozens of 
checkpoints, two border crossings, corruption, 
being attacked, ethnic paranoia, military escorts 
and wrecks, it is hard not to see the challenges of 
the proposed pipeline being that different from 
ours.
The fact is, long-distance pipelines are critical 
to the world’s energy future, but are often located 
in some of the world’s least stable regions. Baku- 
Ceyhan is no exception. Alternative routes to 
deliver Caspian crude to the rest of the world 
have been examined, some even function, but all 
represent significant risk. Any pipeline from 
Baku to Ceyhan will suffer from mishaps. The 
fact that the region is inherently full of hazards
only maximizes this reality.
One final note: after traveling nearly 1000
miles and skirting at least four conflict zones, we 
came in contact with an ethnic Abkhaz 
community, the same ethnic group involved in 
the separatist war in western Georgia since 1992. 
Abkhaz volunteers from Turkey fought in 
Georgia. This community has been in Turkey 
for centuries, part of the fallout of the Caucasus 
wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Still, it seems odd to run into Abkhaz at the end 
of a route that has been selected primarily for its 
safety feature, to avoid a northern option that, 
among other tilings, would place the pipeline in 
proximity to war-torn Abkhazia. Even here at the 
shores of the Mediterranean, it is impossible to 
distance oneself from the realities of the 
Caucasus.
Dodge Billingsley has been engaged in security research in 
the Caucasus since 1993. He has worked on defense- 
related films for the History Channel and the Discovery 
Channel. He is the producer and director of the film 
“ImmortalFortress: A Hook Inside Chechnya’s Warrior 
Culture, ’’awarded the 1999 Bronzy Plaque.
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Russia, Ukraine, and the breakup of the Soviet Union
(Hoover Institution Press, 2000)
Reviewed by Mark L. von Hagen
Today, when ethnic identity and nation-build­ing have assumed a hegemonic place in the programs of A A ASS conventions, at the recent World Congress in Tampere, and in 
specialist organizations such as the Association for 
the Study of Nationalities, it is difficult for the 
current generation of social science and humanities 
scholars to realize that these issues were decidedly at 
the margins of earlier Sovietological agendas. But 
that same generation—my generation to a large 
degree—that today lovingly cites Benedict Ander­
son, Anthony Smith, Ernest Gellner, and Rogers 
Brubaker—to name only a few of the late-20th- 
century social science “revisionists” of national 
identity—looks back far less often at the work of 
those who have labored patiently and quietly for 
several decades within our own Sovietological 
vineyards.
Roman Szporluk, the Mykhailo Hrushevskyi
Professor of History and Director of the Ukrainian 
Research Institute at Harvard University, is the 
author of several books devoted to twentieth- 
century East and Central European intellectual 
history, including: The Political 'Thought of Thomas G. 
Masaryk (Boulder, 1981), a study of the “father” of 
modern Czechoslovakia; Communism andLLationalism: 
Karl Marx versus Friedrich Last (Oxford, 1988); and an 
annotated, translated edition of Russia in World 
History (Ann Arbor, 1970) by Mikhail Pokrovsky, 
the dean of the “new” Soviet historians of the 1920s 
who, for his efforts to write a global history based 
on historical materialism and internationalism, 
suffered disgrace under Stalin. The volume under 
review, Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet 
Union, brings together a selection of Szporluk's 
essays spanning twenty-five years between 1972 and 
1997. Their greatest contribution is to the rethinking 
of the postwar period of Ukrainian, Russian, and 
Soviet history, including post-Soviet developments. 
The essays also illustrate how broadly informed, 
good old-fashioned Kremlinology can help us better 
understand Soviet politics and post-Soviet develop­
ments through the prism of “the nationality ques­
tion” in Russian and Soviet history. Because most 
of the essays were written before the relevant 
archives were opened in Ukraine and Russia,
Szporluk posed interesting questions to a wide 
range of available published sources: Soviet 
ethnographers' studies and demographic statistics, 
urban geography, education, press, and language 
policy, ideological pronouncements, even fictional 
literature. But he was also constantly scouring the 
latest social science literature on nationalism for 
additional insights and comparative perspectives, 
including such partly forgotten classics as the works 
of Plans Kohn, John Armstrong, Frederick 
Barghoorn, and Karl Deutsch.
The essays give us a preview of some of the 
major outlines and themes of Szporluk's forthcom­
ing history of modern Ukraine. The histories of 
both Ukraine and Russia, or more accurately their 
historiographies, after a half-century of Cold War 
divisions and struggles, and with archives opened 
wide, are ripe for reconceptualization. Perhaps 
because Szporluk's work has been so focused on 
ideas, particularly geopolitical and historiographical 
ones, his own reflections on modern Ukrainian and 
Russian history are very suggestive of such new 
avenues of conceptualization? It is on those larger 
themes and conceptualizations that I want to focus 
in this essay.2
Particularly in this aspect, Szporluk's essays recall a 
respected tradition in Ukrainian historical writing in the 
diaspora of raising important intellectual and historiographical 
issues for future historians, even when the hope of archival 
access remained distant. The most influential such collection 
has been the writings of Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, Essays in 
Modem Ukrainian History (Edmonton, 1987); an important 
collection on Galician Ukraine edited by .Andrei S. Markovits 
and Prank E. Sysyn, Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism 
(Cambridge, 1982); and on early modern history, edited by 
Ivo Banac and Prank Sysyn, Concepts of Nationhood in Ear/y 
Modem Eastern Europe (Cambridge, 1986). Por a still earlier 
period Ihor Sevcenko recently brought several of his essays 
together in a provocative and learned volume, Ukraine Between 
East and driest (Edmonton, 1996).
I have been grappling with many of these themes in my 
own research and writing: "Docs Ukraine Have a History?" 
Slavic Review (fall 1995); "Writing the History of Russia as 
Empire," in Ospovat, livtukhov, Gasparov and von Hagen, 
eds., Kayrn', Moscow, St. Petersburg: Multiple Faces of the Russian 
Empire (Moscow, 1997); with Karen Barkey, eds., After Empire: 
Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building (Boulder, Colorado, 
1997); "Federalism, Rcgionalisms and 1’an-Movements as Rc-
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Russia, Ukraine, Empire, Nation
Szporluk's overarching concern has been with 
the state- and nation-building his tor)' of Eastern and 
East Central Europe. The cases he highlights in this 
collection are Ukraine and Russia, in their various 
editions in the modern period. He argues that the 
fates of these two contemporary states have been 
historically interwoven in ways that are full of 
ironies and paradoxes. And today, he argues fur­
ther, their separate state- and nation-building pro­
jects continue to influence each other in profound 
ways.
The central nationality question for Eastern 
Europe, Szporluk reminds us in a very sobering 
reversal of the traditional focus on the non-Rus­
sians, is the Russian question,* 3 by which he means 
the urgent imperative for Russian elites to transform 
their state's self-identity from an imperial to a 
national one as a crucial component of Russia's 
political modernization. What Szporluk describes as 
the Soviet Union’s own version of imperialism has 
its roots in Stalin’s russification policies; the conse­
quence has been a confused and dialectical relation­
ship between Russianness and Soviet communism. 
He insists that while desovietization and shedding 
the imperial legacy are two distinct processes, they 
are also intertwined in complicated ways because the 
Soviet Union and Soviet identity, such as it existed, 
became perceived by non-Russians as Russian, even 
if the ethnic Russian population, or at least some of 
its leading intellectuals, felt itself denied national 
self-expression in the Soviet Union. The new 
national identity (rosstiskit, presumably) that 
Szporluk clearly prefers for Russia is one we would 
call civic or territorial, not ethnic. In other words, 
citizens of Russia must come to see themselves 
primarily not as ethnic Russians (russkie) allied with 
other Russians outside the borders of today's 
Russian Federation, but as accepting the sovereignty
of those borders and the multiethnic population 
that lives within them.4 *
Much of the same is true for post-Soviet 
Ukraine, which paradoxically inherited a civic- 
territorial version of a Ukrainian nation from Soviet 
institutions and practice; however, that achievement 
is threatened today by extremists both within 
Ukraine and without (especially in Russia) who seek 
to ethnicize politics and identity in ways that 
Szporluk fears would lead to violence. Instead of 
the ethnic nationalism (or nationalizing states) that 
most scholars look for (and find), Szporluk devotes 
several chapters to defining better (and on Ukrai­
nian material) what we understand by civic-territo­
rial identities and loyalties? How have Ukrainians 
been able to think about themselves and their state 
without emphasizing ethnicity and even language? 
In a particularly ingenious borrowing from the 
literature of urban and regional geography, Szporluk 
traces how Kyiv achieved the status of “primate 
city” in Ukraine; he interprets the 1959 census data 
as evidence that Kyiv was perceived and accepted by 
most Ukrainians, east, west or south, as their histor­
ically legitimate capital and major city.
The status of the capital in the rank-order of 
major Ukrainian cities became an important factor 
in Ukrainian citizens’ capacity to imagine a Ukrai­
nian territorial state. (Kyiv only became the capital 
of Soviet Ukraine in 1934, after it was transferred 
there from Khar'kiv.)6 Here Szporluk demonstrates 
how important the postwar period of Soviet and 
Ukrainian history' is proving to be in better under­
standing contemporary politics and identities in the 
region. His observations are grounded in analyses
imaginings in/of the Russian Empire," unpublished paper; 
and most extensively in the collborative research project (with 
Andreas Kappeler, Erank Sysyn, and Zenon Kohut),
"Peoples, Nations, and Identities: The Russian-Ukrainian 
Encounter" (with funding from the NEH, the Alexander- 
von-I Iumboldt Stiftung, and the Canadian Institute of 
Ukrainian Studies).
3 Indeed, Szporluk relies on a much richer literature on
the non-Russian nations than he is able to for the Russians
themselves. Besides an unjustly forgotten study by Frederick 
Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism (New York, 1956), 
Szporluk turns to more recent studies of Russian nationalism. 
See Yitzhak M. Brudny, Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism 
and the Soviet State, 1953-91 (Cambridge, 1998); John Dunlop,
The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism (Princeton, 1983); 
and Alexander Yanov, The Russian New Righl (Berkeley, 1978).
4 Chapters 1 anti 16 allow the reader to sec the continuity 
in Szporluk's concerns while also charting a considerable- 
evolution of his thought in response to important changes in 
post-Soviet politics.
5 Szporluk's reflections on civic-territorial identity' are 
especially developed in chapter 5. Here and elsewhere he 
takes issue with Rogers Brubaker and David Eaitin, and the 
many scholars who have followed in their theoretical and 
methodological footsteps, on their notion of the 
"nationalizing state" pursuing an ethnicization of politics, 
culture and identity.
6 Szporluk borrows the concepts via the writings of 
Chauncey Harris {Cities of the Soviet Union: Studies in Their 
Functions, Si^e, Density, and Growth, 1970) and David Hooson 
(The Soviet Union: People and Regions, 1966) and applies them to 




of changes in ideology and policy, as well as demo­
graphic and ethnographic trends.7
The Soviet West and Eastern Europe
But, of course, the Ukrainian-Russian relation­
ship does not exist nor has it evolved in a geo­
political and intellectual vacuum. Another major 
theme of Szporluk's essays is the enduring impor­
tance of both Eastern and East Central Europe 
more generally but also what he calls Far Eastern 
Europe, or the Soviet West, in particular, for the 
Ukrainian-Russian relationship and for the fate of 
Empire, whether Russian or Soviet. This region 
includes the historic kresy of Poland (territory today 
shared by Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine), Latvia, 
Estonia, Moldova and other contiguous territories 
contested by Romania, Russia and the Ottoman 
Empire at various points in the past. Szporluk 
contends that the western half of the Russian 
Empire, and later the Soviet Union, proved to be a 
constant threat to the imperial order by undermin­
ing its legitimacy; the populations of this region 
were more “European” than the Russians them­
selves and have not ever been successfully inte­
grated into the Moscow-centered state. What 
Szporluk means by the region's “European” or 
“Europeanizing” character is that it was a conduit 
for and translator of modern ideas and institutions, 
especially national ones, from western Europe into 
the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. The relations 
of the Russians with other parts of their empire, 
especially the Turko-Muslim worlds, were also 
fraught with tensions and contradictions, but inso­
far as the imperial and Soviet elites thought of 
themselves as European or modern (or wanted to 
be so regarded by others), it was the relationships 
with and attitudes toward this Soviet/Russian Far 
West that were more urgent to those elites' self­
understanding.8 *
7 Szporluk explores how postwar urbanization processes 
helped reconfigure the status and prestige of Kyiv in chapters 
3 and 5. For other explorations of non-ethnic Ukrainian 
nationalisms, see the work of two anthropologists and a 
historian: Catherine Wanner, Burden of Dreams: History and 
Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine (Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1998); and Adriana Pctryna, "Sarcophagus: Chernobyl 
in Historical Light," Cultural Anthropology, 10 (2): 196-220, 
1995; "Technical Error: Measures of Life After Chernobyl," 
Social Identities, 4 (1): 73-92, 1997; Amir Weiner, Slaking Sense 
of War (Princeton University Press, 2001).
8 This thesis is presented most succinctly in chapter 9 of
the current collection, but is explored more fully in an earlier 
volume of essays edited by Professor Szporluk, The Influence of 
East Europe and the Soviet West on Soviet Society (New York,
During the nineteenth century Poland's several 
rebellions turned out to be “too much for Russia to 
swallow,” but nationalist ideas were attracting large 
audiences in Finland and among the Baltic peoples 
as well. After the disintegration of the Russian 
Empire in the wake of the First World War, the 
Bolshevik state lost those western territories until 
the start of World War II. In its moment of great­
est triumph in war, the Soviet Union annexed its Far 
West and then consolidated its empire in postwar 
Eastern Europe; ironically, that annexation brought 
with it alien political cultures that could not be 
entirely Sovietized out of existence. Szporluk's very' 
original contribution here is to focus on the period 
1939-47 as a transformative moment, a historical 
turning point, whose contradictory outcome eventu­
ally undermined the Soviet solution to the “national 
question” that had been hammered out in the 
interwar years.
Of course, in a set of writings that are so wide- 
ranging and, in many cases, speculative or provoca­
tive, there are bound to be some issues of conten­
tion between historians who have had different 
“groundings” and who therefore look at putatively 
the same processes and events from somewhat 
different perspectives. Most of the concerns I raise 
in Professor Szporluk's work are questions of 
emphasis and degree of generalizability. One set of 
questions revolves around the concept of the 
(Soviet) West and that region's crucial contribution 
to the destabilization of the Russian Empire and 
Soviet Union. First, how coherent is the concept of 
a historical Soviet West to begin with, when the 
differences and similarities are difficult to balance in 
the end? Estonia and Latvia differ in important 
ways from Lithuania even among the Baltic coun­
tries; all three played a different role from Poland 
and Finland (though Estonia has close ties to 
Finland and Lithuania to Poland). And Belarus 
seems to be an outlyer for most of the important 
similarities, as suggested by Szporluk's own dimin­
ished treatment of Belarus in comparison to the 
other cases. Ukraine, of course, both fits and 
doesn't fit the Soviet West, reflecting the historic 
divisions between western Ukraine and the more 
Russian (or Russified) eastern and southern 
Ukraine. These hesitations notwithstanding, the 
Soviet West is highly suggestive and worth pursuing 
further, but it needs more sustained exploration to 
make the case.
Washington, and London, 1976). Sec also The Soviet West: 
Interplay between Nationality and Social Organisation, ed. by Ralph 
S. (Hem (New York, Washington, London, 1975).
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Once we agree that there is something that holds 
together the Soviet West, we need to think about 
how geopohtically important it was as a region or 
sub-region. One might argue that in key moments 
of modern history, whether in the recent disman­
tling of the Soviet Union or the revolutionary end to 
the Russian Empire in 1917, the Caucasus has 
played an equally important role in transforming 
relations of power in the region. Certainly the 
Georgians and the Armenians claimed ancient 
kingdoms and “rediscovered” their national identity 
in the nineteenth century'; Armenia shared Ukraine's 
fate in being divided between empires, but also in 
being an imperial diaspora population. (True, 
neither the Armenians nor the Georgians had to 
“share” their ancient kingdoms with the Russians, as 
Ukrainians have had to contest Russia's claims to 
sole ownership of the Kyivan Rus' period in their 
own history.) The Armenians, Azeris, and Geor­
gians all had short-lived civil war-era states, similar 
to the Ukrainian (and to some degree the Belarusan) 
experiences; and particularly the Georgians and 
Armenians were able to preserve not only their 
language and literature, but distinctive alphabets 
(much as the Baltic republics fought to maintain 
their languages and Latin alphabets as distinct from 
the Cyrillicized written languages elsewhere in the 
USSR). The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict proved 
fatal for the Soviet elites' efforts to hold the multi­
national state together and became the first case of 
inter-ethnic violence on Soviet territory that could 
not be effectively contained.
In fairness, Szporluk does not attempt to raise 
the Soviet West to the prime cause of Soviet col­
lapse, but he suggests that that region posed the 
most intractable dilemmas for the Moscow leader­
ship. And he does attribute much of the credit for 
the relatively peaceful dismantling of the Soviet 
Union to the actions of Russians themselves, partic­
ularly those led by Boris Yeltsin (xxxvi). On the 
other hand, Szporluk's focus on the Soviet West 
offers a far more powerful explanation for the 
political crises that led to the dismantling of the 
Soviet Union than much of the analysis that ex­
pected the end to come from the forces of resurgent 
Islam in Central Asia.9 Still, Szporluk's intriguing 
theses await a more comprehensive and synthetic 
treatment of the role played by the “national ques­
tion” (and individual “national questions”) in the 
end of the Soviet state and political economy.
Russia, Eastern Europe and Europe
Another important theme is Szporluk's insis­
tence on returning the history of Eastern Europe 
and even Russia to a European history' that has been 
distortingly and misleadingly divided by the 
geopolitical struggle of the Cold War for the past 
half century' at least. The redrawn boundaries of 
post-1945 Europe were reproduced in a redrawing 
of intellectuals' boundaries which excised Russian 
history from that of Europe after 1917 and Eastern 
Europe's history' after 1945 (and by retroactive re­
periodization in effect excised all East European 
history) from NATO's reconfiguration as the telos 
and limits of Europe. Although communism was 
one spatial and temporal boundary that served to 
separate Eastern Europe from the “real” Europe, so 
too was East European nationalism used to segre­
gate specialists in the region from their counterparts 
who studied “normal” states and civil societies with 
healthy patriotism, rather than the versions that are 
described in often racialist terms as tribal or atavistic 
in the East.'0
In contrast, Szporluk insists on the European 
normality of much of East European national 
history. (He insists particularly' that Ukraine's 
history' is not all that different from the rest of 
Eastern Europe's.) For one, the nationalisms of 
Eastern Europe are not qualitatively different from 
analogous movements in Europe more generally, 
but share important commonalities in ideas of 
popular sovereignty, language and culture. True, the 
three dynastic empires (and USSR) that ruled over 
today's nations and successor states posed different 
challenges to nation-making elites in the East, and 
the sequence of state- and nation-building was 
different from that of the classic West European 
models. But Eastern Europe has shared in many' of 
the fundamental processes of modern European 
history and deserves broader sympathy' and more 
genuine understanding from those scholars who call 
themselves Europeanists than has been the case 
certainly for the past half century.
Though Szporluk appeals for Europeanists to 
relocate their conceptual boundaries farther to the 
east, he hesitantly draws the line somewhere west of 
Russia's current borders. (He, after all, sees the
This view was most forcefully propounded by Helene 
Carrcre D'Encausse in her Decline of the Soviet Empire: The 
Triumph of the Nations (New York, 1992). Szporluk himself 
makes only positive references to d'Encausse's work.
10 The most influential proponent of dividing the 
nationalisms of world history into good, civic ones and bad 
ethnic ones has been Liah Greenfeld, in Nationalism: Five 
Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, 1992).
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Soviet Far West as Europe's Far East.) The rela­
tionship of Russia to Europe, however defined, has 
today once again been raised on the policy and 
intellectual agenda. Martin Malia, at one end of the 
divide, asserts that Russia has returned to her 
European path of development after having been 
derailed first by World War I and then seventy years 
of alien, Soviet rule. He seeks to rehabilitate a 
westernizing, liberal, national alternative to Soviet 
ideocracy.11 Szporluk's view of Russia, by contrast, 
stresses greater continuity from the Imperial institu­
tions and ideologies to their Soviet, particularly 
Stalinist successors. Such a view aligns him more 
closely with an important antagonist of Malia's, 
Richard Pipes, who also emphasizes Russia's unfor­
tunate history of failed nation-building in the name 
of Empire and autocracy.12 In other words, for 
Szporluk, European means post-imperial (and 
Russia, in his opinion, has not attained that status 
yet), though the history of a couple important 
European powers, France and Britain, remind us 
that decolonization and deimperialization were also 
reluctantly undertaken only in the postwar years, 
and with often tragic consequences (witness, for 
example, the French-Algerian war).
The discussions about NATO and European 
Union expansion have given new life to these 
disagreements about Russia's place in Europe, and 
the views of Eastern and East Central Europeans 
are helping to shape those discussions. Szporluk's 
and Pipes' interwar Polish origins have influenced 
their own wrestling with the question of how 
"European" Russia can become, and their views are 
closer to the European (and I suspect American) 
mainstream than those of Malia. Still Szporluk 
reminds us, in the final analysis, that Ukraine's 
contemporary state- and nation-building projects, 
and possibly Ukraine's basic survival, hinge on the 
successful transformation of Russia to a democratic, 
civic, territorial nation. Many friends of independent 
Ukraine often appear to be wishing for the worst in 
Russia because they rue the historic domination of 
Ukraine by Russia. But a Russia excluded from 
Europe—from European institutions, norms, and 
values—would be a threat to Ukraine's own integra­
tion into Europe. After all, a starkly contrasting
11 See his under Western Eyes (Cambridge, Mass.,
and London, 1999); and The Soviet Tragedy (New York, 1994).
12 Lor Pipes' important statements on these issues, see his 
Russia under the 0Id Regime (New York, 1974); and The 
Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917- 
1929} (Cambridge, Mass., 1964). Geoffrey Ilosking has also 
recently reformulated this thesis in Russia: Feople and Empire 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1997).
model of post-Soviet state relations is that of 
Belarus and Russia in their solemnly proclaimed 
union. Belarus's leadership appears to be willing to 
cede considerable sovereignty to the union and to 
restrict the processes of democratization inside 
Belarus', and such concessions encourage neo­
imperialist thinking inside Russia (and among 
certain circles in Ukraine) as well.
And just as many Russians today blame “Soviet 
legacies”for their contemporary difficulties rather 
than facing up to their own mistaken policies, so, 
too, many Ukrainian political leaders blame “the 
Russian factor”for most of Ukraine's contemporary 
woes rather than admit their own lack of imagina­
tion and political will. This does not mean we 
should turn a blind eye to Russian policies or trends 
that run counter to European or Euro-Atlantic 
interests and values, nor is it a denial of the consid­
erable institutional and social-psychological legacies 
of the Soviet system and Russian domination in that 
system, but too often this type of laying blame 
becomes ideology rather than objective analysis of 
the situation. However the issues of legacies are to 
be resolved, Ukrainian-Russian relations are likely to 
be very important for the foreseeable future. Those 
who hope for the survival and growth of an inde­
pendent Ukraine should also hope for a truly demo­
cratic Russian neighbor. The survival of an inde­
pendent Ukraine in itself will be an important 
indicator of Russia's successful deimperialization, 
or, in Szporluk's understanding, its Europeanization.
Alternative Geopolitical Imaginaries and 
Periodizations
The theme of Russia's reformability is tied to 
Szporluk's search in the region's history for alternate 
political and geopolitical arrangements that would 
have permitted greater accommodation of national 
cultures, identities, institutions, and elites in the 
contexts of the Soviet bloc. Sadly, it is a search that 
leads to the gradual erosion of his hope in the 
Soviet elites' capacity and willingness to redress the 
inequities of Soviet nationality policies and policy 
toward Eastern Europe. Early on, the Bolsheviks' 
own nationality policies during the 1920s, the period 
of korenizfitsiia, offered some hope for a more 
equitable balancing of powers between the domi­
nant Russians and subordinate non-Russians. And 
Szporluk insists that Lenin himself had a good 
appreciation of the Ukrainian question, even if 
Lenin's views remained a distinct minority opinion
34
I IHi HARRIMAN INSTITUTE
in the Bolshevik leadership.13 Elsewhere in the 
region both Tomas Masaryk’s alternate vision of the 
political arrangement of post-1918 East and East 
Central Europe (p. 263) and the Prague reforms of 
1968 (p. 14), one element of which was to restore 
equality in the relations between Czechs and Slovaks 
in Czechoslovakia, held out hope, in turn, for Soviet 
reforms of inter-state East European and intra- 
Soviet national relations. Szporluk also explores the 
Yugoslav solution of extraterritorial cultural identity 
as a possible option for the Soviet Union (p. 59).14
From a perspective that is sensitive to alterna­tive paths of development, Szporluk argues for a periodization of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship that is marked by the following 
important years: 1922, the first "resolution" of the 
Soviet national question in the structure of the 
USSR, a structure which under Stalin would be 
proclaimed as a universal model for all states, most 
importantly those in East Central and Southeastern 
Europe after World War II; 1939-45, a violent 
extension of that Soviet model of nation-building to 
a region that had had considerable alternative 
experience, first Far Eastern Europe, later Eastern 
Europe after the wartime victory; 1956-68, from the 
realignment of power after Stalin's death that per­
mitted a doctrinal reassessment of Soviet experience 
and the brief tolerance of multiple national roads to 
socialism until the repudiation of East European 
experience and the reassertion of the Soviet model 
as universal after the Prague Spring; 1988/91, the 
dismantling of the East European bloc and then the 
Soviet Union itself.
I might reformulate the first important turning 
point in the Russian-Ukrainian encounter by adding 
World War I, the revolutionary and civil war years, 
1914-1923. The war militarized and international­
ized the Russian, Ottoman and Austro-EIungarian
13 Mikhail Pokrovskii, the subject of Szporluk's earlier 
scholarship, set the goal of Soviet history-writing to overcome 
the Russian chauvinist and imperialist legacies of pre­
revolutionary Russia. But also the dissident critique of Soviet 
nationality policy articulated by Ivan Dziuba in Internationalism 
or Russf cation? (New York, 1974) influenced Szporluk's 
thinking; Dziuba argued that Stalinist nationality policies 
violated the more enlightened programs of the Leninist 
1920s. On Lenin's views being those of the minority, see a 
recent study by ,eremy Smith, The Bolsheviks and the National 
Question, 1917-1923 (New York, 1999); on the politics and 
practice of korenfatsiia "in Ukraine, see George Liber, Soviet 
Nationality Polity, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the 
Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934 (Cambridge, 1992).
14 See chapter 2 in the volume under review for a 
discussion of reformist alternatives to Soviet policies.
Empires' nationalities politics, including tire expecta­
tions of “all-Russian” and Ukrainian political and 
intellectual elites. The revolution of 1917 marked 
the first steps in Ukrainian state-and nation-building 
in conditions of relative democracy, and the civil 
war years confronted the White armies and the 
Bolshevik leadership with their first experience of 
Ukrainian states, even if semi-sovereign and even if 
short-lived. (And, after all, how sovereign were 
either the White Governments or even the 
Bolsheviks during the civil war years?) As with 
other periods of transformation in the Russian- 
Ukrainian relationship, so too this set of realign­
ments did not happen in isolation from broader 
processes of change in class, national identity and 
other political loyalties. In large measure, the 1922 
Constitution of the USSR is a legacy of that period's 
wrenching transformations. Geoff Eley has made a 
persuasive case for such a periodization (1914- 
1923), and this chronological remapping also offers 
the possibility of bringing historians of Eastern and 
Western Europe together in new ways, in other 
words of integrating East European history into the 
narrative of an expanded Europe's past.13
Szporluk's essays touch on many other issues, 
but the grand questions of relations between Russia 
and Ukraine, the futures of Europe and Empire, are 
key for rethinking the meaning of the twentieth 
century and remain firmly on the geopolitical agen­
das of today's policymakers in the region and be­
yond. Elis ambivalence about Russia's relationship 
to Europe reflects the very' real doubts and misgiv­
ings in both European countries and Russian elites 
about Europe's new borders. His suggestions for 
rethinking the periodization of the twentieth century 
in Eastern Europe promise greater dialogue with 
historians of western Europe.
To Wayne Vucinich, one of Szporluk's Stanford 
University teachers and a veteran nationalities 
specialist himself, we owe thanks for arranging with 
Hoover Press to publish these essays, but above all, 
Roman Szporluk has earned our gratitude for 
challenging conventional wisdom and imaginary'. 
geopolitical boundaries.
Columbia Unlverslly
15 Sec Geoff Eley, "Remapping the Nation: War, 
Revolutionary Upheaval and State Formation in Eastern 
Europe, 1914-1923," in P. ,. Potichnyi and I I. Aster, eds., 
Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective (Edmonton, 
1988), pp. 205-46. Lor more on my attempt at rethinking the 
place of the Ukrainian revolution in the events of 1914-1923, 
sec my essay "Ukraine," in Acton, Cherniaev, and Rosenberg, 
eds., Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution, 1914-1921 
(London, 1997), pp. 728-40.
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E, arly in 1999, a small, poor, and backward , corner of Europe became the center of J world attention. On March 24, the self- 
proclaimed greatest military alliance in history 
began a 78-day bombing campaign against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), allegedly to 
force it to accept the terms of an international 
settlement for regulating the FRY's relations with 
its rebellious province of Kosovo. NATO's 
“Operation Allied Force” soon went awry, 
however, as myriad miscalculations on the part of 
all the relevant players to this drama quickly' 
threatened to spiral out of control. Then-Russian 
president Boris Yeltsin openly warned that 
NATO's actions could lead to world war, the 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy' in Belgrade 
heightened Great Power tensions even further, and 
the unity of the Adantic Alliance itself was severely' 
tested. In the aftermath of the conflict, Kosovo has 
joined Bosnia in becoming another Balkan 
protectorate of the international community'; 
Macedonia may yet become a member of tliis 
collection, and even Albania's future is uncertain.
How did a small-scale guerrilla war manage to 
become the focal point of a global crisis? The three
books under review here, though very different in 
their scope, all shed light on the problems 
confronting international policies in the region, and 
the misperceptions about the Balkans underlying 
these policies. Glenny's book is the most ambitious, 
offering a grand sweep of nationalist movements 
throughout the Balkans over the past 200 years. 
Vickers provides a well-focused history' of 
Albanian-Serb rivalry' over Kosovo, with the bulk 
of her book concentrating on twentieth century 
events. Judah concentrates on the immediate 
background to the Kosovo conflict of the 1990s 
and the war itself (and at the same time offers a 
commendable example of what a journalist's first 
draft of history should look like). All three books, 
however, suggest that much of what the 
“international community'” has been attempting to 
do in the Balkans has been based on a significant 





The bulk of recent writings on the breakup of 
the former Yugoslavia have focused blame for the 
state’s disintegration on malevolent politicians and 
leaders who deliberately stirred up popular 
prejudices to keep themselves in power. Richard 
Holbrooke, for instance, claims that “Yugoslavia's 
tragedy was not foreordained. It was the product of 
bad, even criminal, political leaders who 
encouraged ethnic confrontation for personal, 
political, and financial gain.”1 Along similar lines, 
Warren Zimmerman has noted that “Yugoslavia's 
death and the violence that followed resulted from 
the conscious actions of nationalist leaders who 
coopted, intimidated, circumvented, or eliminated 
all opposition to their demagogic designs. 
Yugoslavia was destroyed from the top down.”2
A succinct summary of much of the thinking in 
this school of thought can be found in a recent 
report on the November 2000 elections in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina produced by the International Crisis 
Group:
Despite five years and five billion US dollars of 
international community investment in Bosnia, the 11 
November Bosnian elections demonstrated once again that 
international engagement has failed to provide a sustainable 
basis for a functioning state, capable of surviving an 
international withdrawal. The elections highlighted once again 
the near complete failure—in the face of determined 
nationalist extremism—of an international approach that 
places emphasis on hopes that moderate, co-operative Bosnian 
partners will come to power through elections. The elections 
also revealed the complete unsuitability’ of the present Dayton 
constitutional structures, as well as the international 
community’ implementing structures and policies... Many in the 
international community had naively hoped that democratic 
change in Zagreb and Belgrade would translate into change
1 Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 
1998), pp. 23-24.
2 Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe (New York: 
Times Books, 1993), p. vii. This mode of thinking leads to 
some rather perverse logic; for instance, the belief that in 
bombing a country for 78 days you are waging war against 
an individual, not against a country or a people. NATO 
Secretary-General Lord George Robertson, for instance, 
recently claimed “The 19 democratic nations of the Alliance 
did not commit an act of aggression against the Yugoslavian 
(sic) people. We did not have anything against them. We 
acted against Milosevic.” See Yuri Pankov’s interview with 
Robertson, “Dialogue, Not Confrontation,” in Krasnaya 
Zvepda (Moscow), 20 February 2001.
among Bosnia’s Croats and Serbs. To the contrary, these 
democratic victories appear to have energized Bosnia’s ethnic 
extremists.’
A careful reading of the above suggests that 
these “ethnic extremists” must have almost 
superhuman abilities. Neither the passage of time 
nor the expenditure of billions of dollars can defeat 
their agenda. They are able to defy the will of the 
international community7, and have found ways of 
sabotaging or subverting constitutional 
arrangements designed by7 the brightest (?) minds at 
the U.S. State Department.4 * *They are impervious to 
positive democratic changes in Bosnia’s immediate 
regional environment. They7 are even able to waylay 
the will of the people, as expressed in elections 
organized, supervised, and paid for by the 
international community7.
Such views, however, do not take us very7 far in 
understanding what is happening in the Balkans. 
The belief that entire societies can be manipulated 
in this way, as Rogers Brubaker points out, reduces 
the general population to being “passive dupes, 
vehicles or objects of manipulative designs” instead 
of “active participants” and “political subjects in 
their own right.”3 Nor can such views explain why7
3 Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles
(Sarajevo/Brusscls: International Crisis Group Report No. 
104), 18 December 2000, Executive Summary.
4 On this note, it is worth pointing out that many people 
involved in Balkan policy over the past decade have decried 
the appalling lack of understanding about the Balkans 
exhibited by international personnel dealing with the region. 
As Jacques Klein, the head of the United Nations Mission in 
Bosnia recently noted, “There are more people (in Sarajevo) 
who know nothing about this place than in any other capital
where I’ve ever served.” See Klein’s comments as quoted by 
Robert Wright, Irena Guzelova, and Jonathan Birchall, 
“Bosnia-Herzegovina: Fear proves to be the biggest vote-
winner,” The Financial Times (London), 18 December 2000, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Country Survey. Along the same lines, 
the above-quoted report by the ICG (p. 17) claims that the 
international effort in Bosnia has been “hampered by a rapid 
turnover of often unqualified personnel, lacking relevant 
experience, including sometimes in senior positions.” To 
this, one should add that many of today’s so-called “Balkan 
experts” often exhibit a woeful ignorance of, or even 
interest in, anything that happened in the former Yugoslavia 
prior to 1987.
’ Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Keframed: Nationhood and the 
National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 72. Brubaker’s comments were
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nationalist parties in places such as Bosnia are able 
to win election after election for more than a 
decade,* 6 even though the leaders of these parties 
come and go.
Alija Izetbegovic once described the mass 
appeal of national issues by saying, “If you call for 
an open forum on democracy, a hundred 
intellectuals show up. If the forum is about 
nationalistn, you will get 10 thousand people from 
all walks of life on the streets.”7 In a more scholarly 
vein, Ivo J. Lederer observed in his classic 1969 
essay, “Nationalism and the Yugoslavs,”
The eastern European “way of life” is akin to a stream made 
up of a variety of tributaries of which nationalism is only one, 
but nationalism has run so deep and strong that it has 
appeared to possess an elemental, almost gravitational, quality’. 
...nationalism has been the fundamental fact of life for nearly 
two hundred years. Nowhere has this been so clear and 
agonizingly the case as in the lands of the Yugoslavs.8
But while astute politicians and scholars have 
recognized the historical force and social depth of 
tliis phenomenon, far too many others have failed
made in reference to the Krajina Serbs in the period 1990- 
91. If the average citizen in Southeastern Europe is indeed a 
“passive dupe,” perhaps we should reconsider the extent to 
which it is worth the effort to foster Jeffcrsonian-style 
democracy in the region.
6 In fact, in every election held in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 
twentieth century, the inhabitants have voted along ethnic 
lines, essentially malting elections ethnic censuses. See 
Xavier Bougarel, “Bosnia-I lerzegovina: State and 
Communitarianism,” in D.A. Dyker and 1. Vejvoda, eds., 
Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and 
Rebirth (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996), pp. 
87-115. With regard to the post-Dayton period, of course, 
one could question the degree to which elections have any 
real meaning, insofar as representatives of the international 
community have been given the power to dismiss publicly 
elected officials from office—a power used with increasing 
frequency in recent years.
7 Cited by Carsten Wieland, “Izetbegovic und |innah-die 
selektive Vereinnahung zweier ‘Muslim-Euhrer’.” 
SudosteuropaMitteilungen (1999/Nr. 4), p. 351.
8 Ivo j. Lederer, “Nationalism and the Yugoslavs,” in
Nationalism in Eastern Europe, Peter E Sugar and Ivo J.
Lederer, eds. (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1969), p. 396.
to grasp its significance.9 This misdiagnosis of the 
problems facing southeastern Europe, however, 
often leads to seriously flawed policies. The three 
books under-review here provide a useful corrective 
by showing that the problems of the former 
Yugoslavia long predate the emergence of 
Slobodan Milosevic or Franjo Tudjman.
Two points bear stressing here. First, nationalist 
conflict in the Balkans is not merely the result of evil 
leaders stirring up ethnic hatred for the sake of 
their own personal political gain. Although we can 
always count on politicians to embrace policies that 
will further their ambitions, as A.J.P. Taylor once 
noted, "Statesmen exploit popular emotion; they do 
not create it."10 Instead, nationalist leaders gain 
popular support when ethnic groups believe they 
face an existential threat to their survival, a threat 
best confronted by the creation of strong, viable 
nation-states enjoying significant levels of popular 
support and legitimacy.
What determines the timing of these outbreaks 
of interethnic conflict in the Balkans is usually a 
function of events in the wider geo-strategic order. 
More specifically, when the international order 
imposing a modicum of security in the region 
breaks down, individuals resort to seeking security’ 
in their collective national/ethnic identity’.11 Thus,
9 On the reasons why many westerners fail to appreciate the 
popular strength of nationalism, see, for instance, Joseph 
Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: 
Columbia University-' Press, 1981), Chapter 1. See also 
Walker Connor, "Ethnonationalism," in Understanding Political 
Development, Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds. 
(Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1987), pp. 196-220. 
Indeed, medievalists have begun to attack the entire 
contemporary academic paradigm of nationalism as a 
"modern" phenomenon by showing that the "invention" of 
nations and nationalism itself long predate the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. On this note, see Adrian Hastings, 
The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
10 A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 233.
11 Tor useful interpretations of ethnic conflict in the Balkans 
from this perspective, see Barry R. Posen, “The Security 
Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” and )ack Snyder, 
“Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State,” both 
in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International 
Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 
pp. 103-124, and 79-101, respectively. Eor a detailed 
examination of how the security dilemma affects Bosnia-
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the Ottoman Empire's decline in the nineteenth 
century provided the space for Balkan nations to 
rebel against their imperial overlords, most notably 
in the Serbian rebellion of 1804 and the Greek 
Insurrection of the 1820s, both of which Glenny 
covers in a lively fashion. The process proceeded 
throughout the nineteenth century, with, for 
example, the Herzegovinian peasants' rebellion in 
the late 1860s. In light of more recent Bosnian 
history7, it is worth recalling a passage from the 
“Unification Proclamation” issued by the leaders of 
the Serb revolt in 1876:
After so much waiting and without hope for any type of help, 
we resolve that from today we forever break with the non- 
Christian rule of Constantinople, and desiring to share our fate 
with our Serb brothers . . . proclaim that we are uniting our 
homeland Bosnia to the Principality' of Serbia.1"
But the Serbs were not the only ethnic group 
striving to carve their own nation-state from the 
“sick man of Europe.” As Vickers points out (pp. 
42-45), in June 1878, Albanians from various parts 
of the Balkans gathered to form the Prizren League, 
an organization devoted to developing an Albanian 
national program to counter that of the various 
Greek, Serb, and Bulgarian programs then 
emerging as the Ottoman empire decayed. The 
delegates to the meeting proceeded to claim areas 
of present-day Macedonia, Kosovo, and 
Montenegro for the Albanians. Many other ethnic 
groups in the Balkans had their own versions of a 
“greater” national program as well.
Tliis desire on the part of the peoples of 
southeastern Europe to create viable nation-states 
differed little from similar national programs in 
other parts of Europe. As Gale Stokes has 
described this process,
Remapping state boundaries onto ethnic lines is one of the 
major threads of post-French Revolutionary European history. 
The process began with the unifications of Italy and Germany,
Herzegovina, see Susan L. Woodward, “Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: How Not to End Civil War,” in Barbara F. 
Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity and 
Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 
pp. 73-115.
12 "The Unification Proclamation" of 1876, as quoted by 
Nebojsa Radmanovic in Krajiski Nojnik (Banja Luka), 28 
June 1997, p. 34.
ran through the creation of new states at the end of World 
War I, and had its most catastrophic outcomes at the end of 
World War II with the Holocaust and the expulsion of the 
Germans from Eastern Europe . . . the wars of Yugoslav 
succession are not some aberrant Balkan phenomenon; they 
arc the last stages of a process of European redefinition that 
has been going on since the French revolution.13
Indeed, as lstvan Deak adds, “the creation of 
nation-states has been so much a part of modern 
European history7 as to allow us to call it 
inevitable.”14 *
Here it bears stressing that war and its attendant 
violence has been part and parcel of the European 
state-building process; in Charles Tilly’s classic 
formulation, “War made the state, and the state 
made war.”13 Viewed in this context, however, 
many of the explanations offered for the violence 
attending the disintegration of the former Yugoslav 
state, whether “ancient ethnic hatreds” or “elite 
manipulation,” assume only secondary7 importance. 
Instead, it is infinitely more fruitful to understand 
the logic underlying military7 strategies during the 
‘Wars of the Yugoslav Succession” as being driven 
by the imperatives of creating viable states. In the 
former Yugoslavia, as Susan Woodward notes, the 
various ethnic factions were each struggling to win 
“the geopolitical and institutional preconditions of 
sovereignty: obtaining the strategic and economic 
assets and borders of a secure future state, 
destroying those of one’s enemies, and building (in 
the course of war) the armies and foreign alliances 
of a new defense.”16 *
A second point bears mentioning here as well. 
Given the general state of illiteracy prevailing in the 
Balkans in the nineteenth century, and the absence 
of anything resembling twentieth century7 mass 
media, a review of Balkan history over the past 200
13 Gale Stokes, "The Unpalatable Paradox," Nationalities 
Papers 27 (June 1999), pp. 327-329.
14 lstvan Deak, "A Somewhat Pessimistic View of Charles 
Ingrao's 'Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Central 
Europe'," Nationalities Papers 21 (June 1999), p. 320.
Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State- 
Making,” in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States 
in Western TLurope (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1975), p. 42.
16 Susan Woodward, Flalkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution 
After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press, 1995), p. 272.
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years should make us rethink the emphasis recently 
placed on the role of the mass media in the breakup 
of the former Yugoslavia. This is not to say that the 
means of communication in a peasant society at the 
time were benign; Glenny, for instance, cites one 
Albanian epic poem:
z\s always, Albanian and Slav
Were at blood since a tragic fate
Placed fire and gunpowder side by side.
Placed side by side Albania and Montenegro!17
But while historical and cultural legacies may 
have emphasized conflict between ethnic groups 
rather than coexistence, it is a far cry to claim that 
such conflict was conjured out of nothing by evil 
leaders. That is, unless we want to believe that just 
as radio and television supposedly whipped 
Albanians, Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs into 
fratricidal frenzies in the 1990s, gusla's, frula's, 
tambura's and epic poems did the same in the 
nineteenth century'. Indeed, if, over the course of 
45 years, a communist regime (with all of the 
propaganda instruments such a system had at its 
disposal) was unable to inculcate a sense of 
“brotherhood and unity” amongst the peoples of 
the former Yugoslavia, it is hard to believe that 
Izetbegovic, Milosevic or Tudjman could drive 
them into a fratricidal frenzy in a matter of two or 
three.
Instead of blaming evil leaders and malevolent 
media for the violence of the 1990s, a more 
powerful explanatory model should seek to 
understand Balkan nationalist struggles over the 
past two centuries, as Stokes suggests, as simply a 
later manifestation of a common European state- 
and nation-building process. What interrupted this 
“inevitable” flow of modern European history in 
the Balkans was the tendency of the Great Powers 
to use the Balkans as the playground for their 
competitive games, the main thesis of the Glenny' 
book.
One of the most important efforts by' the Great 
Powers to protect their interests in the Balkans was 
the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and Glenny' 
provides a vivid account of the disdain with which
17 Gjaku i marrun (Blood avenged), cited by Glenny on p. 
151.
representatives of the Great Powers treated the 
delegations of various Balkan ethnic groups. Forty' 
years after the Congress of Berlin, in the midst of 
the Great War (the spark of which had of course 
been lit in the Balkans), Nicholas Murray Butler 
would write,
Everyone can now sec that the Treaty of Berlin was one of the 
most colossal blunders in modern political history. It so 
shuffled the cards of diplomacy as to mislead the people 
concerning the game which was being played, and instead of 
settling the grave questions with which it dealt, that Treaty 
simply glossed them over and opened the way for a new 
military' struggle ... 18
Subsequent attempts by the Great Powers to 
address the shortcomings of the Congress of Berlin 
faired little better in achieving a stable solution for 
southeastern Europe. In 1918, as Michael Ignatieff 
points out, Woodrow Wilson
...enunciated the right of self-determination for the peoples of 
the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, and the 
draftsmen at Versailles then laid out the borders that the 
Balkan states have been fighting over, off and on, ever since... 
Eighty years later, America continues to try to remedy the 
errors of Versailles.19
One is tempted to believe that more recent 
efforts by the Great Powers to create “order” in the 
Balkans will be seen by subsequent generations in 
the same light. Tellingly, both Glenny' and Judah 
write that the turning point in the Albanian struggle 
for Kosovo was what happened in Bosnia; more 
specifically, the agreement negotiated to end the 
conflict there, the Dayton Peace Accords (hereafter, 
the DPA). For regardless of the spin international 
officials use to describe the DPA (i.e., that it 
created the basis for a “united state with two 
multiethnic entities”), the fundamental reality' of 
Dayton was that it ratified the creation of mono­
ethnic entities created by force and the violent 
expulsion of ethnic minorities. In this, it was similar 
to the U.S.1 support for the expulsion of the Krajina
18 Sec Nicholas Murray Butler's introduction to Vladislav R. 
Savic, Southeastern Europe: The Main Problem of the Present World 
Struggle (New York: Fleming R. Revell Company, 1918). 
Butler, incidentally, was at the time the President of 
Columbia University.
19 Michael Ignatieff, “The Dream of Albanians,” in The New 
Yorker, 11 January' 1999, p. 36.
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Serbs in August 1995, for among Western countries 
there was “the unspoken but ever-present feeling 
that if there were no more Serbs in Croatia, then, in 
future, there would be no more problem either” 
(Judah, p. 121).20 The lesson for extremists (on 
both sides) in Kosovo was thus obvious: violence 
and ethnic cleansing would be tolerated and 
endorsed. One need only pick the right 
international patrons.
Timothy Garton Ash once noted that “what we 
are proposing to do in our Balkan quasi 
protectorates is not just to freeze war. It is also to 
freeze history.”21 What have been the results of tliis 
effort to “freeze” history? Take, for instance, the 
case of Bosnia. Over the past eight years, the 
international community has spent an astronomical 
550-90 billion trying to bring peace to the country', 
to rebuild its infrastructure, reform its political and 
economic systems, and produce a non-national, 
pan-ethnic democratic consciousness on the part of 
its population.22 Over 20,000 international troops 
and 15,000 international civilian personnel are 
currently in Bosnia organizing elections, postponing 
elections, reversing electoral results, imposing laws, 
rewriting primary' school textbooks, creating 
television networks, monitoring customs services, 
police forces, and military' units, regulating the 
airwaves, reforming the judiciary', setting up a stock 
market... the list is literally' endless. And for all of 
tliis effort, the locals still have an unlimited number 
of ways of obstructing and/or derailing the best- 
intentioned of efforts. A report issued by the U.S.
20 Not all international officials shared this opinion. As 
Glenny (p. 650) cites a statement by Carl Bildt at the time, 
"If we accept that it is alright for Tudjman to cleanse Croatia 
of its Serbs, then how on earth can we object if one day 
Milosevic sends his army to clean out the Albanians from 
Kosovo?"
21 See Ash, “Cry', the Dismembered Country,” Tie New York 
Renew of Books, 14 january 1999, p. 32.
22 for the estimate on how much the international
community has spent in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s,
see Jasna Ilasovic, “Pola budzeta za plate sluzbenika,” Dani 
(Sarajevo), 8 September 2000. Determining a precise amount
is impossible because different agencies use different
methodologies for calculating their expenses. Contrast these 
figures with B-ITs annual GDP, estimated at S6.2 billion in 
1999. I lasovic and others estimate that over half of this 
amount has been spent on the salaries of foreign “experts” 
themselves.
Congress’ General Accounting Office in 2000 
noted that “there has been no measurable progress 
in reducing crime and corruption in the four years 
since the end of the war.”23 In part due to such 
corruption, if one factors out the donor aid Bosnia 
has received, the country' would have experienced 
negative economic growth in the postwar period.24 *
Not surprisingly, Bosnia-ITerzegovina’s young 
people are voting with their feet to escape tliis 
situation; a recent study by a U.N. agency found 
that 62 percent of the country's young people 
would leave Bosnia if they' had a way' out.23 As one 
international official captured the problems 
experienced in trying to impose the international 
agenda on Bosnia,
We’ve played all the cards: the money, the advice, the pressure. 
We have done everything my country has learned to do in two 
hundred years of meddling in other countries. I still wonder if 
it is enough to achieve what we want.26
21 Christopher Marquis with Carlotta Gall, “Congressional 
Report Says Corruption is Stifling Bosnia,” The New York 
Times, 7 July 2000, p. A3.
■4 Why Wilt No One Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina?: An 
Overview of Impediments to Investment ami Self Sustaining Economic 
Growth in the Post Dayton Era. Sarajevo: International Crisis 
Group, 21 April 1999, p. 8.
2’ The public opinion survey by the U.N. Development 
Program was cited by High Representative Wolfgang 
Petritsch in a speech before the European Parliament’s 
Foreign Affairs Committee in Brussels on 22 January 2001.
26 The New York Times, 13 September 1998. In a similar vein, 
after a particularly difficult period of trying to force 
Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs into agreeing to a common 
currency, license plates, and passports, former Deputy I Iigh 
Representative Jacques Klein claimed, ““Never in the 
history of diplomacy was so much time and effort expended 
by so many diplomats over such trivia.” See the Speech by 
Klein before the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
London, 21 April 1999, available at
http://www.ohr.int/speechcs/s99042fa.htm. It is an 
interesting exercise to contrast this exasperation with the 
thoughts of one of the protagonists in the Andric novel 
Bosnian Chronicle, I lamdi Bey Teskeredzic, who, when the 
people of Travnik learned that a French consul was being 
sent to their town, exclaimed, “We’re on our own ground 
here, and anyone else who comes is a stranger and won’t be 
able to hold out long. Many people have come here 
intending to stay, but so far we’ve seen the back of all of 
them.” See Ivo Andric, Bosnian Chronicle (London: Harvill 
Press, 1992), p. 3,
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The above analysis is not meant to deny the 
essentially noble purposes of much of what the 
international community is attempting to 
accomplish in the Balkans. But a mistaken 
understanding of the forces driving the 
disintegration of the former Yugoslavia has led to 
mistaken remedies. The root of the “problem” in 
the Balkans has not been “evil leaders.” Rather, it 
has been the efforts of the various ethnic groups in 
the former Yugoslavia to create states reflecting 
their national identities and aspirations, states which 
provide them with a measure of collective security, 
and states which allow them to participate as 
recognized partners in the international community. 
Unfortunately, many of the short-term policies 
adopted to deal with “evil leaders” in the Balkans, 
uninformed by a comparative perspective of similar 
phenomena during other historical periods or in 
other parts of the world, have been 
counterproductive, if we believe that the real goal 
of international engagement should be to foster the 
economic and social stability needed to sustain 
democratic polities. They have also led to pohcy 
disasters such as NATO’s war in Kosovo.
II. Madeleine's War
Soon after Dayton, extremists in Kosovo 
created an obscure organization named the 
“Kosovo Liberation Army.” The KLA's initial 
actions involved murdering mailmen, forest 
rangers, Serb refugees, and the occasional ambush 
of a pohce patrol (Judah provides the most detaEed 
account in EngEsh of the KLA's origins pubEshed 
to date). By February 1998, the U.S. State 
Department's top Balkan envoy, Robert Gelbard, 
would claim that “the KLA is, without doubt, a 
terrorist organization.”
Throughout 1998, the confEct between the 
KLA and Yugoslav government forces constituted 
a fairly typical guerrilla war and counter-insurgency 
campaign, with all of the excesses common to such 
warfare27; as Deak notes, “history has still to show
2' On this note, it is worth pointing out that several KLA 
leaders are now under investigation by the I Iague Tribunal 
for war crimes committed by KLA forces in 1998-long 
before the NATO intervention. See Tom Walker, "KLA 
Laces Trials for War Crimes on Serbs: Inquiry Turns on 
Albanians," The Sunday Times (London), 3 September 2000.
a poEce or miEtary force that did not grow ruthless 
when attacked by fighters dressed as civiEans.”28 
Prior to March 1999, the fighting in Kosovo had 
been confined to areas in which the KLA had been 
active; Kosovo's major urban areas, such as 
Pristina, Djakovica, and Kosovska Mitrovica, and 
large parts of eastern and southern Kosovo, saw 
Ettle or no violence. Even vociferous supporters of 
the NATO intervention now admit “there was no 
humanitarian crisis in Kosovo in 1997, or in 1998, 
or in most of 1999, in any conventionahy 
understood sense of the term.”29
Yet, as Timothy Garton Ash notes of the KLA, 
this “bunch of farmyard Albanian ex-Marxist- 
Leninist terrorists”30 *very quickly managed to draw 
NATO into the first war in its 50-year history. Flow
The commander of the Kosovo Protection L'orce, Agim 
Ceku, is already believed to be the subject of a sealed 
indictment for war crimes because of his activities during 
the war in Croatia from 1993-95. The political leader of the 
KLA, Hashim Thaci, has been directly linked to a massacre 
of 22 Serb civilians in the village of Klecka in the summer of
1998, and with the assassination of political rivals within 
Kosovo. See Chris Hedges, "Kosovo's Rebels Accused of 
Executions in the Ranks," The New York Times, 25 June
1999, p. 1. See also Tom Walker, "KLA Chief Accused of 
War Crimes," The Suticky Times (London), 10 October 1999. 
Recent assassinations of Thaci's political opponents in the 
wake of Kosovo's October 2000 municipal elections suggest 
his understanding of a democratic transfer of power is 
rather different than Western notions of the term.
28 See Istvan Deak, “Out of the Past," The New Republic, 8 
June 1998. Indeed, as this is being written and we watch the 
growing death toll in the violence between Israeli forces and 
Palestinian demonstrators, we are reminded yet again that 
the struggle between different peoples over land is almost 
always a brutal and bloody affair. Consider, for instance, the 
price of the first six weeks of fighting between Israelis and 
Palestinians in the most recent unrest: according to a U.N. 
report, Israeli forces have destroyed 431 private homes, 13 
public buildings, 10 factories, and 14 religious buildings. The 
human costs of the fighting left over 200 people dead in the 
first six weeks, the vast majority of whom were Palestinian 
civilians. Other tactics adopted by Israeli security forces 
have included extra-judicial assassinations of suspected 
“troublemakers,” and prohibitions on travel for 
communities of tens of thousands of people. See William A. 
Orme ,r., “Palestinian Economy in Ruins, U.N. Says,” The 
New York Times, 6 December 2000, p. A12.
29 David Ricff, “Kosovo’s Humanitarian Circus,” World Po/iy 
Journal 17 (Pall 2000), p. 27.
J° See Timothy Garton Ash, "Kosovo: Was it Worth It?" in
The New York Review of Books, 21 September 2000, p. 53.
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it managed to do so will remain a matter of 
controversy for a long time to come; certainly, it 
has much to do with Western misconceptions of 
what has been driving events in the former 
Yugoslavia (i.e., "evil leaders" instead of historical 
processes). Similarly, it also has much to do with 
the very palpable need among Western leaders, and 
especially those in the U.S., to find a new raison 
d’etre for NATO's continued existence.
Glenny and Judah also cite evidence claiming 
that all sides simply stumbled into the war. 
Milosevic believed that NATO was bluffing, and 
that even if NATO attacked, European public 
opinion would never tolerate a long-term campaign. 
Milosevic may also have calculated that standing up 
to a NATO attack could strengthen his position at 
home.
But Milosevic was not the only one to 
miscalculate. NATO did not have any contingency 
plans worked out for a longer conflict, and the 
original list of bombing targets was exhausted 
within a matter of days. In a very cogent analysis of 
American miscues along the way to the Kosovo 
war, Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz 
point out that on March 24, the first day of the 
bombing campaign, U.S. Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright, the single person most 
associated with the war, declared “I don't see this as 
a long-term operation.” Just eleven days later, 
however, Albright would say, “We never expected 
this to be over quickly.”31
In light of more recent evidence that has 
emerged since these books were written, however, 
it is worth considering to what extent the decision 
to go to war against the FRY really was a 
miscalculation. Considerable circumstantial 
evidence points to the conclusion that hawks within 
the Clinton Administration, led by Albright, were 
eager for a showdown with Milosevic and were 
determined to create a scenario in which a military 
confrontation would be all but inevitable. A 
significant turnaround in U.S. policy was clear by
31 See Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, "Lor the 
Record," The National Interest, L’all 1999, pp. 9-15. Lor an 
example of the extent to which the war in Kosovo came to 
be associated with the U.S. Secretary of State, see the cover 
story of Time magazine for 17 May 1999, entitled "Albright 
at War."
November 1998 when the State Department began 
to claim that Milosevic was the problem in the 
region, not the solution. By this time, the CIA had 
already spent a considerable amount of time 
providing I<LA operatives with American military 
training manuals, field advice, satellite telephones, 
GPS systems, and even General Wesley Clark's 
mobile phone number.32 And when a controversial 
effort to find a political solution to the crisis was 
made in February' and March 1999 during the 
Rambouillet talks, a senior State Department 
official allegedly claimed that the U.S. had 
“deliberately set the bar higher than the Serbs could 
accept.”33
After the failure of the Rambouillet talks, the 
U.S. decision to begin a bombing campaign 
dramatically escalated the fighting in Kosovo, and 
directly triggered the massive refugee movements 
that followed; as Glenny (p. 658) notes, "Instead of 
preventing a humanitarian catastrophe, NATO's 
decision contributed to a flood of biblical 
proportions." Oddly enough, the U.S. State 
Department itself has accepted the view that the 
NATO bombing triggered the massive forced 
expulsions of the Albanian population in Kosovo. 
In a report released in the midst of the Kosovo 
war, the State Department claimed, “In late March 
1999, Serbian forces dramatically increased the scope 
and pace of their efforts, moving away from 
selective targeting of towns and regions suspected 
of KLA sympathies toward a sustained and 
systematic effort to ethnically cleanse the entire 
province of Kosovo.”34 * *
Moreover, NATO's post-hoc justifications for 
the attack have crumbled since the end of the war. 
Two weeks into the air campaign, NATO claimed 
that it had attacked for fear that the Yugoslav 
military had been planning a so-called “Operation 
Horseshoe” to drive the Albanian population out
32 Tom Walker and Aidan Lavcrty, "CIA Aided Kosovo 
Guerrilla Army," The Times (London), 12 March 2000.
33 George Kenney, "Rolling Thunder: the Rerun," The 
Nation, 14 June 1999. The Rambouillet talks themselves have 
been derided by critics as a perfect example of the recent 
American penchant for “drive-by diplomacy.”
34 See Erasing Histoty: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo. Washington,




of Kosovo. In April 2000, however, it was revealed 
that the alleged Operation Horseshoe had been a 
Bulgarian military assessment of possible Yugoslav 
military options, which the Bulgarians forwarded to 
the German Defense Ministry?3 Once the NATO 
attacks began, of course, Yugoslav military units 
and paramilitary forces did begin a massive 
operation to expel ethnic Albanians from possible 
invasion routes into the country—a completely 
predictable response, but one for which NATO 
leaders did nothing to prepare for. As Douglas 
Macgregor notes, “Faced with a population that 
concealed and supported the KLA, the Yugoslav 
forces did exactly what U.S., French and British 
forces have done in counterinsurgency operations: 
they expelled the population and removed the 
insurgency’s base of support.”36
Another aspect of the NATO propaganda 
campaign involved the claim that "genocide" was 
being committed in Kosovo. NATO and U.S. 
officials Eberally claimed that up to 100,000 people 
had been killed by Serb forces. Yet in August 2000, 
a spokesman for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
announced that the number of people killed in 
Kosovo during the NATO attacks would probably 
fall between 2-3 thousand. Moreover, as various 
observers have noted, with NATO bombs falling 
all over the province, and factoring in the fighting 
between the KLA and Yugoslav forces, "not all of 
the dead can be proved to be the victims of murder 
or execution."37
’’John Goetz and Tom Walker, "Serbian Ethnic Cleansing 
Scare Was a Fake, Says General," The Sunday Times 
(London), 2 April 2000. Judah (pp. 240-41) also questions 
the extent to which "Operation Horseshoe" really existed, 
and Ash (p. 57) cites a report on the Kosovo conflict 
compiled by the House of Commons' Foreign Affairs 
Committee which is also skeptical.
36 See Douglas Macgregor, “The Balkan Limits to Power and 
Principle,” Orbis 45 (Winter 2001), p. 100. It should be 
pointed out that during the Kosovo war, Colonel Macgregor 
was chief of strategic planning and director of the Joint 
Operations Center, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe.
37 See Jonathan Steele, "Figures Put on Serb Killings Too 
High," The Guardian (London), 18 August 2000; Daniel Pearl 
and Robert Block, “Despite Tales, the War in Kosovo Was 
Savage, but Wasn’t Genocide,” The Wall Street Journal, 31 
December 1999, p. A01. This is not to dismiss the war
In military terms, NATO could take little pride 
in its performance. A preliminary7 NATO review of 
the Kosovo campaign concluded that Operation 
Allied Force "had almost no military7 effect."38 
According to a secret U.S. military assessment 
leaked to the press, 38,000 sorties (including the use 
of 31,000 rounds of radioactive depleted uranium 
shells) over 78-days of bombing managed to 
destroy 14 tanks and an insignificant number of 
armored personnel carriers and artillery7 pieces.39 
When all was said and done, NATO had inflicted 
embarrassingly little damage on the Yugoslav 
military7. As Ash points out,
It is a remarkable fact that for at least a month the most 
powerful military alliance in history7, with member states 
representing some two thirds of the world's economic and 
military7 strength, with four million men and women under 
arms, and combined defense spending of around S450 billion, 
seemed to be losing the war to a small, impoverished Balkan 
country with a defense budget of scarcely $1.5 billion and 
about 110,000 active-duty soldiers.40
crimes committed by Serb paramilitary7 forces in Kosovo, 
actions for which the ICTY indicted Milosevic and four of 
his top associates on 27 May 1999. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the NATO attack dramatically7 escalated the scale of the 
violence in Kosovo at the time. For a very7 explicit 
denunciation of crimes committed by Serb forces during the 
Kosovo campaign, see the interview with Fr. Sava Janjic in 
NIN (Belgrade), 8 July 1999.
38 Daniel Goure and Jeffrey Lewis, "The Strained U.S. 
Military7: Evidence from Operation Allied Force," National 
Security Studies Quarterly 6, Winter 2000, pp. 25-35; Tim 
Butcher and Patrick Bishop, "NATO Admits Air Campaign 
Failed," The tlkctromc Telegraph, 22 July 2000.
39 See John Barry and Evan Thomas, "The Kosovo Cover- 
Up," Newsweek, 15 May 2000, pp. 23-26. Britain's Royal Air 
Force did not do too well in Kosovo either. A secret RAF 
report leaked in August 2000 showed that of 150 "dumb" 
bombs (i.e., conventional munitions not using laser-guided 
technology), only 3 could be confirmed to have hit their 
target—a 2 percent success rate. See Michael Evans,
"Kosovo 'Dumb-bombs' Missing in Action," The Times 
(London), 15 August 2000.
40 Ash, op. cit., p. 57.
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Unable to destroy the Yugoslav army from the 
air, afraid to fight it on the ground, but desperate to 
salvage its “credibility,” as the war dragged on 
NATO decided to expand the bounds of what was 
an acceptable level of “collateral damage.” As 
NATO's target list expanded, bombs started falling 
on prisons, hospitals, refugee convoys, television 
studios, and the occasional foreign embassy.
Tliis new strategy', however, also required 
NATO to engage in what can only be described as 
war crimes. As Michael Mandelbaum points out, 
the targeting of electrical grids and water facilities 
violate Article 14 of the 1977 Protocol to the 1949 
Geneva Convention, which bars attacks on “objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population.”41 A Human Rights Watch study of 
NATO's conduct of the Kosovo war estimated that 
500 civilians had been killed, and that a third of all 
the incidents and more than half of the deaths 
occurred as a result of attacks on illegitimate 
and/or questionable targets. The report concluded 
that NATO committed numerous violations of 
international humanitarian law in its Kosovo 
campaign.42 Amnesty International was more 
explicit, openly calling the bombing of the Serbian 
state television and radio building (SRT) in which 
16 civilians were killed a war crime, and calling on 
NATO governments to bring to justice the persons 
responsible for the decision to attack this and other 
targets.43
NATO's prosecution of the war raises many 
other disturbing issues as well. NATO's use of
41 See Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure: NATO's War 
Against Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs 78 (September/October 
1999), p. 6.
42 Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, Washington, 
D.C.: Human Rights Watch, 7 February 2000.
43 Collateral Damage or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of 
War by NATO during Operation Allied Force. London: Amnesty 
International, 7 June 2000. Predictably, the Pentagon's own
assessment of its performance during the Kosovo war has
been called a “whitewash” by other groups. As William
Arkin, a military consultant to Human Rights Watch has 
noted, '"Phis was a war advertised as humanitarian in 
purpose, in which the Pentagon stressed that it was doing 
everything possible to minimize civilian casualties. Yet its 
report does not mention one measure taken or one lesson 
learned." "Pentagon Report Whitewashes Civilian Deaths in 
Yugoslavia," Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, 8 
February 2000.
cluster bombs, harshly criticized by international 
human rights groups,44 * has left a legacy of 
destruction that will last for years. Over 150 people 
have been killed by unexploded NATO ordinance 
in the postwar period. The Pentagon, however, has 
prohibited U.S. soldiers from being used to defuse 
leftover munitions.43 Along with the damage done 
to the FRY's infrastructure and population, one 
must also consider the environmental damage done 
by NATO's bombing of chemical plants and oil 
refineries along the Danube. (If the Danube flowed 
northwards and westwards towards Austria and 
Germany rather than southwards and eastwards 
towards Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria, rest assured 
that those oil refineries and chemical plants would 
never have been touched.) Not surprisingly, a 
United Nations task force investigating the 
environmental impact of the NATO attack on 
Yugoslavia reported that NATO had obstructed its 
investigation and had refused to cooperate with 
U.N. experts.46
Politically, Operation Allied Force has proven to 
be a failure as well. Postwar Kosovo is effectively 
partitioned north of the Ibar River, and the 
agreement negotiated to end the conflict, codified 
in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, in many
44 "NATO Use of Cluster Bombs Must Stop," Kosovo Human 
Rights Flash #36. New York: Human Rights Watch, 11 May
1999.
43 "Four Kosovar Children Killed by NATO Cluster Bomb," 
Reuters, 22 September 1999; "Kosovo Child Killed and Five 
Injured by Leftover NATO Bomb," Reuters, 14 March 2000; 
Carlotta Gall, "U.N. Aide in Kosovo Faults NATO on 
Unexploded Bombs," The New York Times, 23 May 2000; 
Jonathan Steele, "Death Lurks in the Fields," The Guardian 
Unlimited, 14 March 2000.
46 Frances Williams, Christopher Brown-Humes and Neil 
Buckley, "Kosovo: NATO 'Hindered' Inquiry." The Financial 
Times, 15 October 1999. Doctors in Bosnia report that 
refugees from the Sarajevo suburb of I Iadzici, which was 
heavily bombed by NATO in 1995, are experiencing three 
times the rate of deaths from cancer typical for other 
residents of Bosnia. See “Svaki treci dan neko umire od raka, 
na grobljima vise nema mjesta,” Os/obodjenfe (Sarajevo), 13 
January 2001. See also Robert Fisk, “I see 300 graves that 
could bear the headstone ‘Died of depleted uranium’.” The 
Independent (London), 13 January 2001, p. 1. For an extended 
analysis of the environmental impact of the NATO attacks 
during the Kosovo campaign, see Vojin Joksimovic, 
“Militarism and Ecology: NATO Ecocide in Serbia,” 
Mediterranean Quarterly 11 (Fall 2000), pp. 140-160.
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ways affirmed the Yugoslav government’s 
objections to the Rambouillet proposals. As 
Michael Mandelbaum points out,
The Albanians had fought for independence based on the right 
to self-determination. The Serbs had fought to keep Kosovo 
part of Yugoslavia in the name of the inviolability of existing 
borders. While insisting that Kosovo be granted autonomy, 
NATO asserted that it must remain part of Yugoslavia. The 
alliance had therefore intervened in a civil war and defeated 
one side, but embraced the position of the party it had 
defeated on the issue over which the war had been fought. 
This made the war, as a deliberate act of policy, a perfect 
failure.47
The final act in this “perfect failure,” however, 
has yet to be played out. As the international 
community’s effort to abide by UNSCR 1244 
increasingly conflicts with the KLA’s goals, the 
potential for conflict rises commensurately. Indeed, 
NATO forces (including American troops) have 
already come under fire from guerrillas on several 
occasions, and as one U.S. intelligence official 
noted of ties between NATO and the KLA, “Not 
only is the honeymoon over, but now the divorce 
has begun.”48 What remains to be seen is how 
brutal and unpleasant the divorce will actually be.
One tiring, however, is clear. As the 
contradictions inherent within UNSCR 1244 lead 
to greater instability within Kosovo, the Presevo 
Valley, and Macedonia, no one will be able to claim 
that KLA leaders were anything less than candid 
about their intentions. As Judah (pp. 103-104) cites 
the words of one KLA leader:
Kosova starts in Tivar |Bar in Montenegro] and ends in 
Manastir [Bitola in Macedonia]. We don’t care what .America 
and England think about it, we should unite with actions, not 
with words. We don’t care what Clinton and other devils think!
Finally, it is worth asking what the Kosovo 
campaign portends for the future of “humanitarian
47 Mandelbaum, op. cit., p. 5.
48 Sec “Kosovo: What Next?” Janes intelligence Report, 28 June
2000; Michael R. Gordon, “NATO Patrols Edgy Border, 
This Time Protecting Serbs,” The New York Times, 25 
January 2001; “Ethnic Albanian Guerillas Claim Macedonia 
Attacks,” Agence France Presse, 27 January 2001; “British 
Troops Battle Kosovo Albanians,” Renters, 1 Eebruary 2001; 
D. Joksic, “Makedonija puna obucenih militanata,” 
Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 4 Eebruary 2001.
intervention,” so widely touted as the justification 
for violating numerous aspects of international law, 
and for threatening regional and international 
stability. Carl Cavanaugh Hodge, for one, has 
argued,
Historically, the principle of national sovereignty has never 
been so absolute as is often assumed, yet its contribution to 
international peace has been significant enough that any 
abridgement of the principle in the name of superseding values 
ought to be accompanied by an authentic commitment to 
those values. Such a commitment was nowhere in evidence in 
the case of NATO's Kosovo adventure. The alliance failed— 
indeed never attempted—to protect the life and limb of the 
very people for whom it fought. It is therefore to be wished 
that Kosovo sets no precedent.49
Indeed, despite claims that NATO's war against 
Yugoslavia marked a milestone in international 
relations, reality will most probably prove quite 
different. Ronald Steel is undoubtedly right when 
he claims the Kosovo conflict left the principle of 
“humanitarian intervention”
about where it began: as the exception rather than the rule. 
Intervention will occur where it can be done relatively cheaply, 
against a weak nation, in an area both accessible and strategic, 
where the public's emotions are aroused, and where it does not 
get in the way of other political, economic, or military needs.’"
In other words, “humanitarian intervention” 
will be done when it is politically useful—not when 
it is morally obligatory.’1 All told, the architects and
49 Garl Cavanaugh Hodge, "Casual War: NATO's 
Intervention in Kosovo,” Ethics and International Affairs 14, 
pp. 53-54.
Ronald Steel, "East Timor Isn't Kosovo," The New York 
Times, 12 September 1999, p. 19.
31 On this note, Andrew J. Bacevic poses an interesting 
question. Given the fact that conflicts in other parts of the 
world often involve human tragedy on a much greater scale, 
Bacevic asks, “According to what criteria do the United 
States and its allies determine that some humanitarian 
catastrophes demand attention, while others—usually 
involving people of color—go unattended?” See Bacevic, 
“Banal and Dubious,” The National Interest 61 (ball 2000), pp. 
94-97. During the Rwanda crisis—when upwards of 400,000 
people were literally hacked to death in a matter of weeks—a 
report by the Organization of African Unity claims that 
Madeleine Albright consistently prevented bringing the issue 
of Rwanda up before the U.N. Security Council during her 
tenure as the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. The report cites 
the former Canadian ambassador to the U.N. as saying,
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proponents of “Madeleine's War” have nothing to 
be proud of. As one of Britain's most respected 
commentators, Simonjenkins of the London Times, 
summed up NATO's Kosovo campaign, if tliis was 
“victory,” then it could at best be considered “a 
victory for cowards.”
III. NATO's Kosovo
Perhaps even more disturbing than NATO’s 
original decision to attack Yugoslavia is the fact that 
in the postwar period it has refused to create an 
environment in which the various ethnic groups 
inhabiting Kosovo can live in peace and security. 
The obsession with force protection and the 
overwhelming determination not to suffer any 
NATO casualties in the province has made murder, 
kidnapping, arson, and extortion the defining 
features of life in Kosovo under NATO. As James 
Orbinski, the president of Medecins Sans Frontieres 
(the organization which won the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 1999), noted when announcing that MSF would 
leave Kosovo, “There has been a passive 
acceptance of acts of violence against minorities. A 
culture of impunity has emerged.”* 32
Indeed, a typical month in postwar Kosovo 
certainly does not leave room for anyone to believe 
that NATO has created a haven of tolerance or 
stability, as the KLA and its offshoots have gone 
on an unchecked rampage of assassinations and 
other forms of terrorism. Consider, for instance, 
the situation on the ground in Kosovo in August 
2000, fourteen months after NATO occupied the 
province to establish “peace.” On August 2, Sejdi 
Koci, the leader of Ibrahim Rugova's Democratic 
League of Kosovo (LDK) in the town of Srbica, 
was wounded by an unknown gunman. Also on 
August 2, a mine planted on a road near the village
“The role of the United States ... is an almost
incomprehensible scar of shame on U.S. foreign policy. 'I’he 
United States . . . knew exactly what was going on ... I 
don’t know how Madeleine Albright lives with it.” See 
Colum Lynch, “West Turned Back on Rwanda Genocide, 
OAU Report Says,” The Washington Post, 8 July 2000, p. A14.
32 "Nobel-Winning Agency Blasts UN, NATO in Kosovo," 
Renters, 17 August 2000. See also "Ethnic Cleansing 
Continues in UN-Ruled Kosovo, Under the Eye of the 
International Actors," Meileeins Sans Frontieres, press release, 7 
August 2000.
of Mali Alas killed three Roma and injured one. On 
August 3, an assassination attempt wounded Agim 
Veliu, an LDK leader from Podujevo. On August 
5, another senior LDK member, Shaban Manaj, 
was found dead ten days after his family had 
reported him missing. On August 6, an LDK leader 
in Srbica, Mehmet Gerkinaj, was also wounded in 
an assassination attempt. On August 9, the wife of 
Avni Salihu, an LDK leader in Dragas, was killed 
when a bomb was thrown down the chimney of the 
Salihu family home. On August 13, an Albanian 
gang attacked and seriously wounded an elderly 
Serb couple in the village of Kriljevo, near 
Kosovska Kamenica. On August 18, hand grenades 
were thrown at a group of Serb children playing 
basketball at an outdoor court in Crkvena Vodica, 
wounding over a dozen. Also on August 18, the 
Orthodox church in Vucitrn was destroyed, and a 
bomb exploded in a U.N. building in Pristina 
housing several international organizations. On 
August 19, the Orthodox church in Velika Reka 
was destroyed after being the target of five previous 
bombing attacks. On August 23, KFOR troops 
themselves came under attack when unknown 
assailants fired rifle grenades at the KFOR 
compound in Vucitrn. (The attack was believed to 
be in revenge for the killing of two Albanians by 
KFOR troops earlier in the month.) On August 27, 
an Albanian hit-and-run driver drove his vehicle 
into a group of children in the Serb village of 
Skulanevo (near Lipljan), killing one child and 
injuring several others. The same day, an 80 year- 
old Serb man was killed by a burst of machine-gun 
fire while tending his cattle in the village of 
Crkvena Vodica.
July wasn't much better. Neither was 
September.
Former KLA members (as well as members of 
its successor organization, the so-called “Kosovo 
Protection Force,” or KPC), are routinely involved 
in various criminal activities and violence.33 Under- 
NATO's watch the province has become the transit 
point for some 40 percent of the heroin sold in
Lor example, the arrest on August 23,d of Refki Sumen, a 
former KLA leader and currently a senior figure in the KPC, 
arrested on suspicion of being involved in extortion, 
smuggling, and homicide. "Kosovo Guerrilla Chief Arrested 
in Mafia Probe," Agence France Presse, 24 August 2000.
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Europe and North America?'1 In the first year of 
NATO’s occupation of the province, over 500 
murders were committed (the vast majority against 
Serbs and other ethnic minorities), yet what is 
euphemistically called a legal justice system in 
Kosovo had failed to return a single conviction?3 
KFOR and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) report that theft, blackmail and 
kidnapping in Kosovo increased 70 percent in 2000 
as compared with 1999?6 In the summer of 2000, 
KFOR troops discovered a list drawn up by the 
KLA's secret intelligence service to assassinate 
various politicians in both Kosovo and Albania. Of 
the fifteen people on the list, three had already been 
murdered?7 In January 2000, U.N. police raided the 
apartment of Hashim Thaci's brother and 
discovered DEM 500,000 in cash, the proceeds of 
various racketeering activities?8 As one senior U.S. 
Army officer described the new structure of power 
in Kosovo, “We call it a thugocracy. The mafia, the 
politicians and the so-called freedom fighters are all 
connected.”33 * * * * 38 9 And, of course, as has now become 
painfully evident, on NATO’s watch Kosovo has 
become a playground for terrorist groups intent on 
destabilizing all of the southern Balkans.
“Freedom of the press” in NATO's Kosovo 
also takes some disturbing forms. On April 27,
54 Sec Maggie O'Kane, "Kosovo Drug Mafia Supply Heroin 
to Europe," The Guardian Unlimited, 13 March 2000. Before 
the war, international police officials estimate two metric 
tons of heroin passed though Kosovo en route to Western 
markets monthly. Since NATO occupied Kosovo, the 
amount has increased to 4.5-5 metric tons monthly.
33 Steven Erlanger, “U.N. Official Warns of Losing the
Peace in Kosovo,” The New York Times, 3 July 2000, p. A3.
36 Nehat Islami, “Kosovo Crime Wave.” Institute for War
and Peace Reporting Balkan Crisis ReportYo. 210, 17 January 
2001.
57 Bota Sot (Pristina), 11 July 2000.
38 Lutz Kleveman, "Brothers in Arms Fall Out Over Spoils 
of Kosovo," The Electronic Telegraph, 12June 2000.
39 See Roberto Suro, "In Kosovo, an Uncertain Mission."
The Washington Post, 20 September 2000, p. A01. In what has 
become all-to-characteristic of the U.S. approach to the 
Balkans, rather than coming up with a policy to deal with 
these problems, officials in the Clinton Administration 
decided that the overriding priority in an election year was 
to keep Kosovo “off the front page.” Sec Jane Perlez,
“Spiral of Violence in Kosovo Divides U.S. and its Allies,” 
The New York Times, 12 March 2000, p. 1.
2000, a newspaper linked to Hashim Thaci accused 
a Serb working for UNMIK of being a war 
criminal, and published his photograph, address, 
and workplace. On May 14lh, the individual in 
question was stabbed to death. UNMIK's response 
was little more than a slap on the wrist, closing the 
paper in question for eight days. The editor of the 
paper immediately announced that it would 
continue to publish similar stories on individuals it 
had branded “war criminals.”60
Nor can NATO take credit for stopping ethnic 
cleansing. As Dennis McNamara, the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees’ special envoy to the 
Balkans, noted in March 2000,
The tragedy is we got nearly a million (ethnic Albanian) people 
back and a quarter of a million new ones (Serbs and other 
minorities) left ... It is a destabilising factor and it makes it 
difficult to see how, in regional terms, a stability pact for 
southeastern Europe, which is predicated on population 
stability, can go very far until we can deal with that refugee 
problem.61
Indeed, since June 1999 when NATO troops 
moved into Kosovo, we have witnessed what is 
perhaps the most comprehensive campaign of 
ethnic cleansing yet seen in the Balkans. During this 
NATO-monitored ethnic-cleansing over a quarter 
of a million people—Serbs, Roma, Turks, Gorani, 
Bosniacs, Croats, and the Jews of Pristina—have 
been driven from their homes. U.N. Secretary- 
General Kofi Annan has called the new ethnic 
cleansing of Kosovo "orchestrated," while a top
60 R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.N. Halts Publication of Kosovo 
Newspaper," The Washington Post, 4 June 2000, p. A22. See 
also Danica Krka, "Kosovo Media Practice Targeted," The 
Associated Press, 30 May 2000. Ironically, some Kosovo 
Albanian journalists now claim that their working conditions 
were better before the NATO intervention. As one 
journalist recently described the atmosphere of intimidation 
reporters are now working under, given KLA harassment, 
“Under the Serbs, you knew what to expect when you wrote 
something they didn’t like. They might come and beat you, 
trash the office, or throw you in jail, but that was part of the 
job, and you felt it was worth the risk. It was part of the 
struggle to end the repression. Now, with these hoods, you 
can’t predict what they will do. They might not even warn 
you, just come up and put a bullet in your head.” See Colin 
Soloway, “Intimidation Silences Pristina Media,” IWPR 
Balkan Cnsis Report Yo. 215, 6 February 2001.




U.S. official has labeled it "systematic."62 Perhaps 
the most serious rebuke of NATO's efforts, 
however, has come from Carla del Ponte, the chief 
prosecutor for the ICTY, who recendy claimed that 
“What is happening (in the Serbian province) is as 
serious as what happened before.”63 That is, what 
is happening in NATO's Kosovo is as serious as 
what happened in Milosevic's Kosovo.
Nevertheless, NATO officials need not worry 
that Madame del Ponte will turn her attentions on 
them because of Kosovo's current state, or because 
of their earlier violations of international law, or 
even because of the environmental destruction they 
are responsible for in the Balkans. As NATO 
spokesman Jamie Shea said during last year's war, 
"without NATO countries there would be no 
International Court of Justice, nor would there be 
any International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia because NATO countries are in the 
forefront of those who have established these two 
tribunals, who fund these tribunals and who 
support on a daily basis their activities.”64 Those 
who pay the piper, as they say, call the tune.
The Balkans’ “Depleted” Future
Gandhi once said that he would die for what he 
believed in, but he would never kill for it. 
“Operation Allied Force” turned Gandhi's belief 
most perversely on its head. While NATO 
countries were unwilling to risk the lives of their 
own “soldiers” to save the people they had 
allegedly gone to war to protect, they were more 
than willing to rain death and destruction on the 
region for the sake of “credibility.” As Noam 
Chomsky points out in his own typically incisive 
analysis of the Kosovo war, British operations 
during the conflict were code-named “Agricola.” 
Agricola, Chomsky reminds us, was the father-in- 
law of Tacitus, who once famously denounced
62 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Interim Administration in Kosovo," S/2000/538, 6 June
2000. The comments by the U.S. official, James O'Brien, can 
be found in George Jahn, "Anti-Serb Violence 
Condemned," The Associated Press, 8 June 2000.
<13 "U.N. Tribunal Awaiting Arrests of Suspects Karadzic, 
Mladic," Renters, 18 July 2000.
M Shea's remarks were made during a NATO Press 
Conference in Brussels on 17 May 2000.
ancient Rome's own military misadventures by 
saying, “Brigands of the world, they create a 
desolation and call it peace.”6’
History may well judge NATO's actions in the 
same light. Glenny concludes his book by noting 
that the morality of NATO's attack on Yugoslavia 
will ultimately be decided by the dedication of 
Western countries to the reconstruction of 
southeastern Europe (p. 661). Here we could pose 
the issue more broadly, and ask to what extent 
Western policy in the region over the past 
decade—characterized by such things as military 
interventions, economic sanctions, and the creation 
of dysfunctional protectorates—has lain the 
foundations for long-term peace and stability in the 
region. Will subsequent generations see the Dayton 
Peace Accords and Operation Allied Force as 
efforts that ultimately brought democracy and 
economic prosperity to the Balkans? Or will they be 
seen as only the latest in a long line of attempts by 
the Great Powers, going back to the Congress of 
Berlin and the Versailles Treaty, to satisfy their own 
interests, even at the sake of setting the stage for 
new conflicts in southeastern Europe?
In the Bosnian context, a view typical of the 
interventionist Western attitude towards the 
Balkans calls on “Bosnia’s Serbs, Bosniacs, and 
Croats... to move away from narrow ethnic politics 
and begin to move toward European integration.”66 
But has this been either the historical or the 
contemporary experience of Europe itself? The 
basis for Europe’s (somewhat successful) post- 
World War II efforts at political and economic 
integration has been based on the emergence of 
viable democratic nation-states enjoying a 
significant degree of popular legitimacy. As Ash 
describes this process,
. . . we in Western Europe have long since been molded into 
nation-states, in a process that lasted from the Middle Ages to
65 Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo 
(Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1999), p. 16.
“ Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles, op. cit., p. 2. 
This observation is not meant to advocate a partition of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Rather, it is meant to critique an all- 
too-common Western interventionist approach, which both 
ignores most of European history and often assumes a neo­




the early twentieth-century . . . It’s precisely on this basis of 
clear separation into nation-states that we have been getting 
together in the European Union, as well as becoming more 
ethnically mixed again, through immigration.61
Indeed, the results of the European Union’s 
Nice summit suggest that there are definite limits to 
the degree to which Europeans—that is, those 
outside the Balkans—are willing to integrate.67 8 But 
if the modern concept of “Europe” is the goal 
towards which the peoples of southeastern Europe 
should strive, can they reach this goal by ignoring 
the historical path that “Europe” itself took to get 
there? Logically, perhaps, yes, but no one seems to 
have the right map.
Finally, if the international community’s goal is 
to create stable democracies in southeastern 
Europe, then one would expect that international 
efforts would be geared towards fostering 
economic prosperity in the region. As the authors 
of a recent study note,
Pew concepts in political science have been as widely accepted 
(particularly in the Western world) as the idea that socio­
economic well-being is the crucial foundation of a sound 
democracy. The formation and growth of a middle class 
through robust economic development is considered to be the 
bulwark of democratic stability.69
But far from fostering economic growth in 
southeastern Europe, Operation Allied Force, and 
many other aspects of Western policy over the past 
decade, have set back the region by years, if not 
decades. One estimate of the cost of the NATO 
bombing campaign to NATO itself was $40 
billion.70 The G17 group of independent
67 Sec Ash, “Cry, the Dismembered Country,” p. 32
68 See, for instance, Mark Mazower, “Nice and the nation­
state,” The Financial Times (London), 21 December 2000, p. 
21. As Mazower points out, “The rise of the nation-state as 
the dominant form of polity on the continent-unimaginable 
even in 1850-was the basic story of the 20th century . . . the 
European nation state, born of war, having survived Hitler 
and the cold war . . . Jhasj revealed its ability to survive 
through adaptation once more.”
69 Stefano Bianchini and Marko Dogo, "Foreword," in The 
Balkans: National Identities in a Historical Perspective. Stefano 
Bianchini and Marco Dogo, eds. (Ravenna: Congo Editore, 
1998), p. 16.
70 Michael R. Scsit, "Cost of Kosovo War Could 1 lit S40
Billion," The Wall Street Journal, 29 July 1999, p. All.
economists in the FRY estimate that the NATO 
attacks resulted in an estimated $30 billion worth of 
damage to the FRY’s economy and infrastructure.71 
Contrast these figures with the annual UNMIK 
budget, which amounts to less than half of one- 
day's bombing.72
Nor was the FRY the only country in the region 
to suffer from Operation Allied Force; in fact, the 
economies of all seven countries of southeastern 
Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Macedonia, and the 
FRY) went into an economic recession after the 
Kosovo conflict.73 Western efforts to reconstruct 
the region, such as the “Stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe,” inaugurated with much 
fanfare in Sarajevo in July 1999, have been 
dismissed as being “little more than a photo- 
opportunity.”74 Not surprisingly, regional leaders 
have grown tired of Western promises of aid. 
Former Romanian President Emil Constantinescu 
summed up the thoughts of many when he claimed, 
“We really have had enough of your nice words, 
while you do nothing to stop our losses, which 
grow bigger each day.”7’
Now that the “evil leader” in Belgrade is finally 
gone and the Balkans are no longer front page
71 See “Ekonomske posledice NATO bombardovanja: 
procena stete i sredstava potrebnih za ekonomsku 
rekonstrukeiju Jugoslavije,” available at 
http://www.gl7plus.org.yu.
72 Misha Glenny, "The Muddle in Kosovo," The Wall Street 
Journal, 23 February 2000.
,3 Economic Survey of Europe, No. 1,2000 (Geneva: United 
Nations Economic Commission on Europe), p. 6.
74 The statement was made by Prof. Ivo Banac during a 
seminar at the Harriman Institute on 1 December 2000.
7’ Bianca Guruita, "The Price of Acquiescence," Transitions 
OnUne, 7 October 1999. One estimate of the cost of the 
international sanctions regime on the FRY to neighboring 
countries as of 1996 was S35 billion. See Unfinished Peace: 
Report of the Internationa! Commission on the Balkans 
(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
1996), p. 8. Given the catastrophic state of the Romanian 
economy, which can in part be attributed to the damage that 
Romania has incurred because of various Western policies, 
such as the sanctions regime imposed on the FRY, and the 
closing of the Danube (itself a result of NATO actions), it 
should not be surprising that a majority' of Romanian voters 
on 27 November 2000 cast their ballots for parties of either 
the extreme left or the extreme right.
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news, the region will soon become passe for all of 
the laptop bombardiers, indignant columnists and 
photo-op seeking politicians that Ash collectively 
calls the “something-must-be-done brigade.”76 
Indeed, top foreign policy advisors for the new U.S. 
administration are already calling for a decreased 
U.S. involvement in the Balkans. As the 
“something-must-be-done brigade” goes on to 
“save” other parts of the world, the peoples of 
southeastern Europe will again be left on their own 
to try to devise some formula for living side by
side, in the absence of war, at least, if not in peace 
and harmony. Unfortunately, after Operation Allied 
Force they will be that much poorer, and dealing 
with yet another tragic legacy of bloody foreign 
intervention.
Gordon N. Bardos is Program Officer at the Harriman 
Institute.
7tl See Ash, “Kosovo: Was it Worth It?” op. cit., p. 60.
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SEPARATISM AND UNIFICATION IN 
THE NEW WORLD ORDER
Evgeny Primakov Interviewed by Nina Khrushcheva
October 9, 2000: Interview with Evgeny Maksimovich Primakov, Member of the Russian State Duma, Leader of 
the Fatherland-All Russia Party, special presidential envoy to the conflict areas of Russia, former Prime Minister of 
the Russian Federation. Interview conducted by Rina Khrushcheva.
NIC: Today there is a lot of talk about 
separatism versus unification. How, in your 
opinion, would it be possible to bridge these 
two extremes?
EMP: Let me start with an overview of 
separatism, so it will be clear exacdy what we 
are talking about.
From the end of the last century the 
prevailing theory held that providing all 
nations with the right to self-determination 
would solve the national problem. This notion 
was fixed when it appeared in the UN 
Charter. Marxists were the “fathers” of this 
theory, and it was right until that time, when 
the national problem became associated with 
colonialism. Then, with the national problem 
existing in a separate state, with oppressive 
and oppressed nationalities within one 
country, it was possible to raise the question 
of separation solving the national problem, 
distinguishing between radical forms of 
separation and forms of separation that were 
too radical. The situation has changed. Two 
and a half thousand ethnicities, nations and 
nationalities live in approximately 150 nation­
states.
Can you imagine the chaos the world 
would find itself should separatism develop? 
That means that separatism now is not a 
problem of separate states, it is a problem of 
the whole world community, and in that 
regard we have to come forward decisively 
against separatism. Surely that does not mean 
that in those cases when all parties are for 
separation, for the creation of a 'new national
state, we should resist and keep them together 
against their will. But when one of the parties 
does not agree: either a separate ethos, or a 
nation which is willing to separate, or the 
states or nations from which they are willing 
to separate, in these cases, I suppose, fighting 
for separation is not the best solution.
Another point I would like to make 
concerns the dangers of separatism today, 
which has begun to merge with extremism. In 
the first instance, I have in mind Islamic 
extremism, and second, its association with 
international terrorism, which makes this 
whole mixture extremely dangerous. Or take, 
for example, religious extremism. Religious 
extremism, in fact, has little in common with 
religious fundamentalism. Fundamentalism, 
for example, for many years had been a 
natural phenomenon among Muslims who 
lived on the territory of the Soviet Union. 
They were pressured, because they could not 
build mosques, they could not perform their 
rituals, etc. In any case, even if it was not 
prohibited, it was not approved, so the rise of 
fundamentalism there had its grounds. It was 
objectively reasoned.
It is important to understand how Muslim 
fundamentalism differs from Islamic 
extremism. Islamic extremism preaches the 
necessity of spreading the Islamic model of 
power and the Islamic model of society across 
nations. I would like to stress, spreading their 
power across nations. Today this particular 
effort creates serious dangers and threats. It 
used to be a widespread notion that only Iran 
was engaged in promoting terrorism,
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extremism and separatism. I do not want to 
argue now that Iran did not do this. However, 
Iran is a Shiite state, and Shiites differ 
tremendously from other Muslims. Besides, 
Iran, for example, has little to do with the 
Sunnite extremism that is emerging today. 
Sunnism includes the Wahabi movement and 
other tendencies, which primarily come from 
Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been shaken for 
decades by violence and power struggles, and 
it shakes those countries around it. It is the 
state where Talibs and Taliban rule without 
hiding their beliefs. These beliefs are to spread 
Islamism to the neighbouring states by means 
of power. That is what separatism means.
NIC.: Take the Russian case, would you agree 
that one should not unite or divide parties that 
are desperate to be separated, unless there is a 
way to solve the problem via democracy? Is 
there a way to solve Russia’s problems, to help 
the nationalities within Russia in their desire 
to become independent, via democracy?
EMP: Of course there is. Moreover, I don’t 
think we really have any other striking 
examples besides Chechnya, where a part has 
a choice to either stay or leave, although, of 
course, ethnic conflicts do exist in other 
places too. And they will exist. The situation 
in the United States is different, where each 
state has a mixed population and nobody save 
Native Americans have historical origins in 
this or that area. But Russia is a different 
story. Let's look at the North Caucasus, for 
example. From the very beginning, much 
earlier than the Russians, many other 
nationalities and ethnic groups lived there. Or 
let's take Povolzhie (areas by the Volga River). 
There, too, ethnic groups and nations are very 
mixed. That is why, in my opinion, we have to 
solve all these problems democratically, 
providing necessary elements of cultural 
autonomy and assistance for the national self- 
expression of the nationalities which are 
subjects of the Russian Federation today. On 
the other hand, they should not get special 
economic treatment because of their ethnicity 
or nationahty. Why, for example, should 
Russian territories neighboring with Tatarstan
or Bashkortostan be worse off than those of 
the Tatar and Bashkir nationalities? So, the 
national support of one nation should not 
come at the expense of others.
NIC: And what about the nationalities that 
would now like to return to areas which were 
theirs historically, “by origin”? For example, 
the case of Crimean Tatars who want to take 
possession of lands they once owned?
EMP: In cases like that they have the option 
of returning individually. Even if we admit 
(and we admit fully) that historical injustices 
and historical crimes took place when many 
nationalities were moved away from their 
lands involuntarily, we have to be reahstic. 
During the time that has passed since those 
crimes (about half a century now), these lands 
have been peopled by others. It would be 
unfair to evict those who live there now, 
because it would be a repetition of the same 
mistakes fifty years later. We may encourage 
them, when they are able, to buy out pieces of 
land or to settle in other places, but again to 
evict one group and return others in its place 
would be unfair. Or take the Chechen auls— 
originally many were the Cossacks 
setdements. During the Revolution many of 
those Cossack setdements were occupied by 
highlanders, because many Cossacks faught 
against Bolsheviks. But after the revolution, 
as a rule, many pro-Bolshevik ethnicities were 
encouraged to take the lands of those 
ethnicities that were against the revolution. So 
in reality, many auls now stand on Cossack 
land. However, it would be wrong to evict the 
Chechens now to restore the Cossack 
settlements.
NI<: Tliis problem, obviously, should be 
solved by today’s measures, finding options 
and possibilities to enable them to live their 
lives according to the present reality. But how 
can we do that practically and to the 
satisfaction of all?
EMP: Undoubtedly, it’s a difficult problem. It 
must be done by democratic means, which 
eventually should lead to the situation, where
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people have to find peaceful ways of living 
together and adjusting to one other; restoring 
some relations that they used to have, and not 
making those relationships antagonistic. 
There is no other option.
Today we can't really decide to evict 
someone in favor of some else and then 
destroy their monuments. We will get the 
same results we had after 1917 and 1991. We 
will do the same unfair things that we did 
before. Everyone who is calling for the 
“restoration of justice” by destructive means 
is creating a new injustice. And one should 
not do that.
NK: You mentioned the Islamic religion. I 
would like to ask you about the Christian and 
Muslim religions. As always, the Orthodox 
Church argues with the Vatican, insisting on 
its own uniqueness, while Muslims unite and 
become stronger and stronger.
EMP: On the whole, Christians are not killing 
each other, they are not really fighting. And 
the Orthodox have their reasons to be 
concerned—they disapprove of Catholic 
attempts to implant their religion in places 
where the Orthodox Church already has some 
roots. So most disagreements come from this. 
But this is not life-threatening for either party.
NI<: Don’t you think that Islamic countries 
uniting presents a danger and that this is 
taking place too close to the southern 
boarders of the former Soviet Union? In 
Tajkistan, for example, and other southern 
areas close to Afghanistan. Not far from 
Russia. Is there a danger for Russia?
EMP: I do not think that the confrontation is 
between Islam and Christianity here. Let us 
take the former Central Asian republics of the 
former Soviet Union, currently Central Asian 
states. When a wave of extremism comes 
from Afghanistan, the fights are not between 
the Christians and the Muslims; the fights are 
between the Islamic extremists and regular 
Muslims for the sacred or secular type of the 
state.
NK: Many in Russia say that there is a 
possible threat for the Orthodox Church if it 
is unable to resist either the Muslim dangers 
or the Vatican pressures.
EMP: No, Orthodoxy is not in danger.
NK: Now a question concerning the Arab- 
Palestinian conflict, which does not seem to 
be ending any time soon. How do you 
estimate the conflict escalation in the Middle 
East? What should we expect? Will it be 
solved one day?
EMP: There is a very dangerous development 
now in that part of the world. Mainly, I think 
it is Israel’s fault. Israel has been holding a 
pretty tough position, trying to impose all its 
conditions on the Palestinians. Because of 
this, signing the peace agreement has been 
delayed and delayed. Americans, in their turn, 
have monopolized the process, trying to base 
everything on the upcoming elections in the 
United States in November [2000]. Russia has 
been practically isolated, despite the fact that 
we could exert a positive influence on both 
sides. We could have done a lot. A lot of 
frustration has arisen because of these 
conditions, again on all sides! This frustration, 
in fact, can be threatening, as the situation has 
gotten even more complicated with some 
religious issues. You see, it is painful for both 
sides, for example, when Sharon appears on 
land that Palestinians believe belongs to them, 
land on which they have mosques and sacred 
objects. No doubt, he did so to make a point, 
but he shouldn't have. Why should he 
demonstrate his power, insisting that he can 
solve all problems by means of that power? It 
creates bad energy and provokes a negative 
reaction, which often leads to irreversible 
results. And then we complain that the Arabs 
are violent. Both Palestinians and Arabs 
certainly have extremists among them, so we 
would be wise not give them a reason to be 
violent.




EMP: Russia is already playing a more active 
role. While we are having this interview, the 
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivanov, is 
in the Middle East. He is trying to smooth the 
situation, to influence both sides. Much work 
has been done to persuade Palestinians to 
delay the unilateral declaration of their state. 
We have a very constructive position, which is 
designed to help them to come to a 
compromise. The United States, however, 
thinks that because Russia is trying to smooth 
the edges it is actually up to something. 
Funny, isn't it?
It was the same situation, by the way, with 
Russia’s position towards Iran and Saddam 
Hussein. Russia, then the Soviet Union, had a 
certain position towards those countries, and 
because of the Cold War tliis position was, 
understandably, in opposition to the position 
of the United States. When the Cold War was 
over, Russia could have worked together with 
America to smooth the situation. There were 
even very positive signs of cooperation during 
the Gulf War. However, Russia was not given 
a real chance, always lagging behind in the 
American view, always doubted, asked to 
prove, explain and justify itself. After 10 years 
it is obvious that such a shortsighted approach 
on the part of the United States has damaged 
the world situation in respect to those states.
NIC: A question concerning Israel or rather 
the example of Israel. Is it possible to solve 
the Kurd problem the same way that, in 1948, 
the question of Israel was decided, by giving 
them the land and the state?
EMP: I am afraid, not. First, Kurds live in 
several states. They live in Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
some Kurds live in Russia, and they do not in 
any way represent a united power. For 
example, during the Iran-Iraq war the Iranian 
Kurds could not unite with the Iraqi Kurds, 
and in the end the Iranians fought against 
their government for Saddam Hussein. The 
Iraqi Kurds fought against Saddam Hussein 
but for Iran's government, i.e., Kurds were 
fighting on two different sides. That is, it is
impossible to solve tliis problem a la the 
“Palestinian war.”
NIC: Another question, tliis time about 
Yugoslavia. You recently said in a private 
conversation, “What can Milosevic do? Fie 
has to leave.” And the next day he agreed and 
acknowledged the election results. Had you 
already known that he would have to leave 
power? What is his fate? Will the Balkans calm 
down one day or not?
EMP: Common sense, really. It was very 
important for Milosevic to accept liis defeat as 
quickly as possible. Milosevic, however, is not 
the core of the problem. In fact, some 
Western politicians contributed to the 
Yugoslav problem without a clear 
understanding of where it might lead. What 
has happened in Yugoslavia now is not the 
end. Why? Because Montenegro, for example, 
would be tough to crack.
NIC: Will it separate?
EMP: The President of Montenegro [Milo 
Djukanovic] just announced that it would be a 
different federation, as they might try to 
separate. If they do, the fate of President 
ICostunitsa is not clear. He is supposed to be 
the President of Yugoslavia, but there will be 
no Yugoslavia. Besides, they already have a 
President in Serbia [Milan Milutinovic]. 
Another problem is that the newly-elected 
president will have to deal with the situation 
in Kosovo, which NATO and its politics have 
lead down a blind alley. It is absolutely unclear 
what will come out of this situation. The 
Army of the so-called Albanian Liberation is a 
terrorist organization right now, and the 
Americans, by the way, have said so 
themselves. Then they changed their mind by 
180 degrees as they understood that they are 
real terrorists. Albanians want to separate. I 
don't quite believe that President 
ICostunitsa—a Serb—will want to assist 
Kosovo’s secession from Yugoslavia. In fact, 
it actually could have been easier to solve 
many problems with Miloshevich. Fie comes 
from the right, and therefore has no fear of
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the strikes from the right. We [the Soviet 
Union] always had much better relations with 
the Americans, for example, when 
Republicans were in power.
NI<: The Yugoslav problem, then, is not a 
Milosevic problem, and you think Kostunitsa 
knows it.
EMP: The Yugoslavia shake-up is still far 
from over.
NK: Now Belarus and Russia.
EMP: I am a very' strong supporter of 
bringing them together, uniting and creating 
one state in the end. I think it would be 
beneficial for us, for Belorussians and for 
other nationalities who lived in the former 
Soviet Union.
NI<: Why?
EMP: I do not agree with those who consider 
that union with Belarus will hinder Russia. 
During the Soviet era, Belarus was “assembly 
shop” for the Soviet republics. That is, a 
republic with good intellectual resources and 
hardworking manpower. This republic does 
not possess as many natural resources as 
Russia, but it is self-sufficient. And moreover, 
the same historical origins bind us together. 
Wiry should we live in two different states, 
especially, if the people, and not just small 
groups from both sides, want it?
NK: You mean, union with Russia is not 
simply Lukashenka’s idea.
EMP: Absolutely not. If a referendum were 
held right now, most people would vote for 
unification. Besides, Lukashenko does not 
think that it has to happen immediately, 
without serious deliberation. ITis objectives 
are to secure Belorussian independence, 
while at the same time developing closer ties 
with Russia. And we agree with him. By the 
way, it took Western Europe a long time to 
reach an agreement on the common currency, 
and it's still not completely finalized. Denmark
had a referendum, and although the state is an 
EU member, the common currency was not 
approved. These processes are very 
complicated,, and the main point is that we 
must move forward toward unification. Then, 
perhaps, Ukraine too will want closer ties.
NK: Is Russia satisfied with Lukashenka as 
President of Belarus, since he supports 
unification?
EMP: What does it mean—satisfied or not 
satisfied? If the Belorussians are satisfied with 
him, he should satisfy us as well. The majority 
of Belorussians support him. There are going 
to be elections there soon [October 15, 2000] 
and I am sure they will be democratic. He 
promised that, and that is true—absolutely all 
parties participate in the election process. 
They can also have their observers at the 
voting districts. They have the right to count 
or recount votes and provide their own report 
of the results. Two of Lukashenka’s rivals are 
under investigation right now, but they are 
official candidates and they will participate in 
the elections. When I met with him recently, 
he told me that he would like them to run for 
election, so no one can claim that it was not a 
democratic election.
NK: It would not be the same sort of 
elections as those that just took place in 
Yugoslavia, that is, with unclear results?
EMP: No. In Yugoslavia, believe me, it was 
not that bad either. In every country', I assure 
you, there are always a few instances of 
election fraud. I think the Yugoslav 
opposition made a major mistake. It was 
necessary to have a second round of voting 
there. Then no one could have said the 
elections were not legitimate, and they would 
have certainly won the second round. A 10 
percent difference would be more than 
sufficient in the second round to prove their 
victor)'. If the re-elections had taken place 
within one week or so, the situation would not 
have changed a bit, and the results would have 
been more than just legal.
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NI<: And, if I may, I would like to ask you 
one last question about the fate of Russians 
living in other states. They have been Russians 
all their lives, they represented a big powerful 
state, and now they are citizens of states that 
are not always favorable to the Russians. 
How does the government plan to help them, 
if it does at all?
EMP: We ought to help them. First, of 
course, we should not push them to leave 
those “other states.” Why should we lose our 
influence in this manner, I mean cultural and 
so on? And then, it is necessary to assure that 
their legal situation is stable, that they are not 
treated as second-class citizens. We are doing 
a lot through our governmental channels and, 
in my assessment, we do a good job in this 
regard. If we continue working in this 
direction, both the countries where they live, 
and the Russian people in those countries, will
be loyal to each other. At the same time we 
face a very important problem: 25 million 
Russians stayed in the republics of the former 
Soviet Union after its collapse. Surely, if some 
of them want to return we would like them to 
go to places other than Moscow in order to 
populate those parts of Russia that are not 
sufficiendy populated, such as, for example, 
the Ural area, where the total population is 
only 18 million. I think if we provide 
emigrants with good enough living conditions 
and reasonable comfort they will to go to 
these areas. The United States became great 
after they populated their virgin lands.
NK: Thank you.
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